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Synopsis 
The nature of human decision making dictates that a decision must often be consid-
ered under conditions of uncertainty. Decisions may be influenced by uncertain future 
events, doubts regarding the precision of inputs, doubts as to what the decision maker 
considers important, and many other forms of uncertainty. The multicriteria deci-
sion models that are designed to facilitate and aid decision making must therefore 
consider these uncertainties if they are to be effective. In this thesis, we consider the 
treatment of uncertainty in multicriteria decision making (MCDM), with a specific 
view to investigating 
• the types of uncertainty that are most relevant to MCDM, 
• how the uncertainties identified as relevant may be treated by various different 
MCDM methodologies. 
We address the first of these objectives as part of the literature survey conducted in 
chapter 2. We identify three key categories of uncertainty. 
1. Risk, relating to uncertainty about uncertain future states of the world. 
2. Imprecision, relating to uncertainty about the accuracy of inputs to the decision 
problem. 
3. Vagueness, relating to uncertainty about the scope and design of the decision 
problem. 
In the latter stages of chapter 2 we briefly consider the use of fuzzy sets as a model of 
imprecision, and the modelling of vagueness using the theory of rough sets. In chap-
ter 3 we present a literature survey focusing on the treatment of risk in each of the 
value function, outranking, and metric MCDM schools. We emphasise in particular 
the use of a small number of state scenarios as a treatment of risk, arguing that the 
resulting scenario-based approaches offer an integrated view of risk modelling within 
the MCDM framework, and facilitate a deeper exploration of the set of uncertain 
outcomes by the decision maker. We conclude chapter 3 and the literature survey 
with a summary of important research questions. 
We then select three of those research questions for closer investigation in the re-
mainder of the thesis, using a simulation model in the context of the value function 
methods. The questions considered are: 
1. Can the 'ignoring' of uncertainty by simplification strategies be justified? 
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2. Do non-idealities known to occur in practice significantly affect the results under 
conditions of risk? 
3. To what extent do results differ depending on how many scenarios are chosen 
and what scenario selection policies are used? 
In chapter 4 we describe the structure and implementation of the simulated value 
function approach. We consider the simulation of an additive utility model taking 
into account the full range of uncertain outcomes, two models based on using expected 
attribute values as inputs to an additive utility model, and four scenario-based models 
differing only in the way that the scenarios are selected. The relative success of each 
model can be investigated by comparison to the results achieved by a multiplicative 
utility model based on an idealised preference structure. The chapter concludes by 
briefly proposing how similar investigations may be conducted in the context of each 
of the outranking and metric methodologies. 
The results of simulating different value function methods are presented in three ex-
periments making up Chapter 5. The experiments are demarcated in order to focus 
in the first experiment purely on the use of scenarios in value function modelling, 
and then investigate the interaction between the use of scenarios and certain practi-
cal non-idealities introduced in the latter two experiments. The second experiment 
investigates the effects of errors in the assessment of criterion weights and scenario 
relative likelihoods, while the final experiment investigates the effects of criterion 
omissions, independence violations, shifts in reference levels and piecewise modelling 
of marginal utility functions. The chapter concludes with a post hoc evaluation of the 
simulation structure presented in chapter 4. 
The final chapter is dedicated to the identification of conclusions and recommenda-
tions for future research. The key conclusions from among those discussed are: 
1. the danger inherent in using a scenario-based model has been understated in 
the literature, and results can be poor if the approach is applied uncritically. 
In particular, the notion of diversity as a basis for scenario selection needs 
to be more closely investigated for scenario planning and MCDM to be more 
meaningfully integrated. 
2. a simplification of the modelled preference structure appears to have less severe 
consequences for the integrity of results than a simplification of the modelled 
stochastic structure. 
3. the use of a model employing expected attribute values can produce good results 
if the expected attribute values are closely approximated. However, the danger 
exists that if the expected values are not closely approximated, the results are 
extremely poor. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background to the Problem 
The nature of human decision making has over time attracted and fascinated a 
far wider group than the mathematicians, operations researchers, psychologists and 
economists which today make up most of the field of multiple criteria decision making 
(MCDM). The questions of how we do and, what is usually a different matter, should 
make decisions are of sufficient scale and scope to provide a home to a multitude of 
disciplines. 
Of course much of human decision making must be made under conditions of un-
certainty. Although as we shall see later the notion of uncertainty is often used as 
a loosely defined umbrella-term for a number of more specific concepts, intuitively 
we recognise it as an epistemic condition indicating a lack of accuracy, confidence or 
precision. Inasmuch as reality can be considered an infinitely detailed construct inca-
pable of being fully comprehended by humans (for example, [105]), all decisions can 
be considered to be subject to conditions of uncertainty. The task of those developing 
and applying MCDM models is therefore 'to look for precision in each class of 
just as far as the nature of the subject admits' [91]. 
The freedom of interpretation permitted by the previous quote is evident in the diverse 
development of MCDM models. Nevertheless it is also a frequent cause of concern 
that the different emphases implicit in various methodologies give rise to different re-
sults. The nature of MCDM is that it provides support and structure for exploration 
rather than hard solutions to the problem, and as such the different solutions can 
viewed as realisations of the different aspects explored and the different languages of 
exploration. However, it is important that those aspects of the problem emphasised 
by the various methodologies are known and appreciated, and in particular 
which aspects of the decision problem each methodology is most sensitive to. This 
has sometimes been missing from methodological developments in MCDM. 
1 
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1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Within the field of MCDM, a specific form of decision is specified that is nevertheless 
sufficiently general to encompass a wide range of problems. The problem context 
involves a decision maker (DM) who must consider a choice of action given a number 
of alternatives. This choice is governed by a set of objectives, usually conflicting in 
any non-trivial problem, that are used as means for evaluating the alternatives. The 
resolution of this conflict through the progression to a final choice lies at the core of 
MCDM, but encompasses many aspects. Firstly, there is the considerable problem of 
identifying the appropriate alternatives and objectives, or structuring the problem. 
Then, we need to construct a suitable model not only to provide a solution to the 
problem, but also to facilitate the DM gaining meaningful insight into the decision 
context, the choices available, and his or her own preferences. Lastly, the information 
and insight obtained using the model needs to be interpreted and implemented in a 
meaningful way that serves the original aims of the decision analysis. 
The construction of a model depends on the evaluation of how the alternatives perform 
on the various objectives, so that these performances may be weighed up against each 
other in progression to a resolution. The problem therefore becomes considerably 
more difficult when those evaluations cannot be specified with precision; that is, they 
are uncertain. In such a case not only must we construct a decision model, but we 
need to accommodate the uncertain evaluations in some manner. Moreover, the two 
aspects are not independent of each other. 
The overarching problem can therefore be simply stated: that the performances 
of the alternatives are not known with certainty, how should we go about constructing 
a decision model? 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
are four main objectives which are the subject of this study 
1. To investigate what aspects of uncertainty are relevant to MCDM. 
2. To investigate how the uncertainties identified as relevant are treated by various 
different MCDM methodologies. 
3. To investigate interrelationships between the modelling of the uncertainty as-
pects and the multiple criteria aspects of the decision problem. 
4. To highlight ways in which the methodologies identified by objective 2 might 
be improved based on the implications of objective 3. 
2 
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1.4 Limitations of the Study 
• In general we consider that the aim of the decision analysis is to place the 
alternatives in a (not necessarily complete) rank order, that is we assume the 
ranking problematique [75]. We therefore exclude from consideration several 
alternate problematiques (see [7]), although the methods are in general similar 
and would require only minor modifications. 
• We adopt the conventional but often-criticised assumption that the problem 
context has been structured so that the starting point is a well-defined decision 
table. We therefore ignore important issues such as defining sets of alternatives 
and criteria, and isolating the decision problem from its broader environment. 
The full decision process is described in, for example, [7] and [75]. 
• Although we initially identify three categories of uncertainty relevant to MCDM, 
the interests of time and resource savings we pursue in detail only uncertainty 
relating to the physical randomness of future events. Investigations into the 
other two types of uncertainty are limited to brief discussions of the key issues 
in each. 
• We also initially present the three MCDM methodologies of value function, out-
ranking and metric methods. A simulated approach to decision making under 
uncertainty was only performed for the value function methods. The value func-
tion methods were chosen on the basis that their axiomatic foundations allowed 
a simulation model to be constructed relatively quickly and easily, based on 
extending existing work done by Stewart [86J. Proposed simulation approaches 
and issues are presented for the other methodologies. It is hoped that these 
approaches will be implemented in the future. 
• A final limitation is the reliance on simulation approaches to achieve objectives 
3 and 4. Although many of the issues are best suited to behavioural studies, 
this is neither in the time or cost framework of the current study. This obvi-
ously influences the aspects chosen for closer investigation; we postpone a more 
detailed discussion until chapter 4. 
1.5 Plan of Development of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 pre..'lents the three dominant MCD::Vl methodologies from a deterministic 
context. The deterministic framework is both conceptually easier and more developed 
than its uncertain counterpart, and so provides a natural starting point for any fur-
ther investigation. Then, we structure a formal view on the uncertainty that we wish 
to consider further, providing a working definition and identifying three categories 
of uncertainty that are relevant to MCDM. A morphological framework for decision 
making under uncertainty is provided before we briefly consider the issues around two 
3 
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of these categories, leaving the third to a more detailed investigation in chapter 3. 
Chapter 3 presents the current state-of-the-art in the treatment of decision problems 
where the performances of the alternatives are dependent on unknown future events. 
The chapter concludes with a review of those issues identified as significant during 
the chapter, and attempts to structure them into a suitable framework for subsequent 
solution. 
Chapter 4 begins with the selection of the key research questions to be considered 
in the remainder of the thesis. A brief introduction to simulation in MCDM is then 
provided, followed by an explanation as to why this mode of investigation was chosen 
for this study. It then describes in detail the simulation approach used in the re-
mainder of the thesis to study the value function method, and provides two proposed 
simulation approaches that may be useful in future studies of outranking and metric 
methods. 
Chapter 5 presents the results of the simulation approach outlined in chapter 4, fol-
lowing which the final chapter makes conclusions and recommendations by drawing 
together the results of the simulation study and important aspects arising from the 
literature survey. 
1.6 Terminology and Preliminary Notation 
"We make extensive use of the following basic MCDM features: 
Alternative: Implicit in any decision is a choice between various courses of action. 
The set of alternatives is made up of the possible courses of action facing the 
DM. Usually we refer to a discrete set of explicitly identified alternatives, al-
though in some circumstances the alternatives are defined implicitly in terms 
of a set of constraints. 
Criterion: A criterion is a basis or dimension on which the alternatives may be 
compared and judged. We refer without loss of generality to criteria in the 
increasing sense only more is always preferred. 
Attribute: Often criteria may be fairly esoteric notions (comfort, employee satisfac-
tion). An attribute is a well-defined measure of performance associated with 
each criterion that may be used to unambiguously rank the alternatives accord-
ing to the aspect identified by the relevant criterion. 
Decision Variable: When the alternatives are implicitly defined by constraints, 
they are expressed in terms of a number of unknown variables for which the 
4 
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DM must make a decision. Combinations of these decision variables can there-
fore be considered to be alternatives from which the DM must decide the most 
favourable option. 
Objective: Objectives, like attributes, are measures of performance that may be 
used to judge performance. However, they are continuous analogues of at-
tributes, defined in terms of decision variables. 
vVe to a set of n alternatives indexed by i E {I, ... , n}, and a set of m criteria 
indexed by j E {I, ... , m}. Each criterion is associated with an underlying attribute, 
so that by we denote the evaluation of alternative i on criterion j. It is often useful 
to think of these evaluations in the framework of an n x m 'decision table' z. vVhen 
referring to specific alternatives in the full set, we typically refer to alternatives a and 
b, and denote their evaluations on criterion j as zj(a) and zj(b). In the continuous 
framework, the set of r decision variables is represented by {Xl, ... , x r }, while objec-
ti ves are referenced in the same way as criteria, using j E {I, ... , m}. The Zij will in 
this case be represented as a linear weighted sum of the decision variables. 
The may be deterministic or stochastic. Where they are stochastic, we associate 
with each random variable Zij a probability density function fij (Zij) and a cumula-
tive probability distribution Fij(Zij), which we abbreviate as ii) and Fij respectively. 
When we refer to specific alternative a on criterion j we break from the convention 
above and denote the probability distributions faj and Faj · 
Scenario: We consider the Zij as random variables, so that there is in principal a 
single multivariate probability distribution governing the joint realisation of all 
the Zij' Each realisation of this multidimensional random variable corresponds 
to a potential future state of the world, so that the underlying form of the 
distribution is likely to be extremely complex and unattainable from a practi-
cal perspective. We therefore make no attempt to specify the full multivariate 
probability distribution, but rather seek only to characterise it using a small 
number of potential realisations or states, which we term the scenarios. The 
term 'scenario' is thus used consistently with the scenario planning literature 
(e.g. [96]) to refer to an internally consistent future state of the world, although 
we extend this definition to include a precise probabilistic interpretation. Al-
though we do not make an explicit assumption about the characteristics of these 
scenarios, they will in general be constructed either as (incomplete) 'snap-shots' 
of a future state, or a plausible evolution from the present state into the future. 
We refer to the set of scenarios using the index k, k E {I, ... ,pl. We then write the 
consequences of scenario k for alternative i on criterion j as Zijk. When referring to 
a specific alternative a the notation becomes Zjk(a) as before. 
5 
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Chapter 2 
Introducing Uncertainty into 
MCDM 
2.1 Introduction to Deterministic MCDM 
Let us assume that the decision process has progressed through the problem structur-
ing pha.se to arrive at a set of n alternatives for closer evaluation, as well as a set of 
m criteria. Each of these criteria is associated with an underlying attribute, allowing 
for the evaluation of the performance of alternative i on criterion j to be represented 
by an attribute value Zij. We assume in this section that we know precisely the Zij, 
and assemble these evaluations an n x m decision table, z. 
2.1.1 Value Function Methods 
The value function methods aim to structure and subsequently exploit a function 
V that will associate with each alternative a real number such that for any two 
alternatives a and b, 
a'rb 
arvb 
V(a) > V(b) 
V(a) V(b), 
(2.1) 
(2.2) 
where a 'r b means that a is preferred to b, and a rv b indicates indifference between a 
and b. Although assumptions of completeness and transitivity guarantee the existence 
of V(·), the simplification of this so-called value function is of paramount importance 
from the practical perspective of ease of use and understanding. An additive represen-
tation V(a) = 2.:7=1 wjvj(a), where vj(a) is an abbreviation vj(zj(a)), is possible if 
preferences between two alternatives can be expressed without recourse to the level 
of the criteria for which evaluations are equal. This condition is termed preferential 
independence. 'Within the resulting marginal value functions, the framework of value 
tradeoffs is employed as a vehicle for strength of preference information. The question 
essentially asked is 'How much of attribute 1 is required to compensate for a fixed 
6 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
decrease in attribute 2?'. It is this tradeoff issue that is explicitly formalised in the 
value function methods. 
Intra-criterion Information 
The elicitation of value scores is a constructive exercise in elucidating often murky 
thought patterns and value judgements from the DM, and is a cornerstone of the 
learning aspect of the value function methods. Four broad elicitation approaches are 
possible: 
1. The explicit definition of a marginal value function for each attribute, either 
over the set of real alternatives or a broader hypothetical set encompassing, for 
example, concepts of best- and worst-possible performance. 
2. The construction of an underlying qualitative value scale, examples of which 
are the Likert and Beaufort scales, again over either a real or hypothetical set 
of alternatives. 
3. A direct rating the value of each alternative, usually by referring to perfor-
mance relative to the best- and worst-performing alternatives. 
4. By inference from a set of pairwise strength of preference evaluations, as in the 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) developed by Saaty [78]. 
Generally, the values on each criterion are standardised, for example by assigning a 
value of 0 to the worst alternative (real or hypothetical) and 100 to the best. 
additive form of the value function implies an interval scaling for the attribute values. 
The selection of a zero point on the value scale is in many cases arbitrary, being set 
at either the worst performance among a set of alternatives or a perceived worst-case. 
As such it is only the ratios of differences between attribute values that have an ab-
solute meaning. The choice of elicitation approach obviously has enormous practical 
implications for both the elicitation process and the progression of the analysis, well 
beyond the scope of this introduction; these issues are dealt with in [7]. 
Inter-criterion Information 
When constructing value scores, the performance evaluations took place within each 
criterion separately. Naturally not all criterion can be considered equal - some may 
be more important than others, so that a weight may be assigned to each criterion. 
Although the precise meaning of 'importance' is often difficult to pin down, the use of 
value function methods implies a very specific interpretation for the criterion weights. 
Essentially the weights are scaling constants indicating the relative value of swings 
between two standardised points on the value function, example a swing from 
worst to best performance. The decision maker is required to identify the criteria in 
which a swing from worst to best is most highly valued, and then judge the value of 
similar 0 100 swings on the other criteria, using the favoured criterion as a reference. 
7 
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This is known as the swing-weight interpretation, and clearly eneompasses the range 
of the attribute values on a partieular eriterion as well as more esoteric notions of 
'importanee' . 
Aggregation and Exploitation 
The global value scores are easily obtained from the additive form once the scores 
and weights have been eomputed, so that the global rank ordering of the alternatives 
follows trivially. These results are advoeated as a meehanism for further diseussion 
and learning, as well as possible restructuring where the various issues surrounding 
the sensitivity analysis that this is appropriate. 
Why Use a Value Function Approach? 
The use of a value function approach does require eomplianee with some fairly strong 
behavioural assumptions, at least in principle. ·Where the DM is comfortable with 
these constraints, no other MCDM approaeh provides as structured a framework 
for the investigation of and tradeoffs. This structure, partkular the 
formality and simplicity of the eriterion weights and additive aggregation, is likely to 
be invaluable in facilitating a deeper understanding of the problem. Essentially the 
model is simple enough to be considered to 'run in the baekground' while freeing the 
DM to eonsider only the tradeoff at hand. Unfortunately it is this simplification 
which is the biggest potential pitfall of the value function methods. Where the DM is 
not comfortable with the underlying assumptions, but nevertheless uses the methods, 
a decision may be 'forced' out of the DM. In sueh eases there is an inevitable question 
as to whether 'the final decision is justified by the characteristks of the problem or 
by the mathematical properties of the method' [98]. The value function approach 
is therefore ideal for direct use with the DM in the interactive environment of a 
workshop, with the strong proviso that the DM is eomfortable with the behavioural 
assumptions implied by the model. 
2.1.2 Outranking Methods 
The outranking methods aim at constructing a preference relation over the set of alter-
natives such that alternative a outranks alternative b if there are sufficient arguments 
to support the assertion that 'a is at least as good as b', and no arguments of sufficient 
strength to refute this assertion. The aim is intentionally rather vague, which allows 
interpretations as to what constitutes sufficient supporting and negating argu-
ments. The outranking relation is applied directly to the underlying attribute values, 
without recourse to an intermediary such as a value function. This releases the out-
ranking approaeh from the requirements of eompleteness and transitivity. This is a 
fundamental feature of the outranking methods: it is maintained that ~1CDM is a 
eonstruetive process that should not impose on a DM the demand of deeisiveness. 
An additional possible outeome of the decision analysis is therefore incomparability, 
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which covers the situation where a lack of information or inadequately-formed prefer-
ences preclude either strict preference or indifference. Any further characterisation of 
the outranking relation, particularly axiomatically, is a difficult and ongoing research 
problem [9, 98]. 
Intra-criterion Information 
The construction of the outranking relation relies on the formalisation of the support-
ing and negating arguments discussed earlier. Although the different formalisations 
give rise to several different outranking methods, two common features are indices 
measuring concordance and discordance. The concordance Cj (a, b) builds up 
the evidence supporting the statement that a outranks b on criterion j, while the 
discordance index dj (a, b) provides evidence against the assertion. Discordance takes 
the form of a veto, so that if a performs far worse than b on even one criterion, then 
one may not say that a outranks b, regardless of the information on the other criteria. 
Discordance lends a strongly non-compensatory element to outranking methods 
good performance on one criterion does not necessarily trade off bad performance 
on another criterion. It requires the specification of a veto threshold t} by the DM, 
representing the smallest interval [Zj (a), Zj (b) J, where Zj (a) ::::; Zj (b), which is sufficient 
to refuse the assertion that a outranks b. We define the criterion-wise concordance 
and discordance indices for two outranking methods that will be referred to again 
later in the study . 
• ELECTRE I: A criterion j is included in the aggregation of the global concor-
dance measure if zj(a) ~ (b), that is 
{
I if zj(a) ~ zj(b), 
o otherwise. 
A criterion j is considered to be discordant if zj(a) + t} ::::; zj(b), that is 
(a) + tj ::::; zj(b), {Ol if otherwise. 
These specifications are also used the ELECTRE II method . 
(2.3) 
(2.4) 
• ELECTRE III: The concordance and discordance measures are extended into a 
fuzzy environment by the introduction of two D::\1-specified thresholds addi-
tion to the veto threshold tj defined earlier: an indifference threshold t; and a 
strong preference threshold t~, which also may depend on zj(a). Concordance 
is then calculated as 
1 if zj(a) + t~ ~ zj(b), 
zj(b) - (zj(a) + t~) 
ti. tP 
J J 
if (a) + tj ::::; zj(b) ::::; zj(a) + t~, (2.5) 
o if (b) ~ (a) + t~. 
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Similarly the discordance measure dj ( a, b) is given by 
o 
zj(b) - (zj(a) + 
t1f -J 
1 
Inter-criterion Information 
if zj(a) + t; ;:::: zj(b), 
if zj(a) + t; ::; zj(b) ::; zj(a) + tj, 
if zj(b) ;:::: zj(a) + tj. 
(2.6) 
The aggregation of the criterion-wise measures of concordance and discordance into 
corresponding global measures naturally requires some form of weighting procedure. 
However, the non-compensatory aspect of the outranking methods means that the 
swing-weight interpretation is inappropriate. The weight on each criterion is viewed 
as 'the number of votes' allocated to that criterion in the vote to test the assertion 
that alternative a outranks b. This is most clearly seen in the context of a 'pure' non-
compensatory approach such as ELECTRE I. For the more sophisticated outranking 
methods, the weights are partly numbers of votes and partly tradeoffs, in the regions 
where the methods are non-compensatory and compensatory respectively (see [98] for 
further details). In the absence of definitive operational and behavioural interpreta-
tions the criterion weights may end up being judged on notions of 'importance' that 
are known to be fairly arbitrary. vVe again examine the two outranking methods . 
• ELECTRE I: The global concordance measure is computed as 
,\:",m w-c-(a b) C(a, b) = L....tJ=1 m J J , 
2: j =1 Wj 
The global discordance measure is given by 
D(a, b) = {o if 3j : .dj(a, b) = 1 
1 otherwIse 
(2.7) 
(2.8) 
• ELECTRE III: The global concordance measure is defined as for ELECTRE I, 
while the global discordance measure is given by 
where 
m 
D(a,b) IIf(dj(a,b),C(a,b)) 
f(dj(a, b), C(a, b)) 
j=1 
{ ~ - dj(a,b) 
1 - C(a, b) 
10 
if dj(a, b) < C(a, b), 
if dj(a, b) > C(a, b) 
(2.9) 
(2.10) 
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Aggregation and Exploitation 
The construction of the outranking relation involves the synthesis of information 
regarding the concordant and discordant pieces of information relating to the assertion 
that alternative a outranks alternative b. Again, the exact manner in which this 
synthesis occurs depends on the outranking method used . 
• ELECTRE I: Alternative a is said to outrank alternative b if C(a, b)D(a, b) 2 to, 
where to is a user-specified concordance level indicating the 'majority vote' 
required to pass the assertion . 
• ELECTRE III: No firm conclusion is drawn from the concordance and discor-
dance results; rather a 'credibility index' S(a, b) is attached to the assertion that 
a outranks b, where S(a, b) = C(a, b)D(a, b). The credibility index takes on val-
ues between a and 1, increasing with the strength of the evidence supporting 
the assertion: it has therefore been compared with the notion of a membership 
function in fuzzy set theory [7]. 
The relaxation of the assumptions of completeness and transitivity means that pref-
erences may not be represented by a numerical function, so that the ranking of the 
alternatives becomes a non-trivial procedure for which more than one method exists. 
Generally though, two 'distillations' are produced. One is a descending rank order, 
which begins with the alternatives that outrank most alternatives and ends with al-
ternatives that outrank very few or no alternatives. The other is an ascending rank 
order, starting vvith alternatives that are outranked by many other alternatives and 
building upward to alternatives that are outranked by few or no alternatives. These 
two rank orders give different information and decision support, and should at least 
initially be considered separately. Depending on the divergence of the rank orders 
it may be possible to meaningfully synthesise them using an intersection operation. 
Further details may be found in [98] 
Why Use an Outranking Approach? 
The outranking methods aspire to lofty ideals of dynamicism and constructivism in 
the decision process, but an essential question is whether they are able to deliver 
on these ideals. The notion of incomparability permits an indecisiveness which is 
a natural part of decision making, yet the methods demand a high level of com-
prehension in the specification of behaviourally ill-defined thresholds and weights. 
The unstructured nature of the approach (in terms of the consequences of the lack 
of axiomatic foundations) is a source of potential confusion among facilitators and 
decision makers, yet it also allows the decision-aiding process to go on when other 
methods may fail; for instance when compensations between criteria are unclear or 
when underlying units of criteria are very heterogenous. The use of tradeoffs may 
be considered undesirable in certain politically-charged environments, although any 
MCDM method must necessarily bring to light some value judgements that might be 
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considered controversial. Nevertheless, the outranking approaches seem ideally suited 
to high-level decision making in purposefully ill-defined and messy environments. In 
such environments, flexibility may be considered an asset above all others. 
2.1.3 Metric Methods 
Goal programming is the oldest of the MCDM approaches considered here, dating 
bade to work done in the 1950's by Charnes and Cooper [15]. The underlying cog-
nitive model is that the DM sets goals or aspiration levels for the objectives under 
consideration, and then evaluates prospective alternatives via a dynamic and iterative 
comparison with the aspiration levels. It is the explication of this comparison that 
gives rise to the many varieties of goal programming which we have grouped under 
the umbrella of metric methods. In 1976, Simon [80] proposed a descriptive model 
of decision making that became a motivation for the use of goal programming. His 
notion of 'satisficing' supposed that a DM will search for an alternative offering sat-
isfactory performance on all criteria without necessarily attempting to maximise this 
performance. In the considered MCDM context, this translates to the DM seeking 
to achieve a satisfactory level of performance on the most important criterion before 
considering other criteria. In what follows, criteria have been defined so that they 
are satisfied when their goals are exceeded i.e. in a maximising sense. Accommoda-
tions for other forms of deviations are easily made, but the conformity simplifies the 
presentation. 
Intra-criterion Information 
The comparison of an aspiration to the performance of an alternative naturally takes 
the form of a distance measure, so that we attempt to minimise the underachievement 
i.e. positive deviation, between the aspiration 9j and the performance of an alterna-
tive (a) on a particular criterion j. This distance-based measure of performance 
implies that attributes should be defined over cardinal and not categorical scales. The 
aspirations themselves may be specified along a spectrum ranging from highly opti-
mistic, even unachievable, values, to strict lower bounds on acceptable performance. 
Placing a set of aspirations in this spectrum may be difficult for even an experienced 
DM, and the cognitive processes guiding aspiration selection are poorly understood. 
Belton and Stewart [7] have suggested that 'moderately optimistic' aspirations be 
set, so that aspirations on certain subsets of criteria are feasible, but no alternati've 
satisfies all aspirations simultaneously. 
Inter-criterion Information 
The progression towards a decision requires a comparison of the deviations in different 
criteria, introducing a need for some weight measuring the relative importance of each 
criterion. The weights are to be interpreted as for the value function methods, in a 
swing-weighting sense. Notions of relative importance are integrated with the different 
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ranges on each criterion, so that the weights take the form Wj Tjl Rj , where I j is a 
measure of the relative importance of the swing from worst to best values, and R j is 
the range of values for criterion j. 
Aggregation and Exploitation 
The global comparison of alternatives requires the aggregation of the single criterion 
deviations into a measure of the distance between the performance of an alternative 
and the aspirational performance. A distance computed over such a multi-dimensional 
criterion space implies that a choice of some metric is necessary. The general goal 
programming formulation is 
(2.11) 
where Wj is the weight assigned to the deviation OJ from goal gj, for each crite-
rion j, and 0: denotes the choice of metric. Typical choices for 0: are one, giving 
the Archimedean goal programming formulation [7], and infinity, which describes 
the Tchebycheff formulation. The choice of metric implies quite different behav-
ioural models: the Archimedean formulation minimises a weighted sum of deviations, 
while the Tchebycheff formulation minimises the maximum weighted deviation. The 
Tchebycheff approach therefore seems more closely aligned with the interpretation of 
satisficing introduced earlier. 
A rank order can be established on the basis of the above minimisation. However, the 
sensitivity of results to the choice of goals and the difficulty of selecting well-balanced 
goals means that this rank order should be used as a basis for further exploration 
of tradeoffs rather than for alternative selection. This has given rise to a number of 
so-called interactive procedures to guide the iterative reassessment of aspirations in 
order to comprehensively search the decision space (for example, see [89]). 
Why Use a Metric Approach? 
The metric approaches generally require less preference information than either value 
function or outranking methods. The methods are fairly simple conceptually, and 
model the intuitively appealing heuristic of satisficing for decision making. There 
is little in the methods to confuse even an inexperienced DM; an aspiration level is 
an intuitively meaningful concept even if its influences in terms of contextual and 
psychological factors are not well understood. Whether this lack of depth in the 
preference information is seen as an advantage or a disadvantage is likely to depend 
on the context of the decision problem. In some circumstances, it may be impossible 
or unnecessary to make the detailed preference judgements needed to construct a 
value function or outranking relation. Typical situations might include the early 
stages of a decision process, where the focus is on the selection of a set of acceptable 
13 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
alternatives for deeper analysis, or routine decisions, where the difference between 
an acceptable alternative and an optimal one is unlikely to be sufficient to warrant 
a more detailed analysis. In other circumstances, it may be more important for the 
DM to gain insights into the nature of his or her preferences through the tradeoffs 
that are available. A metric method is unlikely to be as facilitative in these respects 
as a value function or outranking method. In particular, metric methods should not 
be used to avoid asking the DM difficult questions. 
2.2 Aspects of Uncertainty 
The precise characterisation of uncertainty is notoriously problematic, being based 
more often than not on the background of the researcher (computer science, systems 
engineering, decision analysis, ... ) and the generally closely related context of the 
problem. In fact, even a broad definition of uncertainty is lacking from many texts 
dealing expertly with its incorporation and reduction [50, 28]. These texts prefer 
to provide a taxonomy of uncertainty in a more precise manner, leaving the actual 
broader concept of uncertainty as a cloud hanging over the classifications. 
Although the depth of an information-theoretical treatment of uncertainty is well 
beyond the scope of this thesis, it is certainly possible and beneficial to at least have 
in some sense a firm notion of the uncertainty we are trying to model. Following 
Zimmerman [115], the notion of uncertainty is founded on two conjectures 
1. Uncertainty is viewed as a 'situational property'; that is, it depends heavily on 
the context of the problem under study. 
2. Uncertainty is a subjective impression which is as such intertwined with the 
nature and behaviour of the decision maker. Most importantly, this implies a 
dependency on the quality and quantity of information available to the DM. 
The view of uncertainty assumed in this thesis can then be represented graphically 
by adapting the framework provided by Zimmerman to a multicriteria context, as 
shown in figure 2.1. The uncertainty model is therefore advocated as a 'filtering' of 
the information regarding the uncertain phenomenon prior to the perception of this 
information by the DM. The DM does not view the uncertain phenomenon directly, 
but rather uses the uncertainty model as 'glasses through which to view the uncertain 
situation' [115]. As such, the selected uncertainty model should be compatible with 
both the features of the uncertain phenomenon and the decision maker. As the 
graphical representation suggests, the selection of an uncertainty model is influenced 
by and influences the choice of an MCDM model, with this dual selection being 
dependent on both the problem and DM context. The implication is that no single 
uncertainty theory and consequent model may claim to be universally superior, and 
that an informed, integrated view of uncertainty modelling is necessary. 
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Figure 2.1: A Graphical View of Uncertainty Modelling 
Having provided a notion of uncertainty, the primary objective is to break it down 
into more practical and pragmatic segments by providing a rough taxonomy of un-
certainty properties and, by way of the previous argument, of the uncertainty models 
themselves. The nature of this taxonomy is neither exhaustive nor agreed upon, al-
though generally there is at least some common ground. In the following section three 
broadly representative taxonomies are discussed. It should be emphasised that the 
taxonomies are not examined from the perspective of whether or not it is practically 
meaningful to model the types of uncertainty in the context of MCDM, but rather 
from a purely classificatory standpoint. 
2.2.1 Zimmerman's Taxonomy of Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is represented by a four-valued vector characterised by the following 
properties. 
L The causes of uncertainty. 
• Lack of information 
• Abundance of information 
• Conflicting evidence 
• Ambiguity (complexity) 
• Measurement 
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• Belief 
2. The quantity and quality of information. 
3. The type of information processing required by the DM. 
4. The language required as an output to the DM. 
Aspects 2, 3 and 4 are not considered directly by this thesis, although they will nat-
urally influence directly both the choice of the MCDM model and the nature of the 
decision process. Lack of information pertains to a situation in which the informa-
tion is not sufficient, either qualitatively or quantitatively, to describe the problem 
deterministically. Two typical insufficiencies are information about the occurrence of 
a future state of nature, and information exactly describing objects i.e. approxima-
tion. The transition to certainty can only be achieved by the acquisition of more or 
better information. In contrast, the uncertainty relating to abundance of information 
pertains to the inability of human beings to absorb large amounts of data, and can 
only be reduced by transforming the data to more concise, meaningful information. 
Uncertainty due to conflicting evidence is observed whenever information points to 
more than one possible behaviour. ·Within the context of MCDM, it is conflicting 
evidence, and the resulting uncertainty regarding this conflict, which motivates the 
consideration of an MCDM modeL The type of uncertainty called ambiguity stems 
from the different meanings of certain linguistic information i.e. good, bad. A key 
point is that the remedy may depend on collecting more information about the na-
ture and context of such words, so that modelling ambiguity (for example, by way 
of fuzzy sets) may become secondary or even unnecessary. Measurement uncertainty 
relates to the inherent fallibility of all physical measurements, although within the 
context of MCDM it should be categorised with a lack of information. Finally, un-
certainty of beliefs relates to the evolutionary nature of subjective information, and 
the lack of 'objectivity' in information. Naturally behind this type of uncertainty 
lies a wealth of debate regarding the state of objectivity of any kind in information. 
Further information about the taxonomy can be found in [115]. 
2.2.2 Klir and Folger's Taxonomy of Uncertainty 
The following taxonomy is presented very much from the two authors' perspective of 
integrating information theory with fuzzy sets. As a result the omission of uncertainty 
arising from the unknown future state of the world is not overly surprising. More 
detail regarding the taxonomy is available in [50J. 
1. Vagueness 
2. Ambiguity 
• Nonspecificity in Evidence 
• Confusion in Evidence 
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• Dissonance in Evidence 
Vagueness relates to difficulties experienced in making precise distinctions between 
concepts or categories in the real world, and so is equivalent to the ambiguity of 
the Zimmerman taxonomy. In the Klir and Folger taxonomy, ambiguity pertains to 
'situations in which the choice between two or more alternatives is left unspecified', 
the mathematical analogy of which is the one-to-many relation. Ambiguity is further 
divided into three classifications. Nonspecificity of evidence refers to the sizes of the 
subsets that have been identified as potential locations of a particular object, such 
that a larger cardinality implies a higher degree of ambiguity. Confusion of evidence 
exists whenever the subsets potentially locating an object overlap either partly or not 
at all, so that the information pointing to the different locations manifests itself as 
uncertainty, specifically ambiguity. A related uncertainty is dissonance in evidence, 
which is exhibited whenever the potential locations of an object are disjoint. The 
conflict arising from situations of confusion or dissonance are analogous to the earlier 
definition of conflicting evidence. 
2.2.3 French's Taxonomy of Uncertainty 
The taxonomy is constructed with respect to three methodological steps involved in 
conducting an analysis. The first phase is termed a modelling phase, involving the 
construction of what we have referred to as the problem context. The emphasis is on 
representing the real world in a tractable yet realistic model. The second phase is an 
exploration of the models built up in the modelling phase. Finally, the third phase in-
terprets the results of the explorations and translates them into meaningful guidance 
for the decision maker. Within the context of the graphical representation of uncer-
tainty provided in 2.1, the modelling phase refers to an investigation of the system 
locating the uncertain phenomenon, so as to provide a summary (in the form of the 
problem context) which will bridge the divide between the real-world phenomenon 
and the perception of it. The exploration phase is firmly based on the interaction 
between the uncertainty and MCDM model within the assumed problem context. 
The interpretation phase refers to the directing of suitable information from the ex-
ploration phase to the decision maker. Further details on both the methodological 
and taxonomical aspects may be found in [28]. 
1. Uncertainties expressed during modelling 
• Uncertainty about what might happen 
• Uncertainty about meaning (ambiguity) 
• Uncertainty about related decisions 
2. Uncertainties expressed during the exploration of the models 
• Uncertainty arising from physical randomness 
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• Uncertainty about the evolution of future beliefs 
• Uncertainty about the subjectivity of beliefs and preferences 
• Uncertainty about the accuracy of calculations 
3. Uncertainty expressed during interpretation 
• Uncertainty about the nature of the model i.e. normative or descriptive 
• Uncertainty about the depth of the analysis 
The taxonomy is introduced in the context of the complete modelling of a decision, so 
that a great deal of importance is placed on the uncertainties relating to the structural 
issues surrounding the decision problem. 'While acknowledging the great importance 
of accommodating these structural uncertainties where possible, the primary focus 
of this thesis is on the interaction between MCDM models and uncertainty models 
taking place in the exploration phase. In many instances, the only recourse to the 
structural uncertainty represented here by modelling and interpretative uncertainty 
will be through further restructuring. In these cases the integrated decision model 
cannot ease these uncertainties, since it operates only on the perceptive model that is 
provided as an input. No model may capture what is not perceived, so that whether 
all criteria have been identified or whether another decision is related strongly enough 
to warrant inclusion lies beyond the scope of the exploration phase. 
2.3 Integrating Uncertainty into MCDM 
The taxonomies of the previous section were presented from various points of view: 
Zimmerman's from the area of systems engineering, Klir and Folger's from the more 
mathematically-driven theory of information, and French's from the perspective of 
a pragmatic decision analyst. The broad concept of uncertainty is not even defined 
in the latter two, so that we cannot be sure that they suppose to measure exactly 
the same concept. Nevertheless, the aim of the previous section was not to judge 
or even compare directly the various classifications, but merely to present them for 
consideration. In this section, an attempt is made to synthesise those parts of the 
taxonomies that are most relevant to ::YICDM. In doing so, we hope to arrive at a 
generally acceptable classification of uncertainty that, though non-unique and non-
exhaustive, is applicable to MCDM. Three broad categories of uncertainty are defined: 
risk, ambiguity, and vagueness. 
2.3.1 Risk 
In many cases, it becomes necessary to predict the future outcomes of alternatives in 
order to compare them. For example, in comparing two holidays, it might be necessary 
to consider the possible weather at the time of the holiday. Risk corresponds in the 
French taxonomy to the uncertainty arising from physical randomness, and to the 
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inherent lack of information about this uncertain future in the Zimmerman taxonomy. 
Klir and Folger do not consider risk in their taxonomy due to the emphasis on fuzzy 
set theory. It is generally accepted that true physical randomness should be modelled 
using probability theory [28], although the precise nature of these probabilities is 
often not agreed upon. Some authors [93] make a distinction between cases where 
the probabilities of occurrence are known and unknown, calling them decisions under 
risk and decisions under uncertainty respectively. This distinction may serve some 
purpose in the debate between objectivists and subjectivists, but from the perspective 
of practical MCDM the treatment of both cases is identicaL We therefore consider 
all decisions involving random or unknown outcomes to be decisions under risk. 
The diverse connotations of the word 'risk' mean that it is often confused in a specific 
context. In the context of decision analysis, risk is often interpreted in the sense 
of a preference for a lottery over the expected value of the lottery. More broadly, 
risk is associated with the occurrence of an unpleasant event. Within the field of risk 
analysis, risk is considered to be a function of both the likelihood and consequences of 
a catastrophic event (see, for example, [52]). Neither of these uses should be confused 
with the uncertainty relating to the physical randomness of the outcomes. 
2.3.2 Imprecision 
Within the decision process, it is a necessary step that the decision maker must pro-
vide preferential information, for example when judging the weight of each criterion. 
The accuracy of this information is in a sense arbitrary, and decided by the needs 
of the analysis and the confidence of the decision maker. Nevertheless, no decision 
maker could possibly say that the weight of criterion j is exactly 0.4888 and not 
0.4889. In any case where subjective information about beliefs or preferences needs 
to be elicited, the limited discriminatory power of the human mind is likely to raise 
some doubt or uncertainty in the decision maker, and it is this uncertainty which we 
call imprecision. This imprecision extends easily into physical processes. For exam-
ple, although a car's top speed may be specified by the manufacturer to the nearest 
kilometer per hour, we may only be confident that it lies within 5 km/h either side 
of this and certain that it lies within 15 km/h either side. Imprecision is likely to 
be highly specific both to the context of the problem and the nature of the decision 
maker. 
Imprecision encompasses to a large extent uncertainty arising from different linguistic 
meanings, although strictly they do model different limitations. The concept of am-
biguity in Zimmerman's taxonomy refers to an imprecise concept usually represented 
by a linguistic term, while the uncertainty discussed in the previous paragraph refers 
to an imprecise judgement which nevertheless may have a precise linguistic meaning. 
There is an important consequence of the distinction: linguistic imprecision may be 
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resolved by more detailed definitions of the concepts under scrutiny, so that a more ef-
ficient and constructive remedy may be found via a return to the restructuring phase. 
Ambiguity in the Zimmerman taxonomy, nonspecificity of evidence in the Klir and 
Folger taxonomy, and uncertainty about the subjectivity of beliefs and preferences in 
the French taxonomy all fall under the umbrella of imprecision. 
2.3.3 Vagueness 
The final type of uncertainty relates to a more basic and fundamental uncertainty 
than the previous two. The idealised real world is assumed to be constructed from 
infinitely detailed objects which to all intents and purposes cannot be fully perceived 
by human beings. In an attempt to deal with this uncertainty, each human being 
assembles a set of information which is considered an adequate representation of this 
infinitely detailed world. This adequacy is clearly a matter of degree and information. 
In the context of MCDM, the progression of the decision maker may see a rapid 'as-
similation' of information about the problem context and, more importantly, about 
underlying preferences. While the consequence of this evolution may be a reduction 
of imprecision, the uncertainty about the nature and evolution of knowledge is a no-
tion which engulfs both risk and imprecision, and it is this uncertainty which we term 
vagueness. 
The distinction between imprecision and vagueness is admittedly a tenuous one. Im-
precision is intended as a lower level uncertainty governing feelings of doubt and inad-
equacy in the current state of the decision process. Vagueness, on the other hand, is 
an almost unperceived governing force that determines the limits of the entire decision 
process. Although uncertainties relating to the structuring of the MCDM problem 
are not of primary importance, many may be captured by the notion of vagueness, 
including all the modelling uncertainties in French's taxonomy. It is a catch-all which 
provides a header of 'given the totality of information at the time' to the analysis. 
Belief in a situation in Zimmerman's taxonomy, vagueness in Klir and Folger's tax-
onomy, and uncertainty about the evolution of future beliefs French's taxonomy 
are all encompassed by vagueness. 
2.4 Uncertainty in MCDM: A Morphological Box 
A morphological box is a crosstabular approach which can be employed to tease apart 
the important aspects of the problem at hand. Two fundamental compnsmg 
the current problem are identified: one relating to the nature of uncertainty present in 
the decision, and the other relating to multiple criteria aspects of the same decision. 
Section 2.3 characterised three categories of uncertainty which are considered to be 
most relevant to MCDM. Section 2.1 presented three broad methodological MCDM 
schools in a deterministic context. Although neither classification can claim to be ei-
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ther exhaustive or disjunctive, they do provide a basis for the following morphological 
framework for the consideration of the treatment of uncertainty in MCDM methods. 
We have been able to find references in the literature to all but two of the boxes, 
namely those representing vagueness in the value function methods and vagueness in 
the metric methods. All the other boxes have been considered to a greater or lesser 
extent. 
We may consider risk to be an 'external' uncertainty in that it essentially relates to 
the environment or decision context locating the decision problem i.e. is independent 
of the DM. Imprecision and vagueness, on the other hand, may be grouped together as 
'internal' uncertainty which is specific to a particular DM. It is obvious that the three 
uncertainties are not mutually exclusive, so that more than one type may be present 
in a single problem context. In fact it has been argued here that vagueness, since it 
represents uncertainty about the current state of knowledge, will always be present 
in a decision problem, and the only issue is whether we wish to model it explicitly or 
not. A high-level treatment of uncertainty in MCDM therefore might consist of all 
three types of uncertainty considered simultaneously. This thesis does not pretend 
to have such grand ambitions: it presents only a brief discussion of the key issues 
in currently popular models of imprecision and vagueness, focusing primarily on the 
treatment of external uncertainty. 
The focus on risk is due to two main considerations. Firstly, the time and resource 
constraints on the thesis preclude the consideration of all three uncertainties. There is 
also a very real sense of building towards an integrated model, of 'learning to walk be-
fore running'. Risk then, although not occurring in all decision problems, is the most 
visible uncertainty when it does occur. While the internal uncertainties of impreci-
sion and vagueness may be ameliorated through discussion and restructuring, risk is 
unlikely to be as flexible. These two points in particular motivate the consideration 
of the single uncertainty, risk, represented by the first column in the morphological 
box. 
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2.5 A Note on Fuzzy Sets 
The fuzzy set theory introduced in 1965 by Zadeh [110] is currently the most complete 
and well-known approach for the general modelling of imprecision. The fundamental 
notion in fuzzy sets is that imprecision manifests itself as an arbitrariness in establish-
ing precise boundaries for a set of interest. This allows the membership of an element 
x to a set A to be considered a matter of degree by allowing a membership function 
flA(X) to take on any value between 0 and 1, which are respectively equivalent to the 
classical concept of set exclusion and set inclusion. By defining appropriate sets of 
interest, fuzzy set theory is immediately and broadly applicable. Several interpreta-
tions are possible depending on the definition of the set of interest. For example, we 
could define a set 'fast cars'. A car with a top speed of 180 km/h would belong to 
this set to a greater extent than a car with a top speed of 170 km/h, so that we may 
assign membership values of 1 and 0.8 respectively. Otherwise, in evaluating car A by 
its top speed, we may define a set of interest 'top speed of car A'. It is then possible 
to reflect uncertainty about the exact top speed of the car by assigning membership 
values of 1 to 180 km/h and 0.8 to 175 km/h if it is believed that 180 km/h is more 
representative of the car's top speed than 175 km/h. In this sense, fuzzy MCDM 
corresponds more to a sensitivity analysis embedded into the decision modei than 
anything else. 
It is our purpose here to discuss the relevance of fuzzy sets to MCDM, rather than 
to present the various methodologies in any detail. Generally, the aim of a fuzzy 
MCDM analysis is to provide fuzzy global evaluations that will inform the DM about 
the range of global scores that may be obtained given the imprecise information. Nat-
urally, some evaluations will be considered more representative of an alternative than 
others, so that we may attach a membership function to the fuzzy global evaluations 
of each alternative. In contrast to conventional MCDM providing crisp evaluations, 
ranking the fuzzy global evaluations is non-trivial due to the possibility that the 
evaluations overlap each other considerably, so that several different ranking methods 
exist [16]. An overview of the huge amount of research done into fuzzy mathematics is 
presented by Kandel [44J. Chen and Hwang [16] provide a detailed survey of available 
fuzzy value function and outranking methods. In the value function methods, differ-
ent solution methods obtain the membership function of the global evaluations either 
following Baas and Kwakernaak's sequential evaluation of a-cuts [4] or Bonissone's 
use of approximate arithmetic operations on fuzzy numbers [8]. Greater acceptance 
of fuzziness has been achieved in the outranking methods, largely through the influ-
ence of the well-known ELECTRE III [75] and PROMETHEE [10] methods which use 
thresholds to allow the concordance and discordance indices to take on values in the 
interval [0, 1]. A more complete treatment of imprecision has recently been presented 
by Goumas and Lygerou [31]. The original fuzzy GP method is sometimes cred-
ited to Zimmerman [113], although the first explicit formulations were proposed by 
Narasimhan [64J and Hannan [35]. Generally, the fuzzification of the constraints jus-
22 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
tities them being treated equivalently to goals, so that the fuzzy decision is computed 
on the basis of a maximin aggregation over the confluence of goals and constraints. 
The intuitive appeal of including the natural imprecision of human perception into 
the decision making process means that fuzzy set theory has received a great deal 
of attention, perhaps disproportionately so. Nevertheless, there are still doubts as 
to some fundamental issues at the heart of the use of fuzzy sets, particularly for the 
purposes of decision aid, to which we now turn our attention. 
The Cognitive Relevance of Fuzzy Sets 
Perhaps the most important of these doubts relates to the suitability of fuzzy sets as 
normative models of decision making. The implicit assumption is that the imprecision 
of qualitative human judgment is well modelled by fuzzy mathematics. However, a 
well-founded axiomatic system on the b&'lis of which we may judge this assumption is 
still lacking [27]. Even the simple operations of intersection and union have no well-
defined conceptual parallels, so that several definitions have been proposed [114]. A 
related problem is the lack of behavioural justification for the many ranking methods 
available, which is particularly important since different methods may give different 
results. The maximin operation used in the metric methods can be considered overly 
pessimistic and undesirable in many contexts [71J. French [27J discusses some of the 
difficulties in fuzzy measurement theory. 
The use of fuzzy MCDM techniques relies heavily on membership functions, yet their 
elicitation is not clear, and typically seem to have been chosen for convenience on 
the basis of minimum and maximum values, a value with maximum membership, and 
linear interpolation between the points to form a triangular fuzzy number. Again, 
whether this structure is consistent with decision maker preference is not apparent, as 
is the impact of different forms of the membership function on results. Some indication 
might be taken from results that similar triangular approximations of probability 
distributions (as in PERT, for example) performed very poorly [46]. 
Restrictions on the Fuzzy Elements of MCDM Models 
Generally, different MCDM methods consider only certain elements of the decision 
problem to fuzzy. We may consider the 'external' &'lpects of the decision prob-
lem (evaluations, probabilities) and the 'internal' aspects of the DM (marginal value 
functions, thresholds, goals, criterion weights) as potentially fuzzy elements of an 
MCDM model. Value function methods have treated both the evaluations Zij and 
criterion weights Wj as fuzzy. Having recognised the fuzziness of trade-off informa-
tion, it is then ignored by demanding the precise specification of the marginal value 
functions. The opposite is true in the outranking methods, which model the impreci-
sion of DM preferences via the pseudo criteria, but consider both the evaluations Zij 
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and the weights Wj to be crisp. 
The apparent contradiction is that having recognised the imprecision of human judg-
ment we must pick and choose certain sources of imprecision while ignoring others. 
But which forms of imprecision are most keenly felt by DM's, and which forms have 
the rnost influence on results? Arguably the area where DM's are likely to feel the 
imprecision in their preferences most acutely is in the definition of the marginal value 
functions, particularly considering the importance of correct modelling and the large 
impact of inaccuracies on results, reported by Stewart [85]. However, Goumas and 
Lygerou [3l] rejected the use of fuzzy thresholds in the PROMETHEE generalised crite-
ria on the basis that the resulting preference index may spread out to include almost 
the entire interval [0,1]. Similar results might be expected for value functions. The 
requirement of additivity for criterion weights dictates that the fuzziness in one cri-
terion cannot be incorporated without consideration of all criteria simultaneously. A 
similar argument holds for the scenario probabilities, so that the modelling of these 
quantities is considerably more difficult. It is certainly true that the multiplication 
operation means that using fuzzy numbers in several areas of a problem will widen 
the bounds of the results. The question, however, is whether the decision maker feels 
that the results are a true reflection of the imprecision or merely spurious effects of 
overemphasising the imprecision in too many areas. 
Facilitation of Learning 
From the perspective of practical decision aid, the normative applicability of fuzzy 
sets is largely a function of the insight and opportunity for reflection provided to the 
DM. The DM unfamiliar with numerical evaluations and general elicitations may well 
derive some comfort in the knowledge that the imprecision experienced is actually be-
ing accommodated, but whether the final fuzzy evaluations allow for the impacts of 
different imprecisions to be teased apart is doubtful. There is the risk, when including 
a fuzzy analysis as part of an MCDM model, that the imprecision compounds itself 
in such a way as to obscure the various aspects of a decision problem. Since the 
goal of MCDM is to bring the DM to a better understanding of the problem through 
learning and focusing on key aspects, it may be more suitable to resolve imprecision 
at the outset via the elicitation of crisp inputs (with the knowledge that these will 
be investigated as part of the later sensitivity analysis) rather than attempting to 
model the imprecision and carry it throughout the process. In many cases, initial 
imprecision may be at least partly reduced by simplification, restructuring and re-
flection, analogous to the construction of a value tree decomposing high level criteria 
that could be interpreted as fuzzy into lower-level, crisp ones. 
The difficulty of selecting one crisp number is in any case not completely nullified 
by the consideration of the fuzzy since those same difficulties may arise in the 
24 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
choice of the parameters and form of the fuzzy number. Fuzzy set theory is a pre-
cise mathematical framework which, although allowing for imprecision to impact on 
results, still demands rigour and exactness from the DM. \Ve may of course define 
further fuzzy parameters on the original fuzzy number, quickly leading to a problem 
of infinite regress. At what stage does the imprecision cease to represent a material 
concern of the D:\1 and become just a spurious property of the model? 
Despite these problems and challenges, fuzzy set theory addresses a source of uncer-
tainty that is not conducive to stochastic modelling. These imprecisions might be 
investigated as part of a sensitivity analysis, but if they are of such magnitude or 
importance that the decision maker feels paralysed to continue before their inclusion, 
then fuzzy set theory is at present the only established means of doing so. There 
seems to be a common misconception that fuzzy sets are to be used as alternatives 
to probability distributions [108, 14]. The notion of imprecision relates to the frailty 
of human judgement and imprecise expression which is present regardless of future 
states of the world. It is difficult to interpret a probability distribution around a value 
as anything other than uncertainty about the future states of the world, essentially 
external to the preferences of the decision maker, as much as that is possible in the 
MCDM context. Rather, the use of fuzzy sets should be viewed independently of 
the use of probability distributions as modelling the imprecision that is very much 
inherent and personal to the D:'v1. 
2.6 A Note on Rough Sets 
The model of vagueness based upon the rough set theory proposed in 1982 by Pawlak 
[67] is an attempt to capture the essence of uncertainty regarding the state of our 
available knowledge. Rough set theory is founded on the philosophy that there is 
a certain amount of information associated with every object in the universe. The 
assumption is then that objects are considered and described only by the informa-
tion that is available about them, which to all practical purposes is incomplete. Two 
objects that are different in the idealised world may therefore appear to be the same 
in the reduced context. The reduction of classificatory ability is said to occur via 
the granulation of knowledge, leading to objects characterised by the same informa-
tion being viewed as indiscernible. That such granulation occurs is beyond question, 
and is in part the reason behind the development of the outranking school, where 
incomparability of alternatives is allowed based on a current and inferior state of 
knowledge. Even within the utility school, the reliance of the DM on the current 
state of knowledge is implied via the emphasis on learning processes and facilitating 
D:\1 understanding. Furthermore the basic tenet of the rough set philosophy, that 
our representation of our world i.e. the decision problem, is limited by the availability 
of knowledge, is appealing. 
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The development of the interaction between rough sets and M CD M is very much 
in its infancy. Until recently, work was based exclusively on the original framework 
laid down by Pawlak [68], which assumed the selection of a classification problema-
tique (see, for example, [70, 69]). In 1999, Greco et al. proposed extensions to that 
framework based on the pairwise comparison of alternatives using graded dominance 
relations [32], which allowed the ranking problems on which MCDM is founded to be 
modelled. This recent movement represents a significant advancement. Even more so 
than fuzzy sets, rough set theory offers the opportunity to model a type of uncertainty 
that has long been acknowledged in the cognitive sciences, but more importantly one 
which has no other representation in MCDM. It is our purpose here to provide a dis-
cussion of the issues surrounding the integration of rough sets and MCDM, without 
presenting the theory itself. The original work of Pawlak [67] remains the standard 
reference on the subject, while Greco et al. [33] provide the most complete review 
of the current movement. Exemplary applications may be found in [81, 22, 82]. We 
focus here on three key issues: the role of rough sets in MCDM, the extension of rough 
sets to MCDM methods, and the interaction between vagueness and other types of 
uncertainty. 
The Role of Rough Sets in MCDM 
The most conspicuous aspect of applying rough set theory to MCDM is the role 
played by the exemplary decisions. Most applications of rough set theory emphasise 
a prescriptive approach by using a training set to induce a set of decision rules to 
apply to a -vvider set of alternatives [82, 22]. This in fact places rough sets within the 
paradigm of preference disaggregation [39], which seeks to infer a preference model 
based on existing decisions. This poses few methodological concerns in AI fields such 
as expert systems and machine learning, where the starting point is that the DM is 
an acknowledged expert. In the context of MCDM, however, the unfamiliar strate-
gic problems to which MCDM is often applied means that there may be no experts. 
There appears to have been no discussion as to the desirability or even feasibility of 
the use of exemplary global decisions. Researchers frequently point to the fact that 
people are more confident exercising their judgements than explaining them as a psy-
chological justification for using exemplary decisions [32]. From a descriptive point 
of view, a set of exemplary decisions may well provide the reasons for those decisions 
and an adequate prediction of future choice. From a normative standpoint, however, 
there is little to suggest that such confidence is justified. Furthermore, there has been 
no research as to the effects of flawed exemplary decisions. 
Consequently the role of rough sets in MCDM needs to be re-evaluated. Decision aid 
in general performs the dual purpose of explaining the context of the decision problem 
to the DM, and prescribing a sensible course of action given that particular decision 
context. The great advantage of rough sets is that they provide a unique depiction 
of the former, using very natural concepts like the classificatory ability of attributes. 
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Most importantly, these computations do not require any further preference informa-
tion if they are performed directly on the decision table of evaluations. A rough set 
approach is in this regard ideally suited to a pre-processing stage, where the set of at-
tributes identified as most significant by the rough set analysis may be modified based 
on preference information elicited from the DM before moving into a deeper analysis. 
If the focus of interest is shifted away from a preoccupation with prescription, the 
rough set theory offers detailed and mature opportunities for a greater understanding 
of the decision context at a time of the process which is often neglected. 
Extensions of Rough Sets to MCDM Methodologies 
The relational basis of rough set theory has resulted in its development in MCDM 
being purely along the lines of the relational outranking methods. The rough set 
approach extends the information obtained from the intuitive global evaluations of 
the DM to the full decision problem. In this sense, the outranking model appears 
embedded in the rough set approach. In doing so, the contextual information de-
scribed previously is expressed, with additional information contained in the decision 
rules. Although these decision rules provide a straightforward interpretation of the 
reasoning behind the rank ordering which is both valuable and easy to understand 
[70], their derivation and the consequential prescription does require substantially 
more DM involvement. Most importantly, all information except that relating to the 
decision rules is obtained without recourse to the outranking methodology. Whether 
the information contained in the decision rules is considered sufficiently desirable to 
employ the full rough outranking approach is likely to be dependent both on the con-
text of the problem and whether the outranking method is considered by the analyst 
a.."l appropriate. 
At present, the role of rough set theory in value function models is limited to infor-
mation gathering in a pre-processing phase. The challenge here is to fuse together 
the functional aspects of the value function methods with the relational aspects of 
rough set theory. The link between discrete metric methods and rough sets is likely to 
be similar in that a decision table of deviations may be considered. However, metric 
methods may derive greater benefit from a rough set analysis on the basis of shared 
interests in pre-processing and similarly low levels of DM involvement. A general 
issue that has not received treatment is the distinction between the importance of 
attributes from the perspectives of rough set theory and MCDM. The importance 
weights in MCDM are pieces of preferential information elicited from the DM that, 
while depending on the range of values for a particular attribute, are also dependent 
on what the DM considers to be valuable. As a result they may not be derived di-
rectly from the evaluations. The importance of attributes in the rough set theory 
is purely a function of the classificatory ability of each attribute, requiring no input 
from the decision maker. Currently, there is no treatment of preferential importance 
in the derivation of decision rules. 
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Integration with Other Uncertainties 
The interaction between the various forms of uncertainty provides another rich and 
important area for study. There has been some theoretical research in the area com-
bining rough and fuzzy sets [24], most notably providing fuzzy extensions of similarity 
and dominance relations. Although the motivation for relationships such as similar-
ity and dominance to be considered a matter of degree is clear, the introduction of 
fuzzy sets does not alleviate the problems associated with rough set applications to 
MCDM outlined here. If anything it may provide unnecessary sophistication to an 
already complex process. The consideration of stochastic outcomes together with 
rough sets has received far less attention, perhaps suffering from the relative scarcity 
of stochastic outranking methods. In the investigative pre-processing environment 
advocated, there is no reason why, where the uncertain outcomes have a discrete 
representation, scenarios should not be treated in the same way as attributes. Given 
the evaluations of n alternatives on m criteria p scenarios, the rough set investi-
gation may be setup using either p n x m alternative-criteria information tables or m 
n x p alternative-scenario information tables. The combined rough set analysis may 
provide information on crucial or redundant scenarios, on which scenarios are associ-
ated with a particular alternative or attribute, and dependencies between scenarios 
on each attribute. In a prescriptive environment, Zaras [111] provides a modified 
pairwise comparison table based on the concept of stochastic dominance, on which 
the conventional rough set techniques may be applied. 
There are therefore numerous directions for future research. However, for rough set 
theory to make significant inroads into general MCDM practice, there needs to be a 
general shift of emphasis into softer procedural issues such as ease of use, interactivity 
and transparency. This represents a fundamental change from the current focus on 
more sophisticated mathematics and algorithms on the part of rough set practitioners 
based predominantly in AI. 
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Chapter 3 
External Uncertainty: The 
Treatment of Risk 
The uncertainty arising from stochastic outcomes, which we have termed risk, has 
received more attention than other forms of uncertainty. It is widely accepted, not 
only in MCDM but in the context of broader mathematical modelling, that uncer-
tainty arising from such physical randomness should be modelled using the tools of 
probability theory [28]. The starting point here is taken as the conclusion of the 
problem structuring phases, already well into the decision aiding process. If the re-
sultant attribute values Zij are dependent on the outcome of some future random 
event(s), they may be viewed as random variables with associated probability den-
sity functions fij(Zij) and cumulative probability distributions Fij(Zij)' However, the 
methodological differences between MCDM methods mean that the incorporation of 
probabilities into the techniques often proceeds in very different ways. In this section, 
an examination is made of the use of probability distributions in each of the three 
MCDM areas. We make one important distinction: between methods making use of 
the full probability distribution and methods using only a subset of the full range of 
outcomes, which we term scenario-based approaches. 
In section 1.6 we defined a scenario as an internally consistent future state of the world 
that is also in some sense a characterisation of the full multivariate probability distri-
bution governing the performance evaluations, the aim being to simplify what is likely 
to be an extremely complex functional form. There are two fundamentally different 
approaches to the construction of scenarios in a decision process under uncertainty. 
The first is similar to what Keeney has termed (and criticised as) 'alternative-focused 
thinking' [47], where the scenarios are viewed as joint realisations of the stochastic 
Zij) implying that the alternatives must be considered first. Subjective probabilities 
are often assigned to such realisations. The set of scenarios is usually a small subset 
of the complete set of possible future states, and so the probabilities are usually inter-
preted as relative likelihoods, although this is often not made explicit. An advantage 
of such an approach is that it does allow the DM to investigate the range of possible 
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outcomes that may follow the choice of a given alternative. However, Wright and 
Goodwin [106] argue that the scenarios generated will tend to suffer from well-known 
heuristics such as anchoring and adjustment [94], and inertia [37]. As a result the 
scenarios tend to reinforce currently held perceptions of what is likely to occur, 
so that excessive confidence is placed in a narrow range of possible futures. 
The second approach has been applied predominantly in strategic planning, and was 
developed primarily through pioneering work done at Royal Dutch/Shell [101, 100J 
in response to failures of probability-based forecasting techniques. Scenarios are con-
structed in a top-down approach that focuses on the underlying forces causing un-
certainty in order to identify and differentiate predetermined and uncertain elements 
of the future via cause-and-effect relationships. The approach aims at identifying an 
alternative that is robust to the range of scenarios that will bound the uncertain fu-
ture, but it is the on these cause-and-effect relationships which gives attention 
to the sources of uncertainty without assigning probabilities to them. The scenarios 
are developed prior to (or at least independently of) the construction of alternatives, 
so that the process emphasises the articulation of values and objectives rather than 
charting the possible courses of alternatives. The placement of this construction ap-
proach is therefore the framework of Keeney's 'value-focused thinking' [47], albeit 
applied to the treatment of uncertain outcomes. 
The two approaches differ substantially in their philosophical approaches to uncer-
tainty: the first attempts to manage the uncertainty via its representation as prob-
abilities, while second may be placed in the framework of the so-called soft OR 
approaches by emphasising the incorporation of uncertainty as a structure of the 
problem and an opportunity to better understand the contextual environment in 
which the problem has been formed, rather than as a solution method. However, 
these differences will generally manifest themselves in the creation of scenarios (see, 
for example, [11]), while from an MCDM perspective a major challenge is how to 
incorporate the already formed scenarios into an analysis, and particularly to aid in 
the evaluation phase. Thus while acknowledging the importance of appropriate sce-
nario construction, it is possible to move directly into areas where the two schools of 
thought common procedural elements. 
An important objective of scenario-based MCDM is evaluating performance under 
each scenario, which is considered to be a deterministic set of evaluations. The 
output of a scenario-based MCDM approach must include separate evaluations for 
performances under each scenario if it is to contribute to conclusions of robustness. 
This motivates the treatment of scenarios as part of the objectives hierarchy, which 
naturally brings about questions of where in the hierarchy to place them. Consider-
ation of the objectives hierarchy as a framework reducing composite objectives into 
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lower-level objectives clarifies the issue to some extent. The demand that aggregation 
across scenarios be delayed until the end if it is to be carried out at all means that it 
is natural to include the scenarios as the second level of the hierarchy. This has the 
effect of creating a 'super-MCDM' problem consisting of p generally closely related 
problems. Including the scenarios at lower levels will necessarily require aggregation 
across scenarios in order to progress to further evaluations. 
There are two basic modes of evaluation which are common to the scenario-based im-
plementation of all three of the MCDM methodologies considered in this thesis. For 
each criterion j, alternative-scenario combinations can be formed by considering the 
performance of alternative i on scenario k. These alternative-scenario combinations 
can then effectively be treated as higher-level alternatives, so that the evaluation of the 
set of n alternatives on criterion j occurs over all scenarios simultaneously. Goodwin 
and '\fright [30] term this 'the evaluation of alternative-scenario combinations over 
each criterion'. Otherwise, for each criterion j, the alternatives may be evaluated 
separately within each scenario, which is termed here the evaluation of alternatives 
over each criterion-scenario combination. \Ve therefore refer to the domain of the 
scenario-based decision problem as being either the criterion space (in the former 
case of evaluating alternative-scenario combinations) or criterion-scenario space (in 
the latter case of evaluating alternatives). These modes of evaluation are discussed 
in more detail in the following sections. 
3.1 Value Function Methods 
3.1.1 Multiple Attribute Utility Theory 
Multiple attribute utility theory (MAUT) is the oldest and most well-established of 
the frameworks provided to cope with stochastic outcomes in MCDM, and despite 
numerous severe and long-standing objections, at least to its empirical validity, it 
remains a standard textbook treatment of risk. In fact, a surface scan of risk treat-
ment in MCDM might well lead one to believe that the subject begins and ends 
with MAUT, although fortunately this is not the case. In this section, the aim is to 
present MAUT from a broadly structural point of view in order to gain insight into 
the way that uncertainty is firstly incorporated into the model, and then handled in 
the progression towards a final decision. The reader is referred to Keeney and Raiffa 
[48] for a more comprehensive coverage of the subject. 
The mUltiple attribute value theory (MAVT) discussed in 2.1.1 can be viewed as a 
special case of MAUT by considering that the Zij in the former are just degenerate 
random variables. The outstanding feature of MAUT, both reason for its pop-
lIlarity and the criticism levelled at it, is that it is firmly founded on the axiomatic 
base of expected utility theory. These axioms are assumptions made about the be-
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haviour of the decision maker in terms of the way that preferences are formed, and 
are required to justify the existence of a utility function U(·) satisfying the expected 
utility hypothesis, which is stated below. 
Expected Utility Hypothesis 
a>- b ~ E[U(a)] > E[U(b)] 
Let X = {Xl, ... , xr } be a set of possible prizes, while the lottery offering prizes 
Xi, i E {l, 2,.", r} with associated probability Pi is represented as {PI, Xl;'" ;Pr, xr}. 
Furthermore, some of the prizes may be entries into further lotteries, The axioms 
necessary and sufficient for the existence of a utility function are presented as: 
Completeness Axiom 
Thansitivity Axiom 
Consistency Axiom 
Continuity Axiom 
Independence Axiom 
The completeness axiom requires that the decision maker be able to express 
some opinion when confronted with a choice between two lotteries: either a strict 
preference or indifference. It demands a certain level of decisiveness of the decision 
maker, which has been argued, particularly in support of the outranking methods, to 
be too strong to be a valid axiom [77]. Although it may be true that, at least early 
in the decision process, preferences are incomplete enough to justify a conclusion of 
'incomparability', supporters of MAUT require only that in theory a decision maker 
will be able to balance the available information at a certain stage in the decision 
process to arrive at a decision of weak preference [27]. Transitivity of preferences is a 
more natural expectation, although transitivity of indifference is often systematically 
violated in practice i.e. it is descriptively invalid [83], The violation hinges on the 
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decision maker's lack of discriminatory power, so that from a normative point of view 
the axiom may be viewed as rational and relatively un controversial. The consistency 
axiom places a rational bound on the range of preferences that can be held, and the 
continuity axiom is a technical requirement that, although descriptively dubious, 
can be justified in a normative sense by the same arguments as for transitivity. 
The crucial utility-theoretic axiom is that of independence, which demands that 
preferences between lotteries exclude common outcomes from consideration. The 
independence axiom has an abstract normative appeal, but in practical examples has 
been systematically and consciously violated by a wide variety of decision makers, 
giving rise to several well-known paradoxes [1, 25]. 
From a descriptive standpoint, the violations merely confirm the descriptive failings 
of expected utility theory, and are only threatening from a normative perspective 
if they can be justified in a 'rational' sense. A common justification includes the 
so-called framing effects of levels against which decision makers compare 
alternatives [12], so that the way in which an attribute value is viewed depends 
on the context in which it is presented. This explanation is often supplemented 
by considering how uncertainty is incorporated into the final decision the role 
played by the probabilities [107]. EDT axioms demand that probabilities are 
viewed purely as weights to be attached to the prospective rewards of the lottery. In 
practice, the probabilities may be viewed as more complex measures of risk, so that 
relative weightings implied by two probabilities do not necessarily capture the 
DM's true feelings. Furthermore, the normative appeal to ignore these perceptions 
of the probabilities as irrational does not seem entirely convincing, and runs the 
risk of alienating decision makers unable to reconcile themselves to the axiomatic 
requirements of EDT. The alternate treatment of the probabilities lie at the heart 
of the relatively recent developments in non-expected utility theory, which will be 
discussed in more detail later. Howev-er, it must be added that the non-expected 
utility-theoretical models come ,¥ith problems of their own, having generally traded 
off broad applicability and ease of use for increased realism. In addition, fatal 
violation of EDT is likely to occur only in relatively few cases. Firstly, the majority 
of decision makers are at least in tentative agreement with the axiom of independence 
[27], and secondly, some apparently non-ED behaviour can be classified as decision 
making with error [13] rather than axiomatic violation of EDT. 
When extending the ideas of the previous section into a multiple criteria framework, 
an aggregation of marginal utility functions for individual criteria is required. In 
the case of MAVT, the acceptance of the preferential independence axiom was 
required to justify additive aggregation in construction of the global value 
function. However, the only demand on the global value function was that it be 
order preserving. Where outcomes are uncertain, the additional requirement that 
the expected utility hypothesis be satisfied demands a different form of independence 
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between criteria. It is the precise nature of tha'le independence assumptions that 
motivate the use of a specific functional form for the global utility function. In 
this section the various assumptions of independence are traced through to their 
corresponding global utility functions. We make use of the notation uj(a) to refer to 
the utility of a specific alternative a on criterion j. 
Utility Independence A criteria space is defined as Zl x Z2 x· .. X Zm and partitioned 
into (X, Y). Then if preferences between lotteries over (X, Y) for fixed Y 
depend only on the marginal probability distributions of X and not on the fixed 
level of Y then the attributes in X are utility independent of the attributes in 
Y. If the reverse is also true Y is utility independent of X, then mutual 
utility independence holds between the attributes in X and Y. 
If each attribute is utility independent of the remaining attributes, but full mutual 
independence does not hold, then the utility function has the multi-linear form: 
m m 
j=l i=l i<j<m (3.1) 
If the attributes are mutually utility independent for all partitions (X, Y) then (3.1) 
becomes the special case of the multiplicative utility function: 
m 
1 + ",U(a) = Il[1 + "'wjuj(a)] 
j=l 
where 1 + '" = Il[1 + "'Wj] 
j=l 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
Additive Independence Additive independence is said to hold if preferences be-
tween lotteries depend only on the marginal probability distributions of the Zj, 
such that for example, 'Vx, x' E X and 'Vy, y' E Y, 
{0.5, (x, y); 0.5, (x', yin rv {0.5, (x, y'); 0.5, (x', yn 
If attributes Zl, Z2, ... ,Zm are additively independent, the global utility function can 
be expressed as the special case of (3.2) when", = 0 in an additive form: 
m 
U(a) L wjuj(a) 
.j=l 
(3.4) 
Just as independence assumptions have implications for the functional form of the 
utility function, various attitudes towards risk also exert an influence. The two most 
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important issues are whether the DM always the expected value of a lottery to 
lottery itself Le. is risk averse for all outcomes, or vice versa i.e. is risk prone for 
all outcomes, and the strength of the aversion or proneness to risk. It can be shown 
[48] that a DM who is risk averse always has a concave utility function, while a risk 
prone DM's utility function is always convex. modelling of risk attitudes into the 
decision process is therefore appealing both as an aid to consistent evaluation and as 
an opportunity for the decision maker to better understand the nature of his or her 
and the implications for choice. 
The axiomatic base of MAUT has allowed for a comprehensive study of model prop-
erties, so that the theoretical basis of MAUT is well established, yet there is a per-
ceived gap between theoretical development i.e. traditionally academically orientated 
research, and widespread practical usage [109]. A brief example of a hypothetical 
decision process expresses the difficulties that may give to this gap. For the mul-
tiplicative model (3.2), the final choice is that alternative maximising expected utility 
i.e. 
mfx E [IT (1 + KWjUij)] 
J=l 
(3.5) 
The calculation of expected utility requires knowledge of all cross-product moments 
up to order m. In most practical cases the evaluation of marginal probability distrib-
utions is a time-consuming and difficult task; it is difficult to conceive of widespread 
use of any method that places even more arduous demands on its users. A natural 
question is then to ask to what extent simplifications to the utility model affect the 
integrity of the results. A persistent and fundamental contradiction [85] in the 
general advancement of methods designed to incorporate the violations of rationality 
axioms, and the apparently inconsequential results of simplifications that in effect 'in-
duce' violations. As an approximation of (3.5) one may reverse the of product 
and expectation: 
(3.6) 
This simplified representation requires only marginal probability distributions, and 
effectively makes the assumption that the criteria are stochastically independent. A 
further simplification is to reduce the model to an additive form: 
(3.7) 
Note that the second simplification (3.7) excludes three aspects of the multiplicative 
representation from consideration: the unit constant, the multiplicative factor K and 
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all the higher order terms. The first two exclusions imply that the Uij of the multi-
plicative model and the Uij of the additive simplification are not necessarily the same. 
However, they are related through a positive affine transformation, and are therefore 
strategically equivalent i.e. they represent the same set of preferences. Other effects of 
both simplifications were analysed by Stewart [85], who found the effects to be min-
imal in terms of incorrect representation of decision maker preferences, particularly 
when contrasted with those errors introduced by incorrect assessment of the marginal 
utility functions. Where preference reversals did occur, alternatives were generally so 
similar that any sensitivity analysis would have detected the near indifference. This 
suggests that a simplified representation coupled with a detailed sensitivity analysis 
will in nearly all cases provide the same level of decision aid as more complex models. 
3.1.2 Scenario-based Approaches 
The role of the probabilities was vital in bridging the gap between deterministic 
MAVT and stochastic MAUT. The aggregation of the uncertain outcomes into expec-
tations implied further requirements in order to satisfy the expected utility hypothesis. 
The analogous choice in a scenario-based value function approach is therefore a vital 
but seldom stated one: do we want to aggregate over scenarios using probabilities to 
find expected utilities? Advocates of scenario planning [96, 101, 106] would say not, 
emphasising the consideration of the totality of information in search of an alterna-
tive which performs well in all eventualities. In such a case the desired output is p 
rank orders, implying that a value theory framework is sufficient. However, many 
practical cases do use scenario probabilities to form expectations, and Pomerol [71] 
has argued to the effect that the maximin criterion implied by scenario planners is 
overly pessimistic. 
In any case it does not seem unreasonable to attempt to aggregate over scenarios in 
some way. In a small sized problem the formulation giving p complete rank orders 
may be enough to arrive at a decision, but for any moderate to large size problem 
the interpretation of the n x p matrix of evaluations may benefit from some form 
of summary. The nature of the summary is largely dependent on the needs of the 
decision maker: it may take the form of an expected utility, but also might include 
other weightings, graphical aid, variance measures or deviations from some reference 
point if these can be specified. The latter aggregations all imply a value theoretical 
treatment. In cases where expected utilities are computed, we must operate in the 
utility theory framework defined by the usual Von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. 
This will have implications for the construction of the utility functions as well as the 
aggregation. However, for ease of presentation in this section we refer to both as 
value functions, except where confusion may arise. 
The construction of the global value function itself involves some important practi-
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cal issues raised by Stewart [87]. The assumption of preferential independence was 
required to ensure the validity of the additive representation. Within the context 
of conventional (not scenario-based) MAVT it is advisable to restructure a problem 
when preferential independence is found not to hold between two or more criteria. 
The question as to whether there are a priori reasons to expect the scenarios to cause 
preferential independence violations cannot be answered in a general sense, although 
the actual assessment of violations may prove more difficult when scenarios are in-
corporated. 
A potential problem associated with the use of scenarios may arise out of causal 
(rather than preferential) dependencies where the relative tradeoffs between two cri-
teria are viewed differently under strongly diverse scenarios. We conjecture that 
the additional qualitative information discovered during the construction of scenarios 
might potentially change the tradeoff preferences of the decision maker substantially. 
Where alternatives have been evaluated over each criterion-scenario combination, 
any potential problems associated with capturing changing preferences over scenarios 
would be avoided, since each scenario is considered separately. Preferences, for the 
criterion in question, would be represented by p separate marginal value functions, 
not necessarily all different. This offers a potential solution where such structural 
problems have occurred in practice. Another related suggestion might be to use an 
alternative elicitation technique in the rating of the alternative-scenario combinations 
- for example the direct rating method. 
The construction of different marginal value functions Vjk for each criterion-scenario 
combination has not been directly proposed in the literature, although there have 
been some allowances for changing preferences over scenarios in other areas [51]. It is 
helpful to attempt to reconcile the ideas of MAUT with the proposed construction. 
Typically, evaluations of values are performed by asking lottery-type questions for a 
criterion j in order to generate a marginal value function Vj' Then, a swing weight 
Wj is defined by considering the relative importance of, for example, the extreme 
points of the function relative to those of the other criteria. What does this assume? 
We may certainly write out a marginal value function in each scenario; although dif-
ferent scenarios might operate in different regions of the value function, the global 
form of the marginal value function may be assumed to remain the same. Now, if 
the value to the DM of a change in the underlying attribute from 0 (or the global 
minimum) to x in all scenarios is not the same for all x, there is no justification for 
the single value function over criterion j i.e. there exists a one-to-many relationship 
between the underlying attributes and the values. This implies that the evaluation 
of alternative-scenario combinations over each criterion (as in MAUT) is valid only 
when 
(3.8) 
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We conjecture that where an alternative-focused construction of scenarios occurs, the 
marginal value functions are elicited with respect to an implicit status quo or ref-
erence scenario. It may well occur that as a result the functions elicited from the 
DM do not capture the full range of preferences. The extent to which this is true 
and affects the progression of the analysis is difficult to answer. The detailed cause-
and-effect structure of the scenarios allows for the construction and exploration of 
additional qualitative information. The question then is to what extent the addi-
tional information influences the preferences of the DM, or at least the awareness 
of those preferences. A follow-up question is whether the influence is sufficient to 
warrant the complexity of allowing preferences to change over scenarios. 
Decision makers may in general struggle to consider attributes within the context of 
a given scenario, particularly when that scenario may be extreme. Certainly, MAUT 
represents an already complex approach for facilitated decision aid. It is important 
not to provide total accommodation of aspects that in many cases might have little 
or no effect on the success of the analysis. 
In both cases the choice of domain (criterion-scenario or just criterion) for the value 
function implies a natural consequence for the assessment of weights. If alternative-
scenario combinations have been rated over each criterion, then a 0-100 swing in value 
will incorporate all p scenarios, so that assessments of weights by questions like 'Is a 
0-100 increase in criterion 1 preferable to a 0-100 increase in criterion 2?' naturally 
elicit a m x 1 vector of joint weightings, which can be used to compute aggregate 
evaluations for alternative a in the p scenarios by 
m 
Vk(a) L WjVjk(a) 
j=l 
(3.9) 
Note that the weighting vector Wj is constant over all p scenarios, due to the eval-
uation of the alternative-scenario combinations over criterion incorporating the 
relative importance of each scenario in the definition of the partial value functions, 
and consequently also in the joint weightings. 
On the other hand, if alternatives have been rated over each criterion-scenario com-
bination, the weighting issues become considerably more complex. 0-100 swing in 
value will incorporate only one scenario, so that two lines of questioning can be fol-
lowed: the first attempts to simultaneously capture importance information on both 
criteria and scenarios i.e. to elicit the joint weights directly, while the second elicits 
separately the importance information for criteria and scenarios before aggregating 
them into a joint weighting. It is helpful at this stage to return to the value tree for-
mulation discussed on page 31. There we suggested that the scenarios be placed in the 
second-highest level of the value tree as parents to p structurally similar 'within sce-
nario' value trees. For ease of presentation we assume that the within-scenario value 
trees are identical, which might often but not always be the case, so that there are mp 
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lower-level criteria. We may then consider the distinction between the elicitation of 
cumulative and relative weights discussed in [7]. Cumulative weights are assessed over 
all bottom-level criteria simultaneously, and are traditionally normalised to sum to 1. 
Relative weights, on the other hand, are assessed within families of criteria i.e. those 
criteria sharing the same parent, and are normalised to sum to 1 within that family. 
Depending on the levels of the value tree and the consequential choice of parent, dif-
ferent types of relative weights can be elicited. For our purposes, we consider only the 
choice of scenarios as bases for the relative weighting of bottom-level criteria. From 
an algebraic point of view, the use of relative and cumulative weights is equivalent. 
The cumulative weight of a bottom-level criterion is simply the product of its relative 
weight in comparison to its siblings and the relative weight of its parent, in this case 
the scenario to which it belongs. 
In the scenario-based decision problem, the direct joint weighting is a rather straight-
forward extension of the elicitation of cumulative weights that considers each criterion-
scenario combination as a bottom-level criterion, so that we may ask 'In which 
criterion-scenario combination is a 0-100 increase most desirable?'. Although techni-
cally this may appear simple, practically it is likely to be far less so. The elicitation 
procedure demands that DM's weigh up different criteria and different scenarios si-
multaneously, which might be particularly difficult if the two are not independent i.e. 
if some criteria become relatively more important under different scenarios. Further-
more the elicitation of all mp criterion-scenario weights is likely to prove tedious for 
even moderate-sized problems. 
In response to these difficulties we may turn to the second elicitation approach, in 
which information about the relative importance of criteria and scenarios are elicited 
separately. In this process we initially consider each of the p scenarios separately, 
eliciting relative criterion weights within each scenario using questions such as 'Is 
a 0-100 increase in criterion 1 preferable to a 0-100 increase in criterion 2 under 
scenario 1?'. The proposed line of questioning addresses the relative importance of 
each criterion, but no scenario information is elicited. The result is a set of pm x 1 
vectors of relative criterion weights 'l/Jjk, one vector for each scenario, indicating the 
weight of criterion j under the conditions of scenario k. Naturally it is possible to 
consider further breaking down the within-scenario weight elicitation by considering 
intermediate level criteria to be parents of the bottom-level criteria and children of 
the scenarios. However, we do not lose any generality by assuming that this is not 
the case, and rather that the relative criterion weights sum to 1 within each scenario. 
In order to arrive at a cumulative weighting it is still necessary to obtain an esti-
mate of the relative importance of each scenario. The elicitation and interpretation 
of weights for higher-level criteria is not straightforward. Although in comparing two 
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higher-level criteria the DM should technically be considering relative effect of 
a simultaneous 0-100 swing on all sub-criteria of the higher-level criteria, this often 
gives way to the use of more abstract notions of importance in the interests of practi-
cal ease. Such practice leads easily to confusion about the meaning of importance and 
subsequent inconsistency. Instead the relative scenario weights may be quite easily 
obtained by extracting one criteria from each scenario and comparing them in the 
usual s\\ing weighting sense. vVe would suggest the choice of the same criterion j 
in each scenario in order to focus the DM's attention on the fact that it is scenario 
weights that are being elicited, although there are no algebraic reasons why different 
criteria cannot be used. The elicitation process can and should be repeated with other 
criteria as a consistency check. The choice of the criteria used should ultimately be 
based on the ease with which the DM is able to think about the available tradeoffs, 
and is at the discretion of the analyst. In any case, the result is a set of p relative sce-
nario weights ¢k. joint or cumulative weighting Wjk can be found by multiplying 
the relative scenario weights ¢k by the relative criterion weights 'l/Jjk. 
m 
Vk(a) = ¢k L 'l/JjkVjk(a) 
j=l 
(3.lO) 
The weighting vector is now different over the p scenarios, but the results of the com-
putations remain aggregate evaluations for alternative a in each of the p scenarios. 
The relative importance of the scenarios is now taken into account through the calcu-
lation of the weights ¢k rather than through the partial value functions. An 
important point is that if all that is desired is a rank ordering in each of the p scenar-
ios, we need not even consider the scenario weights. The tradeoff between simplicity 
of the value function and concise elicitation of importance weights is clear: using the 
criterion domain requires complex partial value function construction but relatively 
simple weight elicitation, while using the criterion-scenario domain requires more 
man ding elicitations, but simpler constructions of the partial value functions. 
Both may be used simultaneously as a consistency check, although in most practical 
circumstances this will be too time-consuming to be a feasible option. 
As a final point on the issue of weight elicitation, we mention the possibility of a 
second approach for eliciting the relative weights. Instead of first eliciting the im-
portance of criterion j given scenario k, we may invert the process to consider the 
weight of scenario k given criterion j, using questions of the form 'Is a 0-100 increase 
in criterion 1 more preferable under scenario A or B?'. This relative weight-
would be followed by the elicitation of relative criterion weights by extracting 
one scenario from each parent criterion, analogously to the process already outlined. 
Although either weighting approach is technically valid, we restrict further attention 
to the latter approach on the basis that it appears more compatible with scenario 
thinking by obtaining information within each scenario. 
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As mentioned previously, the final form of the aggregation is an open question de-
pending largely on the goals of the DM. It is important to draw the distinction 
between the notions of robustness implied by scenario planning and the compen-
satory aggregation implied by more traditional MCDM approaches. The search for 
a robust alternative suggests some sort of maximin aggregation, although to avoid 
overly pessimistic behaviour it may be beneficial to consider 'approximately robust' 
alternatives [76], that is alternatives performing satisfactorily in almost all scenarios. 
The idea of good performance in all scenarios is perhaps unrealistic in the context of 
general MCDM problems, but the negligibility of poor performance is dependent on 
the DM and the problem faced. The extent to which this should and does occur are 
important questions. Lehman [55] has provided some answers to the former, defining 
a negligible scenario as one in which any changes the corresponding outcomes are 
insufficient to change the DM's preferences for a particular alternative. 
Within the traditional forms of aggregation, it is possible to obtain a global value 
score for each alternative by summation over the p scenarios 
p 
yea) = L Vk(a) (3.11) 
k=l 
Note that no additional weighting is required regardless of whether (3.9) or (3.10) 
is used. Both approaches have already incorporated the relative importance of each 
scenario in the construction of the Vk • If probabilities are used, 
p 
Yea) = L Pr[k]Vk(a) (3.12) 
k=l 
We have made use of Stewart's result to the extent that an additive approximation 
may be made with little detriment to the results [85]. Note that this relates only 
to the form of the value function, and not to the approximation abilities of the 
scenarios themselves. A troubling aspect is the lack of interpretation for the scenario 
probabilities in any natural sense, although often relative likelihood is used as a 
surrogate measure [2, 57]. This may not be such a problem if one is willing to accept 
the narrowing of scope that the approximation in (3.12) implies. If relative likelihoods 
are used, the optimal alternative is merely that one which maximises utility over the p 
scenarios. It must then be accepted that if the choice of scenarios does not adequately 
bound the set of all future states i.e. none of the scenarios occur, then the choice may 
have been suboptimal. This emphasises the importance of careful scenario generation. 
3.1.3 Non-Expected Utility Theory 
The so-called non-expected utility methods were predominantly developed as eco-
nomic models of individual choice under uncertainty, with some assistance from the 
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psychological modelling of potential heuristics used by decision makers. The emer-
gence of the non-expected utility models in the late 1970's was an attempt to reconcile 
the tractability of optimising a single utility function with the axiomatic violations, 
particularly of independence, which occurred in practice. As such, the focus is far 
more on a descriptive theory of decision making taking place in a single dimensional 
framework, which takes this section out of the scope of this thesis to some extent. 
However, in light of the earlier discussion on the possible advantages of incorporating 
these violations into a decision model, it is instructive to see how these accommo-
dations have been made. This section is limited to a discussion of two of the more 
accepted and useful non-expected utility models: prospect theory is strongly focused 
on descriptive accuracy, while rank-dependent expected utility is, as its name 
gests, proposed as an extension of Starmer [83] gives details of around ten more 
non-expected utility theoriPB. 
There are two fundamental concepts in the non-expected utility models. One is the 
notion of a reference point against which outcomes should be evaluated in order to 
allow for differential treatment of perceived gains and losses [12]. Then, subjective 
attitudes towards probabilities are often responsible for the psychological weight at-
tached to an event, called the decision weight, differing from the probability of that 
event. Wu and Gonzalez [107] offer evidence of this, as well as the two possible 
explanations of sub additive probability judgments and subjective weighting for the 
nonlinear relationship. A nonlinear decision weighting function may cause problems 
eliciting utilities using standard procedures such as the certainty equivalent method, 
since those questions posed to the decision maker may no longer have the same inter-
pretation for analyst decision maker. In general, the distortion of probabilities 
overweights low probability events while underweighting high probability events, re-
sulting in an 'inverted s-shaped' decision weighting function that is concave below an 
inflection point and convex above. 
One of the earliest and most popular models was the prospect theory proposed by 
Kahneman and Tversky [41] in the field of applied psychology as a procedural rep-
resentation of decision making as a two-stage process. The first comprises an 
editing phase in which alternatives are subjected to a number of decision heuristics 
in order to simplify the evaluation and selection tasks of the second phase. In this 
second phase, a choice is made using evaluations of alternatives via a utility function 
U(a) = Li 7r(Pi)U(Xi), where the 7r(.) allows for alternate weighting of probabilities 
and the outcomes Xi are interpreted as gains or losses relative to a reference point. 
The shape of the utility function is prespecified to be concave for gains, convex for 
losses and in the domain of losses. These properties are interpreted as im-
plications of diminishing marginal utility and loss aversion. inverted s-shaped 
weighting function is advocated based on the assumption that the end points of the 
probability scale i.e. 0 and 1, represent natural reference points so that diminishing 
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marginal sensitivity implies steepness around these points. Prospect theory suffers 
from a number of faults, particularly from a normative point of view. An application 
of prospect theory may result in the selection of stochastically dominated alternatives 
due to the direct transformation of probabilities into decision weights causing non-
monotonicity in U(·). This is a particularly damaging property which is raised by 
many as a fatal objection, even in a descriptive context [83]. The selection of dom-
inated alternatives is addressed by including the deletion of all detected dominated 
alternatives in the editing phase, which then gives the editing phase the appearance 
of a safety net, albeit at the beginning of the process. In addition, from any practical 
perspective the detection of dominance will be a difficult or impossible task. Never-
theless, desirable features such as nonlinear decision weights and reference levels were 
included in later construction of more conventional non-expected utility models. 
Rank-dependent expected utility theory (RDEUT) was proposed by Quiggin [73] 
and has been described as 'the most natural and useful modification of the classical 
expected utility formula' [58]. The key feature of the RDEU model is its use of cumu-
lative probabilities in the calculation of the decision weights to ensure monotonicity 
of the utility function. This has the very appealing property that the weight a..c;signed 
to an outcome depends not only on its true probability, but on its ranking relative to 
other outcomes. If outcomes are ranked from worst to best, Xl, . .. , Xr then weights 
are given by 
7r (Pi + ... + Pr) 
7r(Pi) 
7r(Pi+l+"'+Pr) fori=l, ... ,r 
for i = r 
1 (3.13) 
Rank-dependent expected utility theory comes closest to addressing the true concerns 
about EUT by transforming the probabilities into measures that may more funda-
mentally represent decision maker sentiment when making choices under uncertainty. 
The inverted s-shaped weighting function 7r(')' which overweights low-ranked out-
comes relative to higher-ranked outcomes, has the interpretation of pessimism, and 
shares a close association with risk aversion in utility function [83]. From an ax-
iomatic point of view, RDEUT relaxes the independence axiom of by demanding 
that preferences between lotteries be unaffected by substitutions of common outcomes 
that leave the rank order of outcomes in both lotteries unaffected, a condition known 
as co-monotonic independence. 
As mentioned in the introduction to this subsection, the non-expected utility theory 
methods have been developed in the context of maximising a single utility function 
Le. for a single criterion decision problem. While the extensions and modifications 
proposed by the non-expected utility theorists allow for a more detailed modelling of 
preferences, they are often considerably more complex than the model suggested by 
EUT. In context of multicriteria decision modelling, each criterion would need to 
be extended to incorporate non-expected utility characteristics, so that the complex-
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ity of the model would increase rapidly in the number of criteria considered. It seems 
plausible to suggest that this perceived complexity may have prevented non-expected 
utility theory from making a greater contribution to MCDM. 
3.2 Outranking Methods 
The development of the outranking methods has to a large extent proceeded inde-
pendently of any treatment of risk. Although some attempts have been made to 
incorporate stochastic evaluations into an outranking process, there appears not to 
have been any discussion as to what the desirable aspects of such a treatment are. 
As a result, the proposed models give the impression of improvisations rather than 
structured attempts to bridge the gap between deterministic and stochastic models. 
This is a direct consequence of the well-known lack of axiomatic development in the 
outranking methods [97]. 
3.2.1 Pairwise Reduction of Probability Distributions 
The evaluation of each alternative i on criterion j results in a probability distribution 
fii defined over the random variable representing the relevant attribute value. 
The methods described here reduce the problem to the pairwise comparison of these 
distributions, so that in the spirit of outranking one may say whether the probability 
distribution fai is at least as preferable as the distribution fbi' As mentioned, the 
methods differ considerably with respect to the manner of comparison. 
In 1977 Jacquet-Lagreze [38] proposed the treatment of distributional evaluations 
in the context of outranking. The method consists of a two-stage process. In the 
first stage, the intersection of the two probability mass functions is removed and 
interpreted as evidence in support of indifference. In the second stage, the remaining 
probability mass on each event is examined via the cumulative distributions and 
portioned out as evidence either that alternative a is preferred to b, or that alternative 
b is preferred to a. In a setting where probabilities are defined over a discrete event 
space E = {eI, ... , eh, ... , ep }, an algorithm is provided consisting of setting up a 
p x p crosstabulation of the two probability mass functions fai and fbi' Row totals 
obtained by summation over columns thus represent the probability of obtaining 
precisely the event eh for alternative b i.e. fbi (eh) , while column totals represent the 
probability of obtaining the event eh for alternative a, i.e. fai( eh). The diagonal 
elements provide evidence that a is indifferent to b, lower triangular elements provide 
evidence supporting the preference of a over b, and upper triangular elements provide 
evidence supporting the preference of b over a. It is then possible to aggregate each 
measure over all criteria by using a weighted summation of the individual preference 
measures, analogous to the deterministic aggregation of ELECTRE I. Although the 
method is algorithmically simple, conceptually it is far less so. The elements of the 
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crosstabulation appear to have no concrete interpretation outside of their membership 
to a specific type of evidence; certainly their probabilistic meaning is unclear. Then, 
the incorporation of preference thresholds will considerably complicate the method 
conceptually and computationally. Again, lack of firm physical interpretations make 
it difficult to see how this interesting method might be reconciled with more modern 
outranking approaches. 
A second suite of models [21, 61, 62] compares distributions by constructing a matrix 
pj whose entries Pib denote the probability that alternative a is superior to alternative 
b on criterion j i.e. Pr[zj(a) 2': zj(b)]. The models differ with respect to the subsequent 
exploitation of the probabilities. 
Dendrou et al. [21] simply aggregate the Pib over criteria to arrive at a global index 
for each pairwise comparison 
m 
Pab L WjPib 
j=l 
(3.14) 
where Wj is interpreted by the authors as the probability that criterion j is decisive in 
the assertion that alternative a is superior to b. It is not clear what, if any, advantages 
this operationally difficult interpretation has over the traditional voting one. The 
probabilities can be represented in a matrix P. The global pairwise comparisons are 
further aggregated according to the joint probability 
(3.15) 
A rank order is based on descending values of '"'(i. Note that the evaluations in (3.15) 
imply that if an alternative a is dominated by any other alternative, then fa = O. 
Finally, the model presented here can be linked to traditional ELECTRE models by 
defining an 'agreement matrix' P and a 'disagreement matrix' I-P, corresponding to 
notions of concordance and discordance respectively. 
Martel et al. [61, 62] extend the previous approach to incorporate more sophisticated 
measures of outranking. A confidence index cj{a, b) indicating the support for the 
statement that a outranks b is defined over Pib' taking into account various indiffer-
ence and preference thresholds. Then a local doubt index dj(a, b) corresponding to 
discordance is constructed in a two-stage process. In the first stage, a disagreement 
index is defined with the following desirable properties 
• Increases with the expected value of the excess of zj(b) over (a) . 
• Increases with the weight Wj attached to criterion j. 
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• Decreases with the dispersion of the distributional evaluations for zj(a) and 
zj(b ). 
In the second stage, the disagreement index is augmented with indifference and pref-
erence thresholds to form the local doubt index. Note that the distributional aspect 
of the problem is fully absorbed into the problem by this stage through the definition 
of the P~b and the disagreement index. The aggregation and exploitation of the con-
fidence and doubt indices may proceed as for the deterministic ELECTRE III modeL 
Two issues should be noted. Firstly, the thresholds model the ambiguity or fuzziness 
of the DM's preferences; this model is therefore one of the few to integrate more than 
one type of uncertainty into an MCDM method. Then, thresholds must be defined 
either in terms of probabilities P~b or the even more abstract disagreement index. It 
is an interesting behavioural question whether the DM is able to work vvith these 
concepts to confidently specify the thresholds. 
The third and most recent group of techniques for the pairwise comparison of prob-
ability distributions was proposed by Zaras and Martel [112], and uses concepts of 
stochastic dominance. For a single criterion, stochastic dominance is a collection of 
pairwise distributional comparisons that can be used to evaluate the expression that 
alternative a is at least as good as alternative b. The stochastic dominance relations 
are defined as 
Faj >1 Fbj ~ H1(x) Faj(x) - (x) :s; 0, \Ix E [0,(0) (3.16) 
Faj >2 Fbj ~ H2 (x) = lX HI (y)dy :s; 0, \Ix [0, (0) (3.17) 
Faj >3 ~ H3(X) lX H2 (y)dy :s; 0, \Ix E [0, (0) (3.18) 
where the relation >i is referred to as first-, second-, and third-degree stochastic dom-
inance for 'i (1,2,3) respectively. By assuming different classes of utility functions, 
it is possible to express preferences consistent with the expected utility hypothesis, 
in terms of only stochastic dominance relations. 
E[U(a)] > E[U(b)], \I U1 
E[U(a)] > E[U(b)], \lU2 
E[U(a)] > E[U(b)], \lU3 
(3.19) 
(3.20) 
(3.21) 
where U1 is the class of all increasing utility functions, U2 is the class of all utility 
functions that are concave and belong to U1 , and U3 is the class of all utility functions 
that are decreasingly risk averse and belong to U2 . Similar conditions have been 
provided for convex utility functions [111]. 
When moving into a multicriteria framework, Huang et aL [36] have shown that a 
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necessary condition for multiattribute stochastic dominance is stochastic dominance 
on each individual criterion. Given the conflicting nature of multicriteria problems, 
this is hardly an operationally useful result. The authors therefore propose the use 
of a weighted aggregation 
m 
C(a, b) = L wjcj(a, b) (3.22) 
j=1 
where Cj( a, b) = 1 if a stochastically dominates b on criterion j, and is otherwise zero. 
This results in a concordance index as for ELECTRE I. particular, this allows for 
the specification of only a subset of attributes via the choice of appropriate thresholds. 
More recently, Zaras [111] has proposed a rough set approach to finding a suitable 
set of criteria to model multivariate stochastic dominance. 
Martel et al. [60] and Azondekon et al. [3] have considered stochastic dominance as 
a more general measure of preference, by defining a local preference index 
cj(a, b ) {
(Jj(a, b)(j(a, b)Oj(a, b) if:3i: a b 
o otherwise 
(3.23) 
where (Jj(a, b), (j(a, b), and OJ(a, b) are functions scaled between 0 and 1 that de-
crease as dominance conditions weaken from > 1 to >3. Thus {Jj (a, b) attains its 
maximum only when faj lies completely above fbj, (j(a, b) whenever a >1 b, and 
OJ ( a, b) whenever a >2 b. The previous method can be considered the special case of 
(Jj(a, b)(j(a, b)Oj(a, b) = 1. The graded preference is in accordance with the increased 
difficulty of perceiving preferences between distributions for which weaker dominance 
conditions hold. Local indices can be aggregated into a global outranking index using 
(3.22), following which the matrix of indices may be exploited using an ELECTRE 
III or PROMETHEE procedure. A general problem relating to the practical use of 
the stochastic dominance methods is the rather inaccessible concepts relating to the 
definitions of dominance, particularly of the second- and third-order. There is a dan-
ger that stochastic dominance is viewed as a black box, so that the explanation and 
justification of results and the iterative nature of the decision process is likely to be 
adversely affected. 
3.2.2 Construction of a Distributive Outranking Relation 
In response to the early synthesis of the distributional evaluations performed in the 
previous models, d'Avignon and Vincke [19] proposed a model which, rather than 
summarising the stochastic evaluations as P~b' uses them to proceed to a distributive 
outranking degree indicating the probability of attaining various degrees of outrank-
mg. 
A preference index lj(a, b) denoting the preference for alternative a over alternative 
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b on criterion j is defined for all possible combinations (Zj (a) ,Zj ( b)) of the stochastic 
evaluations and scaled between 0 and 'Wj, where 'Wj is the weight attached to crite-
rion j once all weights have been normalised to sum to one. A degree of preference 
Hj(a, b) indicating the preference for alternative a over b on criterion J' can then be 
associated with the probabilities that Ij(a, b) takes on various values. Provided that 
the evaluations of the alternatives can be considered independent, probability 
corresponding to each Hj(a, b) is given by 
(3.24) 
where faj (er ) is the probability of obtaining event er for alternative a on criterion J', 
and fbj(e s ) is the probability of obtaining event es for alternative b on criterion j. The 
key feature of the method is the construction of this random variable Hj(a, b). The 
aggregation of the preference degree into a distributive outranking relation is made 
more difficult by the distributional aspect of the problem, but proceeds in the spirit 
of the ELEcTRE III and PROMETHEE approaches. Essentially the preference degree 
Hj (a, b) may be aggregated into a pain,vise outranking degree by simple addition over 
criteria, 
m 
Sea, b) = ~ Hj(a, b) 
j=l 
(3.25) 
before distributive measures of average 'strengths' Sea) and 'weaknesses' ~V(a) are 
defined as 
1 
S (a) = n 1 ~ S ( a, b) 
bfa 
1 ~V(a) n _ 1 ~ S(b, a) 
afb 
(3.26) 
(3.27) 
Again, the exploitation of these measures is far more difficult due to their distrib-
utional nature. An initial suggestion [19] is to use the median of the distributions 
to arrive at a rank order with respect to each of strengths and weaknesses. More 
advanced exploitation procedures have been proposed in [19]. Although the distrib-
utive method is impressive from theoretical and methodological points of view, it is 
a complicated algorithm composed of parts for which no firm interpretations seem 
available. Its general practical applicability remains untested. 
3.2.3 Scenario-based Approaches 
As for the value function models, the use of scenarios in outranking applications of 
the scenario approach may proceed in two methodologically different ways, based on 
whether or not we attempt the construction of an outranking relation and subsequent 
48 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
rank order in each scenario, to be tentatively aggregated in the final analysis. There is 
little in the literature to suggest any work on either of these approaches. As mentioned 
before, models treating the problem of uncertainty in the outranking methods tend 
to be isolated from one another, so that there is little unified effort. 
Nevertheless, methods presented in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 all involve direct use 
of user-specified probability distributions. From a methodological point of view, it 
makes no difference whether the full or reduced probability distribution is used, so that 
these methods may be applied without modification. There are, however, practical 
implications of such scenario-based reductions which raise important questions. Both 
the number of scenarios and the way in which scenarios are selected are likely to 
strongly influence the results. This is also true for the value theory models, but is 
especially clear in the context of methods pairwise comparisons of probability 
distributions Le. the methods of Jacquet-Lagreze [38], Martel et al. [61], and Zaras 
et aL [112]. Whether the direct comparison of probability distributions these 
methods more sensitive to scenario selection is a question that could be investigated 
reasonably easily via simulation. It would appear crucial to maintain the same spread 
as the full probability distribution, perhaps the form of some extreme quartiles. 
Such a strategy would coincide with the traditionally popular approach of selecting 
the best- and worst-cases before (qualitatively) interpolating between them to select 
the remaining p 2 scenarios. The work of Keefer and Bodily [46] in approximating 
probability distributions is likely to be particularly relevant to the outranking methods 
in this context. 
If we wish to take a different approach to risk by building up a deterministic model 
in each scenario, then it becomes necessary to view the scenarios as part of the 
objectives hierarchy. As discussed earlier, the scenarios fit naturally into the second 
level of the hierarchy, giving an :NICDYI super-problem consisting of p structurally 
similar problems. The issues of interest are the definitions of the concordance and 
discordance measures, the assessment of weights, and the manner of aggregation. 
The method of evaluating alternatives over each criterion-scenario combination will 
proceed in a similar way to deterministic outranking methods. Concordance and 
discordance measures on each criterion can be computed separately for each scenario, 
although the precise nature of the computations will depend on which outranking 
method is employed. The ELECTRE I measures are given by 
C(a, b) 
D(a, b) 
2.:::(j,k)E~(a,b) Wjk 
2.:::7=1 Wjk 
{
I if 3(j, k) : Zjk(a) 
o otherwise. 
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where ~(a, b) is the set of all criterion-scenario combinations for which a is indifferent 
or preferred to b, and tjk are veto thresholds for criterion j and scenario k. The 
ELECTRE III measures are defined as 
o 
o 
zjk(b) - (Zjk(a) + 
tjk -
1 
if Zjk(a) + t;k :2: zjk(b), 
if Zjk(a) + tjk S zjk(b) S Zjk(a) + t~k' (3.30) 
if Zjk(a) + t~k S zjk(b). 
if zjk(b) S Zjk(a) + t~k' 
if Zjk( a) + t~k :2: zjk(b) :2: Zjk (a) + tjk' (3.31) 
if zjk(b) 2': Zjk(a) + tjk' 
where tjk,t~k and tjk are the indifference, preference and veto thresholds respectively, 
so that t;k < t~k < tjk' The notion of discordance may prove more problematic in a 
scenario context. Specifically, discordance means that if performance is poor enough 
on a criterion, even in one scenario, then that outranking relation is vetoed. This 
implies a strict condition, so that care should be taken that the veto thresholds are 
consistent with such an interpretation. In particular, it appears that performances in 
a single scenario would need to be extreme in order to incur a veto. 
The question of changing preference structures over scenarios is raised briefly once 
again. In a manner similar to the specification of the marginal value functions, it 
is theoretically possible to specify different threshold v-alues in each scenario. Since 
all thresholds may be functions of Zj, the scenario-based modifications are matters 
of preference rather than the attribute domain of a particular scenario. It is again 
an interesting behavioural question whether certain circumstances can be imposed 
which might lead the DM to consider tightening or loosening thresholds depending on 
which scenario is considered. As we are considering each scenario independently of the 
others, weights are permitted to differ across scenarios to reflect different importance 
judgements by the DM. Similarly to the elicitation of weights discussed on page 
38 for the scenario-based value function method, weights may either be assessed as 
the joint importance Wjk of criterion j under scenario k i.e. direct elicitation of the 
cumulative weights, or as the product of the relative criteria weights 7/Jjk and relative 
scenario weights ¢k. The different interpretation of the weights attached to each 
outranking criterion-scenario imply the need for different assessment procedures. In 
particular, the relative scenario weights might proceed as before by extracting one 
criterion from each scenario, or could assess the (essentially abstract) importance of 
each scenario directly. The technical incorporation of scenario-dependent weights is 
secondary to considerations of ease of use and interpretability. As before, it is not 
clear whether decision makers are able to isolate their preferences conditional on a 
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particular scenario. Furthermore, where this is possible, it is not clear how demanding 
this task is, and to what extent it is a desirable aspect of a decision aid (in terms of 
insight gained and effect on results). 
The outranking method at this stage consists of a set of m concordance measures 
Cjk(a, b) and m discordance measures djk(a, b) for each scenario, each considering the 
statement 'alternative a outranks alternative b on criterion j in scenario k'. The 
degree of aggregation depends on the demands of the DM. If all that is required is 
an evaluation within each scenario, then the construction of an outranking relation 
in each of the p scenarios can proceed as for the deterministic outranking methods. 
That is, we may define an aggregate concordance measure 
C ( b) = 2:=;:1 WjkCjk(a, b) Jk a, ,\""m 
6j=1 Wjk (3.32) 
that can be compared to the set of j discordance indices in order to build the out-
ranking relation in scenario k. Without trivialising this often difficult step, we can 
refer to section 2.1.2 and assume that such an aggregation has resulted in a set of p 
outranking relations. This provides the DM with at least a partial rank ordering in 
each scenario, which from the perspective of scenario planning is seen as the most 
important output. We can note that since no aggregation is occuring over scenarios, 
it is possible to use either the cumulative weights Wjk, or the relative criterion weights 
'l/Jjk. It is not necessary to explicitly consider the relative scenario weights ¢k. 
Nevertheless, it might be beneficial to consider further aggregation over scenarios. 
Such an aggregation would result in an outranking relation considering the proposal 
that 'alternative a outranks b' in a global sense. The aggregation of concordance 
measures across scenarios takes the form of the simple summation 
p 
C(a, b) L Ck(a, b) (3.33) 
k=l 
provided that the scenario weights have been incorporated into the earlier construc-
tion of the Ck(a, b). The treatment of the discordance indices can consider each of 
the jk criterion-scenario combinations analogously to a criterion in a deterministic 
outranking context, so that the global discordance measure can be written as 
where 
D(a,b) = IIf(djk(a,b),C(a, b)) 
j,k 
f(djk(a,b),C(a,b)) = {~ djk(a,b) 
1 - C(a, b) 
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The data for the problem therefore resembles exactly the input for a deterministic 
outranking method. Based on this super-outranking problem a final outranking re-
lation is contructed with respect to the chosen method. For example, the ELECTRE 
III credibility index is again given by S(a, b) C(a, b)D(a, b). 
An obvious point is that we have not included scenario probabilities at any stage of 
the analysis. The lack of axiomatic assistance and the behavioural fuzziness around 
the notions of thresholds and weights makes it difficult to decisively identify where 
probabilities might be included. The flexibility around the definitions of the weights 
provides some scope to include notions of relative likelihood as well as relative 
portance there. This would imply that (3.33) could simply be modified to reflect 
the inclusion of probabilities. Although the notion of discordance appears to exclude 
probabilities by much the same justification by which weights are excluded from con-
sideration, it seems likely that the relative likelihood of different scenarios will have an 
impact on the setting of veto thresholds. In such a relationship, a less likely scenario 
would require larger differences in performance to induce a veto, all else equal. A 
more precise characterisation of this relationship, and the abilities of decision makers 
to think in such a way, are difficult practical questions. 
As a final point we return briefly to the problem of evaluating alternative-scenario 
combinations over criteria. Although this was the approach followed for MAUT, it 
was shown section 3.1.2 to imply some quite strict conditions. Within the out-
ranking methods, the direct comparison of alternatives on different scenarios takes 
the form of questions to the that alternative-scenario pair (i, k) outranks (j, I). 
This provides additional information reflecting the implied relative importance of 
each scenario, so that it is unnecessary to consider scenario information in the weight 
elicitation. However, the pairwise nature of the comparisons in an outranking context 
may result in unwelcome discordances in this elicitation environment. particular, 
it allows for the possibility that two alternatives may veto each other if performances 
are very different in two scenarios i.e. 'boom' and 'bust' scenarios. These possibilities 
alone preclude the elicitation from general use. 
3.3 Metric Methods 
In a deterministic mathematical programming setting it is assumed that all infor-
mation necessary for representing the decision is known with certainty prior to the 
solution of the model. In practice it may often be extremely difficult or impossible to 
provide numerical values for each of the parameters, either due to future uncertainties 
(e.g. next year's level of rainfall in a reservoir planning problem), unstable or poorly 
understood relationships (e.g. of tourism on the demand for a product), or a mixture 
of the two. In problem contexts where this is the case, an approach that then replaces 
the uncertain parameters with their expected values by making 'reasonable guesses' 
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may be adequate when combined with careful sensitivity analysis. Nevertheless, this 
approach is guilty of 'wishing away' the uncertainty inherent in the system, rather 
than treating the uncertainty directly. Furthermore, where sensitivity analysis indi-
cates that the optimal solution depends strongly on the uncertain values, it makes 
sense to seek the extra flexibility offered by considering the uncertainty in a more 
comprehensive way. 
When one or more of the parameters of a mathematical program is represented as 
a random variable, a stochastic program (SP) results. It is assumed that the joint 
probability distribution function of the random parameters is known, either described 
via marginal distributions if the random variables are independent or using joint dis-
tributions where some dependence exists. In most cases it is assumed that the set of 
all possible outcomes of the random parameters is discrete. 
The formulation of the problem is no longer well-defined in the sense that the 
terpretation of optimisation cannot be clarified until the stochastic parameters are 
observed. This leads naturally into potential solution methods for SP problems. It is 
instructive to consider the area of single objective linear programming (LP), where 
most of the work in stochastic programming has been done. A preliminary method 
in that area is to find a decision that will be feasible for all possible realisations of the 
random parameters. This type of decision is known as a fat decision [42], and will 
typically prove expensive due to the extreme nature of the constraints placed on the 
solution. Beyond the fat solution, there are two standard models differing in their 
approach to incorporating this infeasibility. Recourse models assign a response to the 
outcome of the random variables, so that it is possible to associate costs with the 
violations of constraints. The optimisation criterion is then to maximise or minimise 
the expected objective function value i.e. profit, cost. Chance-constrained models re-
strict the probability of infeasibility to a certain level, and then optimise the objective 
function subject to these probabilistic constraints. Further details of these standard 
treatments, as well as considerable problem of numerical solution, can be found 
in any stochastic programming text e.g. [42, 72J. More recently, Liu and Iwamura [56] 
have proposed a dependent-chance programming model, which optimises the chance 
of satisfying an objective given that some other uncertain events occur. For example, 
the authors present an example maximising probability that costs do not exceed 
a certain level, subject to the fulfilment of two demand constraints with uncertain 
constraint coefficients and RHS constraints. 
Within the framework of metric methods, treatments of risk have been scarce [6]. 
A 1998 goal programming review [92] includes only a few lines on the subject, and 
more recent reviews of goal programming [54] and reference point approaches [104] 
do not mention stochastic variants at all. By considering the four methods presented 
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above within the context of metric methods it is possible to understand the reason 
for the lack of diversity. The key issue is that in moving from an LP framework to 
a GP framework, the notion of satisficing means that it is no longer necessary to 
treat objectives and constraints (as they are defined in LP) differently. A fat solution 
therefore has no real interpretation in G P apart from one satisfying all goals in all cir-
cumstances, which in the rare cases of occurrence would most often be an indication of 
overly unambitious goal setting. Within the context of recourse models, the penalty 
function used there penalises deviations from constraints, and so fulfils the role of the 
deviational variables in GP. The recourse formulation is therefore equivalent to the 
GP formulation minimising the expectation of weighted deviations Le. 
(3.36) 
There appears to be little work done in this regard, although the formulation is 
intuitively appealing and was suggested in the first exploration of stochastic GP by 
Contini [17]. The dependent-chance programming model is applied to the GP problem 
by Liu and Iwamura [56] by placing aspirations on the probabilities of satisfying the 
various objectives and minimising the deviations Le. relegating the probability of 
occurrence to the role of constraint. This is, however, precisely the same as the ideas 
behind the extension of chance-constrained programming to GP, in which the cost 
function previously optimised is now included together with the other probabilistic 
constraints. Aspirations may be specified for some or all of these constraints to change 
them into goals, leaving only the deviations to be minimised. The chance-constrained 
goal programming (CCGP) methods have been the almost exclusive focus of interest 
in the treatment of stochastic outcomes in the metric methods, and it is to these 
developments that we now turn. 
3.3.1 Chance-constrained Goal Programming 
A forerunner to the more well-known CCGP models was proposed by Odom et al. 
[66]. The authors operationalise the idea that the DM wishes to minimise the risk of 
not achieving the desired goals, using the corresponding probabilities. This results 
in a maximisation of the joint probability representing the chance of satisfying all 
goals simultaneously, although a less sensitive aggregation is also proposed based 
on a weighted summation of the logarithms of the individual probabilities on each 
objective. The model falls outside of the sphere of goal programming somewhat, 
since there is no concept of minimising the distance to some ideal. The method here 
examines the probability that the deviational variable for objective j lies outside of 
a user-specified interval, 
n 
Pr [dj ~ L aijxi - bj ~ dt]' (3.37) 
i=l 
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but does not penalise greater or lesser violations any differently. There is therefore no 
attempt to minimise the distance to the aspirations set by the DM. This model seems 
part of a common confusion between linear and goal programming models, linked to 
the tenuous and often philosophical distinction between constraints and goals. For 
example, although (3.37) appears as a LP-type objective function, it is possible to 
think of the formulation as minimising the probabilistic distance to the ideal point 
representing certain satisfaction of each goal i.e. the point (0,0, ... ,0). In fact, the 
authors do make a later provision for a threshold probability on each objective in-
dicating the minimum acceptable degree of satisfaction, without providing further 
details. However, by letting these threshold probabilities be goals with correspond-
ing deviational variables rather than constraints, the model becomes identical to the 
well-known CCGP models developed around that time. 
In work between 1978 and 1980 Keown and Taylor [49] proposed a CCGP model 
to incorporate risk in the RHS constraints by modelling the bj corresponding to the 
constraints as random variables. The GP formulation becomes 
(3.38) 
subject to: 
[t aijXi ;?: bj ] + OJ ;?: gj, j = 1,2 ... , m 
t=1 
(3.39) 
Xi ;?: 0, Vi (3.40) 
where gj is an aspiration for the probability of satisfying objective (constraint) j. The 
authors provide a procedure which converts each chance constraint into a (linear) de-
terministic constraint by assuming that the bj are normally distributed. Only then 
are the deviational variables OJ added. The above formulation is therefore slightly 
contrary to the sequence of the solution algorithm, but provides a better conceptual 
view of the model. Shortly after the model of Keown and Taylor, De et al. [20] 
proposed a similar CCGP model that, instead of incorporating stochastic RHS con-
straints, allowed the constraint coefficients i.e. the aij, to be represented by random 
variables. Although the formulation in (3.38) remains the same, the solution proce-
dure is quite different. The authors provide a procedure to convert the stochastic 
constraints into a deterministic form which is non-linear. This constraint can then 
be linearised using Naslund's approximation [65] before adding deviational variables 
to model aspirations. 
There are some important features of this model. Firstly, risk is incorporated via the 
aspirational probabilities gj, representing the level of reliability desired by the DM 
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for the achievement of each objective. Increasing risk aversion is therefore associated 
with higher values of 9j. However, the CCGP models make no attempt to incorporate 
the magnitudes of any deviations or constraint violations. It seems fundamentally im-
portant that both the magnitude and probability of poor performance be included 
as bases for evaluation - a conjecture supported by several studies into the nature of 
risk (for example, [79]). Within the LP framework in which the chance-constrained 
approaches were first developed, probabilistic constraints are applicable because the 
constraints are supposed to be hard. However, when moving into a GP framework, a 
straightforward extension of CCLP seems unwise we must also consider the magni-
tude of the violations since the bj are defined only as goals. 
Secondly, the CCGP models do not lend themselves to the discrete 'decision table' 
formulation of an MCDM problem. In these contexts, there are no explicit constraints 
on performances, so that the bj represent desired levels of performance on each 
terion. This places a significantly greater demand on the DM in terms of required 
preference information. In addition to aspirations for each objective, the DM must 
also provide the desired probabilities of achieving each aspiration. In the presence 
of the aspirational probabilities, it is not clear to what extent the attribute aspira-
tions should be considered goals or constraints. There is certainly some relationship 
between the two aspirations. The attribute aspirations represent a raw level of 
sired performance, while the probability aspirations represent the desired reliability 
of achieving these levels of performance. It may be difficult, however, for a DM to 
separate the two issues of performance and reliability, particularly when the desired 
performance on an objective may be heightened either by increasing the desired mag-
nitude or probability of achievement. 
Even the ability of the DM to think and express preferences in terms of the asp ira-
tional probabilities is an open question. Certainly the setting of aspirations based 
on attribute values is a challenging enough task, and the use of probabilities rather 
than attribute values will almost certainly complicate the matter. Well-known be-
havioural research into the heuristics and biases associated with the interpretation 
and assessment of probabilities (e.g. [30]) would provide some insight into how these 
complications could manifest themselves. The availability heuristic, used by a DM 
judging a probability based on the ease with which the associated event is recalled, 
might lead to overly risk averse behaviour where the consequences of a violation are 
severe or unpleasant. Anchoring perceptions on the status quo, on the other hand, 
might lead the DM to underestimate the probabilities of divergent future states, which 
would result in insufficient risk aversion. Finally, for well-balanced aspirations it is 
important that the probabilities are not interpreted as lower-limits on performance, 
as in the chance-constrained LP models, rather than the goals that they are intended 
as. 
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3.3.2 Other Stochastic GP Models 
The pioneering work of Contini [17] has already been mentioned, but the narrow focus 
of the work prevents its general applicability. Specifically each objective j is determin-
istically related to the decision variables with the exception of a random perturbation 
~j rv N(O, an. Donckels [23] constructs a model along the lines of portfolio theory 
by minimising a weighted sum of the expectation and variance of the deviations. 
sentially this model replaces each objective with two sub-objectives; one minimising 
expected deviations and the other minimising the variance of those deviations. These 
specific 'risk' criteria place the model to a certain extent in the framework section 
3.4, which considers the use of explicit risk attributes. The author admits that 'a 
lot of work remains to be done to make the technique operational'. Specifically, no 
aggregation is provided over different objectives. Such an aggregation seems partic-
ularly problematic, as concepts of tradeoffs between two criteria become murkier as 
a result of the variance terms. It is a practical question whether DM's are able to 
consider tradeoffs between expected values and variances on different objectives. In 
any case, the theoretical formulation can be stated as 
m 
min L wf E[oj] + wj Var[oj]' 
j=l 
(3.41) 
where wi are weights attached to the expected values and wj are weights attached 
to the variances. As mentioned previously, it may be of more practical benefit to 
consider the easier problem of minimising only the expected deviations. 
Much more recently, Ballestero [6J has proposed a stochastic GP model also devel-
oped along the lines of the mean-variance approaches popular in portfolio theory. In 
fact, the model can be considered a generalisation of that portfolio model to several 
attributes. The starting point of the model is the increasing concave utility function 
defined over the values of the objective 2:~=1 aijXi, where the coefficients aij are 
random variables with associated probability distributions. This utility form is then 
linked with notions of satisficing to formulate the stochastic GP as 
subject to: 
m 
min L wjRj(zj)a2(zj) 
j=l 
~ gj, Vj 
Xi ~ 0, Vi 
where Wj is the weight attached to deviations from objective j) Zj is the mean V'dlue 
of objective j, Rj(x) = u'J(x)juj(x) is the local risk aversion coefficient at the point 
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x, and 9j is the aspiration level for the expected utility E[uj(zj)] of objective j. 
The formulation takes the form of minimising risk, as represented by the variance, 
subject to an acceptable average performance on each objective, and can be solved as 
a quadratic program. Again several points can be made regarding this modeL Firstly, 
the model steps outside the compensatory mode advocated in GP by reinstating hard 
constraints on the average objective values. Although the general form of the model is 
an interesting advancement in financial modelling, it is less clear that the behavioural 
implications of the mean-variance framework are desirable in broader MCDM. In 
particular, it is doubtful if DM's think in terms of having to achieve a certain goal, 
and only then consider risk issues. 
Secondly, requirements of the DM are in a sense reduced, as the only aspirations 
required are those representing performance on each objective. However, the 
aspirations are phrased in terms of expected utility, which requires a far greater insight 
on the part of the DM. Ballestero comments that 'precise knowledge of the DM's 
utility functions can help determination of suitable targets', but it is precisely 
in order to avoid explicit construction of utility functions that metric methods are 
often employed. In the absence of full specification of the utility functions, the effects 
of substandard elicitation of the utilities would need to be investigated, although a 
careful sensitivity analysis of the impact of different aspirations might go some way 
toward answering this question within the context of a specific problem. Furthermore, 
the elicitation of the local risk aversion may prove troublesome in some circumstances 
and difficult for the DM to reconcile with the aims of the analysis, although some 
elicitation techniques have becn described in [6, 5]. Therefore although the model 
proposed by Ballestero an interesting and significant addition with respect to 
its link to utility functions, it is this very aspect that perhaps disadvantages it in the 
pre- or early-processing area employing metric methods. 
3.3.3 Scenario-based Approaches 
Given the scarcity of stochastic GP approaches in general, it is unsurprising that 
there have been few developments in the area of scenario-b&"led modifications. The 
chance-constrained GP models presented earlier made use of probability distributions 
defined over uncertain parameters of the decision problem. It would not affect the 
formulation of the problem if only some points of the distributions were used, which 
means that the methods described earlier may be used without further modifications. 
The issues in such cases relate to the appropriate number of scenarios to use, and the 
identification of suitable selection methods for the scenarios. The lack of practical 
usage prevents these questions being considered in any detail Within LP appli-
cations of stochastic recourse models [45, 102, 18], the construction of the scenarios 
appears to take place in a fairly ad hoc manner. 
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Recent work by Korhonen [51] provides a stochastic GP model that, rather than being 
based on chance-constrained ideas, is effectively an extension of recourse models to 
scenario-based GP. A set of scenarios is defined using scenario planning techniques, 
after which the implications of the scenarios in terms of various operating parameters 
are investigated and estimated. Probabilities are assigned to represent the relative 
likelihood of occurrence for each scenario. Aspirations may be defined separately for 
individual scenarios, as are weights attached to the aspirations. The model therefore 
makes allowances for a changing preference structure over the set of scenarios. The 
model finally minimises deviations from the relevant scenario-dependent aspirations. 
Kalu [43] provides another non-standard application of GP under risk, although he 
stresses the impossibility of probability assignment. Regardless, a pre-emptive GP 
model is solved under various scenarios representing different combinations of oper-
ating parameters, with the optimal decision vector given separately for each of the p 
scenarios. 
Although there seems to be no formal theoretical development of such models, the 
applications provided by Korhonen [51J and Kalu [43] represent a far simpler interpre-
tation of the GP problem vvith stochastic outcomes than that provided by the CCGP 
models. In particular, it allows us to retain the same structure found in deterministic 
GP approaches and merely apply it each scenario. We therefore devote the remain-
der of this section to the investigation of such a model, returning temporarily to the 
discrete case before providing some modifications required for continuous problems. 
The basic idea behind the scenario-based goal programming (SBGP) model is to for-
mulate a deterministic GP for each scenario, followed by an aggregation over all p 
scenanos. The GP formulation for scenario k is given by 
m l 
min [I)WjkOjkrl;] a (3.42) 
)=1 
where Wjk is the weight assigned to the deviation Ojk from goal 9jk, for each criterion 
j and scenario k, and 0; denotes the choice of norm. In the GP framework, there 
turns out to be no distinction between the evaluation of alternatives over criterion-
scenario combinations and the evaluation of alternative-scenario combinations over 
criteria. For both the value function and outranking methods, the choice of eval-
uation method depended on the preference structure of the DM, that is whether 
a value function or outranking relation could be constructed over scenarios or not. 
If preferences could be expressed with perfect consistency within either evaluation 
method, then there is no question that the final results would be identical, so that 
the issues pertain to ease of use and related practical matters. Now within the goal 
programming framework, the goals that are elicited from the DM represent far weaker 
preference information than either that used in the construction of the value function 
or the outranking relation. It is this weakening of the elicited preference information 
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that results in the inability of the metric methods to incorporate scenario importance 
information anywhere other than in the weights themselves. The deviations in (3.42) 
give no indication of the relative importance of each scenario. The manipulation of 
goals in order to imply some importance information i.e. by increasing the goals on a 
more important scenario, is nothing more than an ad hoc trick, and is likely to confuse 
what is a cognitively appealing methodology. Furthermore the goals themselves are 
heavily dependent on the attribute domain, and it may well be difficult to divorce 
what is related to scale and what relates to importance. In contrast to both the value 
function and outranking methods, the structure of the problem does not depend on 
whether the inputs i.e. goals, differ over scenarios. The implication is that the weight 
assessment stage must include elicitations of both criterion and scenario importance 
information. 
The assessment of the weights may again proceed in either of the two ways outlined 
for the value function methods on page 38. Either the weights may be elicited simul-
taneously over all mp criterion-scenario pairs, or relative criterion weights 1/Jjk and 
relative scenario weights ¢k may be assessed and multiplied together to find the joint 
weighting Wjk. The first assessment method is a cognitively taxing process, while 
the second method is conceptually at the expense of concision. The concision-
conception tradeoff is familiar from previous sections, and again both methods may 
be used as a consistency check. 
The application of (3.42) in each scenario results in p rank orders, each scenario being 
represented by a n x 1 vector of deviations from which a rank order can be trivially 
obtained. The results comprising the p rank orders and deviation vectors contain 
important information in themselves. While the rank ordering produced by an ag-
gregation over scenarios should certainly not be excluded, the information contained 
in the scenario-wise results should be considered as an important output in its own 
right. This information should be carefully interpreted and scrutinised before pro-
ceeding \vith any further aggregation. Once this has been done, the deviation vector 
in each of the scenarios may be grouped together to form a n x p matrix of deviations 
precisely the form of the input for a conventional goal program. In this sense the 
SBGP appears as an extension of the metric method to the case of the super-MCDM 
problem. A complete metric approach can then be performed on the input table of 
deviations. Specifically, a metric other than the 0: used in the p individual problems 
may theoretically be used to aggregate the super-problem. This presents an interest-
ing opportunity to incorporate the different preference philosophies encompassed by 
the different metrics. 
Formally the full metric method incorporating a second stage comprising the aggre-
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gation procedure may be written as 
(3.43) 
where a and {3 are appropriate metrics for the individual and aggregation problems 
respectively. Any comparisons between the Archimedean and the Tchebycheff aggre-
gation should be mindful that the two aggregations model different behavioural aims. 
The Tchebycheff approach is associated with notions of robustness and strong perfor-
mance over all scenarios, while the expected value aggregation is more compensatory 
in that it searches for alternatives that are on average stronger. Again, which is more 
appropriate can only be argued taking into account the specific problem context and 
DM psychology. However, the aim advocated by the scenario planning philosophy, 
that is the search for a robust alternative that performs satisfactorily under all sce-
narios, is best furthered by the Tchebycheff super-aggregation i.e. {3 00. Such an 
aggregation will consider the worst relative performance across scenarios i.e. in terms 
of the deviations, to be the indicator of an alternative's merit, however the perfor-
mance is measured. 
The model has thus far been faithful to the scenario planning philosophy of not as-
signing any form of probabilistic information to the scenarios. However, rather than 
the absence of relative likelihood, the implication of (3.43) is one of equal relative 
likelihood. This is clear in that the Archimedean super-GP problem i.e. {3 = 1, is 
equivalent to an expected value technique assigning equal likelihood to each scenario. 
If the DM feels comfortable in making at least some judgements regarding the 
ative likelihood of each scenario, there seems no good reason why this information 
should not be used, bearing in mind that the aggregated rank order is not considered 
to be the only output of the SBGP. This information is easily incorporated into the 
following form 
(3.44) 
The expectation aggregation procedure can be considered a more general form of the 
Archimedean procedure, and superior based on its ability to incorporate likelihood 
information where available. The Tchebycheff super-aggregation can be similarly 
adapted, in which case the relative likelihood of scenario k, Pr(k), acts as a weight 
for the performance measure obtained from the within-scenario aggregation. 
It is not the intention of this section to say that probabilistic information need be 
automatically included in the SBGP model; merely that such a consideration is not out 
of the question either. In all cases the inclusion or exclusion of relative likelihoods 
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should be based on (particularly) aims of the analysis, the preferences of the 
decision maker and the context of the decision problem. The history of scenario 
planning is instructive in understanding this. Given that scenarios are constructed to 
be plausible rather than just possible, the scale of the long-term strategic planning in 
large organisations is of such a nature that ruin in any scenario need not incorporate 
any probabilistic information to be considered further; ruin in any scenario, given 
that that scenario is plausible, is sufficient warning. However, this may not always 
or even often be the case. It is evident that the aims and the problem context to 
which scenario planning was traditionally applied, rather than any general theoretical 
concerns, led to the exclusion of probabilistic information in scenario planning. 
Extensions to Continuous Goal Programming 
the value function and outranking methods, the scenarios manifested themselves 
primarily in different attribute values between scenarios, which motivated treat-
ment of each scenario problem separately. In the continuous GP methods, the sce-
narios manifest themselves primarily through different goals gjk and constraint coef-
ficients aijk. Since the LP algorithms generate solutions by optimising over a con-
strained decision space, there is no reason to treat the p decision spaces separately 
where a robust decision is desired. The notion of robustness requires a prospective 
'optimal' solution to perform well on all objectives under any of the scenarios. In 
the continuous case, consideration of the problem as being composed of p separate 
subproblems is likely to return p quite different decision vectors. Each of these vectors 
may perform best in the relevant scenario, but performance on any other scenario is 
unknown and may in many circumstances be poor. 
Within the context of Tchebycheff framework, an extension of the notion of satis-
ficing to choice under uncertainty requires that the decision maker focuses on attaining 
an acceptable performance level on the most important scenario-objective combina-
tion before considering other scenario-objective combinations. If the problems are 
considered separately, this dynamic movement between scenarios is not possible, and 
satisficing can only occur in a local sense. The concepts of satisficing and robustness 
are thus closely related. In contrast to the value function, outranking, and discrete 
GP frameworks that generally split the super-MCDM problem into p separate parts, 
the continuous GP formulation should consider the super-MCDM problem in itself. 
The Role of Interactivity 
The need for an interactive element is likely to be strongly increased by the inclusion 
of a scenario-based treatment of uncertainty. Firstly, there is a greater num-
ber of goals that must be specified than for an equivalent deterministic problem, so 
that tradeoff relationships are necessarily more detailed. Then there remains the 
fundamental question as to whether decision makers can effectively evaluate their 
62 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
preferences under the assumptions of different scenarios. There may be considerable 
uncertainty the mind of the decision maker as to the implications of a particular 
scenario for a objective. A strongly interactive element will allow the decision 
maker to explore the uncertainty around various scenario-objective relationships in 
a 'what if?' environment, as well as performing the more conventional search of the 
decision space to assess the tradeoffs available. The avoidance of the difficult as-
sessment of weights may be particularly beneficial in the early stages of the decision 
process, where the focus is on identifying a set of potentially optimal solutions for 
closer inspection without spending too much time doing so. 
3.4 Explicit Risk Attributes 
An alternative treatment of risk is to consider it as a primitive concern, so that the 
riskiness in an attribute may be characterised based on the reduction of the uncertain 
outcomes to a single risk measure. This measurement of risk has been a critical issue 
in portfolio theory in particular, but also in other areas of economics, psychology and 
decision science. 
The motivation for the consideration of the risk attribute is most easily seen vvithin 
the context of MAUT, although it applies to the other methodologies as well. Risk 
preferences are built into the utility function and various measures can be derived 
once the utility function has been elicited (risk premium, risk aversion function). 
However, the construction of the utility functions is a time consuming and concep-
tually intensive procedure, so that there is some motivation to search for surrogate 
attributes that are able to capture risk preferences. The issue is to what extent the 
consideration of risk measures that essentially 'fall out' of the underlying attributes 
i.e. no judgemental assessments are included, affect the results, in addition to the 
selection of the appropriate risk measures themselves. The decomposition of the un-
derlying attributes involves both value and risk components. The reason that the 
value component has not been mentioned until now is that it appears uncontroversial 
relative to risk, with the use of expected values being widely accepted [79]. This sec-
tion is therefore focused on the risk component, where the major obstacle remains the 
confusion arising from multiple conflicting notions about how risk should defined 
and modelled [26]. 
Weber and Bottom [103] provide a review of empirical research on how the attributes 
of gambles influence risk, from which they conclude the following 
• Risk increases with an increase in range, variance or expected loss of a gamble . 
• Risk decreases if a constant positive amount is added to all outcomes of a 
gamble. 
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• Risk increases if all outcomes are multiplied by a constant positive number 
greater than one. 
• Risk increases if a gamble is repeated many times. 
Although these points should be interpreted in a descriptive sense, the lack of a clear 
conception of risk means that it is no longer clear whether any distinction should 
be drawn between normative and descriptive processes. It is certainly clear that 
the notion of risk should incorporate subjective aspects peculiar to specific DM's. 
Furthermore, different notions risk might be held by, for example, financial an-
alysts (variation around an expected return) and nuclear safety experts (chance of 
a catastrophe). This provides the motivation to consider directly the link between 
measures of risk and preference models. Sarin and Weber [79] summarise previous 
attempts at using empirically valid definitions of risk and value to construct so-called 
risk-value models of preference for decisions under uncertainty in the context of lot-
teries. Therefore for two lotteries X and Y, with the status quo wealth level denoted 
as W, 
X ~ Y ~ f(V(X), R(X), W) 2 f(V(Y), R(Y), W) (3.45) 
where V measures the value of a lottery, R measures its risk, and f is a function 
increasing in V and decreasing in R reflecting the tradeoff between value and risk, 
and may depend on the level of wealth W. More recently, Jia and Dyer [40J have 
proposed a measure of risk based on the normalisation of lotteries to have expected 
values of zero, which allows the risk and value components to be clearly distinguished. 
The defining characteristic of the so-called standard measure of risk is that it depends 
on the utility function of the DM. This allows for the preference-based justification of 
commonly used risk measures as well as, under a condition analogous to utility inde-
pendence, an alternative representation of the expected utility model that explicitly 
expresses tradeoffs between value and risk. 
There are two results that are particularly relevant to MCDM. Firstly, the use of vari-
ance as a measure of risk (at least in a utility theory model) is appropriate only in two 
situations: where the decision maker has a quadratic utility function u(x) x - ,i3x2 , 
and where the utility function is increasing and concave and the random variables 
representing lotteries are normally or log-normally distributed. Some numerical sup-
port is provided by Stewart [88] by means of a simulation study, where it was found 
that the variance may be a misleading risk measure when the utility function takes 
the form of a power function and lotteries are non-normal. However, when an expo-
nential utility function is used, the variance appears to be an adequate risk measure 
even where lotteries are non-normal. A possible explanation for this may be that the 
risk aversion function for the exponential utility function closely resembles that a 
quadratic utility function (for which lotteries need not be non-normal to validate the 
variance as a measure of risk) in the time domain specified in the Stewart simula-
tions. The implication of these results is that the popular impulse to &"lsociate risk 
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with variance, inherited from the 1952 portfolio model of :Markowitz [59], should be 
resisted at least until the requirements have been verified. 
The second point relates to the use of cumulative probability distributions to provide 
comparisons in terms of risk, which is intuitively plausible although somewhat differ-
ent from the notions associated with the variance-based measures of risk. Rothschild 
and Stiglitz [74] provided a risk measure defined over the cumulative probabilities F 
and G associated with lotteries X and Y respectively, but which is sufficient only 
when the lotteries X and Y have the same expected return, so that 
X t: Y -<===? l x (G(t) F(t))dt 2': 0 \/x. 
Stewart also analysed the use of cumulative distributions in the same simulation con-
text [88] and found that 'there appears a prima facie case to be made that the use 
of two well-chosen cumulative probabilities may be useful'. Again there were mixed 
results depending on the form of the underlying utility function, and the use of cu-
mulative probabilities was more successful assuming a power utility function relative 
to an exponential utility function, in contrast to the earlier results for the use of the 
vanance. 
Hallerbach and Spronk [34] have suggested a 'multiple factor approach' to risk mea-
surement by identifying a set of variables or factors influencing risk. This work was 
done very much in the context of the theory of portfolio selection, and as such at-
tempts to model aspects of the economic environment in which share returns are 
generated. It is assumed that a decision maker can identify the specific factors that 
are relevant. Relationships between share returns and the factors are then represented 
by response coefficients which become surrogate risk measures, so that the unidimen-
sional variance measure is replaced with a truly multidimensional reflection of risk. 
The question is whether the conceptual multidimensional risk framework can be gen-
eralised in the context of MCDM, and whether it is practical and tractable to do 
so. It is important to note that within the financial environment, risk is still focused 
on only one criterion, the variability of share returns. In the more general problem 
of :MCD:M under uncertainty, there are several criteria that must be evaluated by 
treating uncertain outcomes. In this context a multiple factor model is needed to 
characterise the risk underlying each criterion, which may be overly time consuming 
if possible at all. However, in mitigation of these setbacks, if the aim of the decision 
process is taken to be a better understanding of the problem and potential solutions, 
then a full exploration into the components of uncertainty may well illuminate some 
issues for the decision maker. 
From the perspective of general MCDM, two issues are of special importance. Firstly, 
the research into risk-value models has been focused on the case of a single attribute, 
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usually share returns. Although the theoretical modelling of risk has progressed to 
a great degree since the developments of Markowitz [59], the challenge to MCDM 
is to incorporate the tradeoff aspects of the multiple criteria model with the single 
criterion risk-value model. In particular, it seems necessary to provide a framework 
to explicitly trade off risk one attribute with risk in another. The basic structure 
of such a framework might follow closely the conventional structure of value tradeoffs, 
although it would seem almost certain that compensations would be far more difficult 
to interpret in a risk setting, perhaps necessitating some modifications. Second, the 
more sophisticated measures of risk within the framework of the risk-value models are 
dependent on the specific form of the utility function, so that at least some modelling 
of the utility function is necessary before the risk measure is available. Bearing in 
mind that the reason that explicit risk measures were considered was to avoid the 
specification of the utility function, and the ensuing complication in the multiple cri-
teria aspects of the problem, their use appears for the time being restricted towards 
a less facilitated 'backroom' analysis. 
3.5 Summary of Research Questions 
As a final point to conclude this chapter and bridge into the next, we attempt to sum-
marise and categorise the main research questions which are raised by the discussions 
in this chapter. Although the categories are rough and not mutually exclusive, three 
investigative regions can be identified. Questions of behaviour refer predominantly 
to the abilities of DM's to operate in the complex and taxing decision environment. 
Generally, they address concerns that too many methodologies do not give enough 
standing to softer procedural issues, so that models appear technically sound but 
difficult to implement. Questions of methodological development consider steps in 
the construction of a decision model that have either been passed over by the liter-
ature or not located. Then, it has been a common concern that different MCDM 
methodologies may provide strongly different results to the same decision problem. 
A common and intuitively attractive justification is that the different methodologies 
emphasise different aspects of the problem, so that the same results cannot be ex-
pected. However, where different versions of the same methodology exist, as in the 
outranking and GP methods, we may expect a greater degree of consistency. Finally, 
questions of pragmatic simplifications may be asked in an attempt to find a balance 
between realism, ease of use and accuracy of results. We may search for the aspects 
of a decision problem which materially affect results and in doing so find a method 
that excludes unnecessary detail without neglecting that which is important. 
Questions of Behaviour 
1. When a value-focused approach to scenario development is used, do DM's be-
come aware of changing preference structures over the different scenarios? 
2. Are DM's able to think and isolate their preferences conditional on specific 
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scenarios? That is it feasible to elicit preference information in different 
scenarios? To what extent does anchoring to the current scenario occur? 
3. Are DM's able to understand and use the stochastic outranking methods? Is 
the level of sophistication too high? How comfortable are DM's with specifying 
thresholds in terms of probabilities? 
4. To what extent do heuristics and biases known to occur during the assessment 
and interpretation of probabilities affect different MCDM methodologies? 
5. Are D::VI's able to specify aspirations in terms of probabilities? Is the revision 
of aspirations more difficult in a probabilistic environment? 
6. Are DM's more comfortable specifying weights on criteria and scenarios simul-
taneously or separately? 
Questions of Methodological Development 
1. How should the meta-aggregation of results in each of the p scenarios proceed? 
How should the notion of robustness be operationalised? How should the notion 
of approximate robustness be operationalised? 
2. How similar are the rank orders produced by the different stochastic outrank-
ing methods? Do they provide different degrees of decision aid in terms of 
opportunities to learn, ease of use and interpretability? 
3. How should probabilities be incorporated into the discordance measures of the 
scenario-based outranking methods? 
4. How similar are the rank orders produced by the different stochastic GP meth-
ods? Do they provide different degrees of decision aid in terms of opportunities 
to learn, ease of use and interpretability? 
5. What kind of metrics are compatible in the criterion-wise and scenario-wise 
aggregation stages of the scenario-based metric model? Should different metrics 
be allowed at all? 
Questions of Pragmatic Simplifications 
1. To what extent does the use of MAUT affect results when preferences change 
over scenarios? 
2. To what extent do the results obtained by MAUT and non-EU models differ in 
a practical environment where the axioms of EUT are violated? 
3. To what extent do stochastic attribute values affect the results of a decision 
model? the 'ignoring' of uncertainty by estimating expected or likely attribute 
values a viable option? 
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4. Do non-idealities such as elicitation errors and independence violations, known 
to occur in practice, significantly affect the results of an MCDM method under 
conditions of risk? 
5. What scenario selection policies are appropriate? To what extent do non-
idealities impact on the selection? How many scenarios should be chosen? 
Should probabilities be assigned to the scenarios? 
6. Are the considered methodologies affected differently by the condition of risk? 
That is, are the results of certain methodologies more or less sensitive to random-
ness in the attribute values? Do non-idealities differentially affect the method-
ologies? Are scenario selection policies consistent over the methodologies? 
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Chapter 4 
Simulation Studies in MCDM 
4.1 Research Experiments in MCDM 
Experiments designed to respond to research questions MCDM have generally taken 
the form of observations of real-world MCDM applications, observations of student 
groups in a controlled environment, or simulation studies of conjectured problems. 
Within MCDM in particular, but applicable to most modelling disciplines, real-world 
experiments are severely restricted by the small number of cases that may be consid-
ered. Each decision process requires considerable resources, time and effort, so that 
decision makers are unlikely to be prepared to participate in academic comparisons 
of multiple decision models. Furthermore, it is far more difficult to perceive the 
mensions on which each real-world decision problem is different, so that it is difficult 
or impossible to isolate the marginal effects of the aspects under study. This, coupled 
with the small number of considered cases, makes general inferences more difficult. 
However, where the research questions relate to the behavioural questions identified 
previously, a real-world experiment is in most circumstances the only approach capa-
ble of offering an answer. Within the context of this study, a simulation approach was 
chosen on the basis of the time and cost restrictions outlined above. This necessar-
ily excludes from the focus of the experiments those aspects that are behavioural in 
nature. remaining questions are all interesting and potentially important; some 
narrowing of focus is required, however. For the purposes of the simulations which 
form the remainder of this thesis, we select the questions which appear to probe the 
groundwork of risk treatment in MCDM. We select the follo\ving three questions for 
closer consideration: 
1. Can the 'ignoring' of uncertainty by simplification strategies be justified? 
2. Do non-idealities known to occur in practice significantly affect the results under 
conditions of risk? 
3. In applying a scenario-based MCDM approach, to what extent do results dif-
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fer depending on how many scenarios are chosen and what scenario selection 
policies are employed? 
These three questions are obviously interrelated: whether certain simplification or 
selection strategies are appropriate may conceivably depend on whether certain non-
idealities are The questions cannot therefore be answered in a strict linear 
fashion, but &'3 a whole they form a strong set of foundations for any future work. 
Although the questions are all relevant for any of the MCDM methodologies presented 
previously, aiming for succinctness we attempt to find answers only for the value 
function methods. The simulations described for the GP and outranking methods 
are limited to proposals for future research. 
4.2 The General Simulation Structure 
All simulation studies in MCDM are faced with the difficult question of which aspects 
of the decision process to include as parameters of the model. Some of the detail of 
the real-world decision process should be excluded without oversimplifying model 
to the point where the results are not clearly interpretable in the real world. In short 
we want to abstract the model to a point where the results obtained are easily inter-
pretable yet capable of making meaningful recommendations for real-world decision 
processes. 
The starting point of the simulation study is the assumption that the DM possesses 
an idealised underlying preference structure, which exists as a goal which is aimed 
towards even if its actual form is not consciously known. This idealised preference 
structure is here a..'3sumed to satisfy the properties of completeness, transitivity, con-
sistency, continuity, and mutual utility independence i.e. preferences may be repre-
sented by multiplicative utility functions. This conjecture should not be associated 
with the (behavioural) idea that underlying every DM is a multiplicative utility func-
tion. Rather it is an explication of the guiding nature of MCDM methods in the 
construction of a preference structure which accurately represents the DM, and may 
be comfortably defended. Most importantly, the idealised preference structure re-
sults in a 'true' rank ordering, which allows for the comparison of the rank ordering 
produced by this so-called true preference structure with rank orderings produced by 
applying various MCDM approaches. 
simulation can be thought of as being composed of five 
1. The generation of a problem context external to the preferences of the decision 
maker. 
2. The generation of an idealised preference structure and a consequent true rank 
ordering. 
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3. The modelling of certain non-idealities relating to errors introduced into the 
decision process. 
4. The modelling of potential treatments of the uncertain outcomes characterising 
the decision problem. 
5. The comparison of the rank orderings produced by the true and non-idealised 
simulations. 
We consider each of these aspects in more detail in the following sections. 
4.3 Implementation of a Simulated Value Function 
Method 
4.3.1 The Problem Context 
The problem context is represented by a set of n alternatives evaluated over m at-
tributes for each of p scenarios, and a set of probabilities Pr( k) on the set of scenarios 
k {1, 2, ... ,p}. The assumption is thus that the true underlying distribution of out-
comes for each alternative is discrete. The assumption is made for convenience, but 
is not particularly restrictive in that for sufficiently large p, continuous distributions 
can be approximated to any desired degree of accuracy. 
The Attribute Evaluations 
The evaluations Zijk, representing the performance of alternative i on criterion j 
when scenario k occurs, will in practice occur almost exclusively in a highly complex 
manner. For the purposes of a simulation experiment it is necessary to limit the 
complexity of the governing process to the point where a meaningful interpretation of 
the simplified structure is possible, without compromising the non-trivial aspects of 
the process. As a result many such simplified structures can be envisaged depending 
on the salient aspects that are being investigated via the simulation experiment. At 
no stage is the simulated structure intended as an even tentative description of reality. 
Here, the evaluations are generated according to the process 
(4.1) 
The Aij are intended to model the conjecture that each alternative will tend to iden-
tify with certain criteria, in that they perform strongly on some of the criteria in 
most or all scenarios, and weakly in some criteria. They are therefore interpreted as 
baseline performance evaluations for alternative i on criterion j when all scenarios are 
considered. Of course some alternatives may perform moderately on all criteria, but 
this remains a case of an identification with a general (moderate) level of performance 
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on each criterion. The Aij are generated over the sets of alternatives and criteria, 
independent of scenarios, according to the following process: 
1. Generate each Aij as the square of a normally distributed random variable with 
a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.1. 
2. For each alternative i, standardise the Aij to sum to unity i.e. Ail + Ai2 + ... + 
Aim = 1, Vi. \Ve discuss later how this construction ensures that the resulting 
alternatives are non-dominated in at least one scenario. 
form of the random variable as well as the values for the mean and standard 
deviation were selected after a number of trial-and-error experiments. Several other 
forms were considered, such as generating the Aij from a uniform distribution and 
standardising them to lie on the unit hypersphere, as done in [85]. The form finally 
selected seemed to provide a balanced but reasonably diverse set of alternatives. For 
the problem context consisting of 7 criteria, most of the Aij lie between 0 and 0.4. 
Naturally there must be some variation of performance over scenarios for the uncer-
tain case to be of any interest. A scenario-criterion interaction Gjk may be envisaged 
whereby certain scenarios have a multiplier effect on the baseline evaluations of 
terion j. The motivation for the use of a multiplicative modification is that some 
scenarios may scale up the magnitude of the evaluations in an environment where 
a consequential scaling of variation is implied. For example, we may consider the 
case of projected future costs and earnings dependent on various inflation scenarios. 
Various magnitudes of scenario-dependent deviations can be simulated by adjusting 
the ranges of the possible values for the Gjk . To be consistent with the interpretation 
of the baseline evaluations Aij ) the Gjk must have a geometric mean of one for each 
criterion. This ensures that the ordering implied by the baseline evaluations is pre-
served in an average sense. It is worth mentioning that the Gjk are independent 
of the set of alternatives, they do not directly impact any relative rank orderings. 
Their inclusion is largely due to the intuitive attractiveness of the resultant model 
and their indirect influence on the implied relative scaling of the additive modification 
Bik· 
The Bik are deviations from the baseline evaluations of alternative i resulting from 
different levels of performance dependent on scenario k. Thus various magnitudes 
of scenario-dependent deviations can be simulated using different ranges for the B ik . 
This additive perturbation is motivated by the conjecture that some alternatives iden-
tify to a greater or lesser extent with certain scenarios, which serves to increase or 
decrease the baseline performance evaluation. This difference is applied equally to all 
criteria, although the different magnitudes of the Gjk ensure that the relative mag-
nitudes of differences are quite different. Of course the influence of the scenarios 
is unlikely to be as simple in practice; a specific scenario may increase performance 
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on some criteria and decrease it on others. The Bik have been generated to have an 
arithmetic mean of zero, for each alternative, so that the order implied by the evalua-
tions Aij are on average preserved for each criterion. This restriction guarantees that 
there is no shift in baseline performance due, for example, to positive modifications 
on all scenarios. Together the Bik and Gjk represent the extent to which the problem 
context i.e. the attribute values, changes over the set of scenarios. The Zijk are then 
standardised within each criterion to lie in the interval [0,1]. Finally, in order for 
(4.1) to be mathematically sound the three two-dimensional variables are each held 
constant over their respective third variables in the creation of the three-dimensional 
Zijk· 
There are two points requiring clarification. Firstly, the first scenario has been gen-
erated as a scenario where the average rules, and is termed the 'status quo' scenario. 
This implies that = 0, \:Ii and Gjl 1, \:Ij. The assumption is motivated and 
justified by the reality that scenarios are often constructed so as to place the status 
quo between some best- and worst-case scenarios. Although in some cases the real 
status quo scenario may be fairly extreme, it might be expected to be fairly central 
in the long run. In any case it provides a useful starting point for the comparison 
and ultimately selection of other scenarios. Secondly, dominated alternatives should 
be discriminated against by any MCDM methodology, and in a simulation context 
serve only to inflate the reported capabilities. It is therefore desirable to work with 
a non-dominated set of alternatives. In the considered context of scenarios, there are 
several levels of non-dominance. Firstly, there is what could be termed total non-
dominance, where each alternative is non-dominated in every scenario i.e. for any two 
alternatives a and b, ~k: Zajk 2:: Zbjk, \:Ij, with at least one strict inequality. For the 
purposes of this simulation, such a condition is considered too harsh and restrictive. 
Instead, we require only that alternatives are non-dominated on at least one scenario. 
This was achieved by restricting the Aij to sum to one so that, within the context 
of the status quo scenario, all alternatives are non-dominated. It will usually be true 
that non-dominance holds on a far larger set of scenarios than just the status quo. 
The Scenario Probabilities 
The relative scenario probabilities were generated uniformly between 0.2 and 1 and 
standardised to sum to unity. For p = 50 scenarios, this meant that the probabilities 
generally lay between 0.007 and 0.035. Within a single replication, the difference in 
relative likelihood between the most- and least-likely scenarios is limited from above 
by a factor of 5, but is than 3 in only 5% of all replications. 
4.3.2 The Idealised Preference Structure 
The idealised preference structure consists of the marginal utility functions used in 
the construction of the global preference function, and the criterion weights. 
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The Utility Functions 
The utility functions used in the construction of the idealised preference structure are 
based upon the characteristics of diminishing sensitivity i.e. risk proneness for losses 
and risk aversion for gains relative to a reference level, and loss aversion [95]. This 
implies a utility function which is convex below a reference level and concave above 
it, and which is steeper below the reference point. Each marginal utility function is 
fully described by four parameters, following the ideas of Stewart [86}: the reference 
level, Tjl the value of the utility function at the reference level, Aj) the curvature 
of the utility function below the reference level, OJ, and the curvature of the utility 
function above the reference level, {3j, and is of the standardised exponential form 
for ° :::; x :::; 
for :::; x :::; 1 
( 4.2) 
Quite a diverse set of preference types may be simulated by adjusting values for Tj 
and Aj. The parameter Aj is an indication of the strength of preference for avoiding 
performances below the reference level for criterion j, so that the severity of the 
preference threshold separating losses and gains increases in Aj. Further details are 
outlined in section 4.4. The use of a single utility function for each criterion together 
with the [0,1] standardisation of the Zijk within each criterion implies the MAUT 
feature that although some scenarios may occupy different segments of the marginal 
utility function, preferences are constant over scenarios (see section 3.1.2, page 37 for 
a discussion). 
The Criterion Weights 
The criterion weights are defined in an average sense, generated uniformly on the 
interval [0.1,1] and standardised to sum to unity. For j = 7 criteria, this ensures that 
the magnitude by which one criteria weight may exceed another is limited to a factor 
of 10, and will in most circumstances be considerably lower (a maximum factor of less 
than 6 is reported in almost 70% of the simulations). The weights are held constant 
over scenarios. 
Construction of the True Rank Ordering 
The global utilities are determined a multiplicative model 
m 
1 + K,U(a) IT[l + K,wjuj(a)] 
j=l 
(4.3) 
where K, is the multivariate risk proneness coefficient. Values of K, greater than zero 
correspond to multivariate risk proneness, while K, E 1,0) indicates multivariate 
risk aversion. The final calculation of the utilities is performed by taking expectations 
over the p scenarios, which produces a complete order, termed the true rank order. 
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4.3.3 The Modelled Non-Idealities 
Additive Representation of Utilities 
Previous studies by Stewart [85] discussed in subsection 3.1 showed that results were 
relatively insensitive to approximation of the multiplicative global utility function by 
an additive form. In light of these findings, and noting the considerable reSUlting con-
ceptual simplifications, additive utility functions are used throughout the simulations 
of the non-idealities. The results have been segmented so as to provide evidence of the 
impact of the additive approximation relative to the other simulated non-idealities. 
Omission of Criteria 
Although the omission of criteria is a structural issue that may therefore befall any 
MCDM methodology, the sensitivity of particular methods to the omission of criteria 
is investigated as part of the robustness study. The number of omitted criteria, 0, is 
a parameter of the simulation. We conjecture again that it is likely that the most 
unimportant criteria are omitted from the analysis, but that there is some scope 
for error in this regard. The m ° criteria are therefore selected with probabilities 
proportional to the ranks of their importance weights, and weights on the selected 
criteria are standardised once more to sum to one. 
Violations of Preferential Independence 
The idealised preference structure constructed in section 4.3.2 represents a utopian 
decision making context, with one consequence being that the criteria satisfy at least 
the condition of mutual utility independence required for the existence of a multiplica-
tive global utility function. However, the real-world decision process may result in 
the elicitation of criteria that violate such independence assumptions by being utility 
dependent. A simple but effective way used by Stewart in [86] and [90] to model these 
independence violations is to consider mixtures of the idealised criteria, which are by 
definition independent. For each pair of idealised, utility independent criteria (Zj and 
Zj+b for j = {1, 3, 5, ... }), we can produce two criteria violating utility independence 
(Zj and , for j = {1, 3, 5, ... }) using 
= (1 ,)Zj + ,Zj+l 
Zj+l = ,Zj + (1 ,)Zj+l 
(4.4) 
(4.5) 
where, is the mixing parameter governing the degree to which utility independence 
is violated. It may take on values in the interval (0, 1) with maximum violations of 
utility independence occurring when, 0.5. 
Shifts in Reference Levels 
The degree of approximation of the elicited reference level to the idealised reference 
level is also dependent on the experience and conceptual abilities of the DM, and 
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may therefore be subject to errors or shifts either side of the ideal. The shift itself 
is viewed as a definitive misinterpretation on the part of the decision maker, and is 
consequently modelled using a fixed value. The size of the shift is a parameter of the 
simulation, er , which may take on positive or negative values. Its impact is in a sense 
to blur the target represented by the idealised preference structure by changing the 
shape of the marginal utility function before it is approximated piecewise linearly in 
the elicitation process. 
Estimation of utility functions by v piecewise linear segments 
In practice the idealised marginal utility functions are elicited by a series of questions 
resulting in a piecewise linear utility function approximating the idealised utility 
function. The number of segments in the piecewise linear function, v, reflects the time 
and effort involved in the elicitation, and is another parameter of the simulation. For 
each modelled criterion Zj defined previously, v + 1 equally spaced points are chosen 
along the attribute axis from the minimum to the maximum values. The value of the 
marginal utility function at each point is defined and linearly interpolated between. In 
cases where some violations of independence occur i.e. I #- 0, the attribute values will 
not in general cover the full interval [0, 1], so that the resulting piecewise linear utility 
function must be standardised to the interval [0,1]. In such cases the weights must 
also be modified to reflect the differences in the relative attribute ranges over which 
the idealised swing weights were originally defined. This is done using proportions 
between the minima and maxima of the non-idealised utilities on each criterion. Once 
all restandardisation is complete, the new piecewise utility functions are used to read 
off the appropriate non-idealised marginal utilities. 
Errors in Weight Assessment 
The elicitation of criterion weights from the DM is a well-known area for the po-
tential introduction of errors into the decision process, particularly where the DM 
is unfamiliar with the elicitation process or has poorly formed preferences. Either 
an additive or multiplicative form for the errors can be envisaged; it should not be 
materially important which is used. "While acknowledging that a multiplicative form 
may be justified in cases where the criterion weight is so close to zero that additive er-
rors may result in non-negative weights, we make the conjecture that decision makers 
view criterion weights as fuzzy but falling somewhere within intervals of reasonably 
consistent width, where that width is determined by the confidence and knowledge 
of the DM. The additive assessment errors are therefore generated uniformly on the 
interval [-eW1 ew ], where ew is a parameter of the simulation controlling the size of 
the errors. In order to retain the property that the weights sum to one, the average 
component is also constrained to sum to zero, and restrictions are applied so that 
criterion weights may not be negative as a result of excessive errors. 
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Errors in Probability Assessment 
The errors in the assessment of scenario probabilities is motivated by much the same 
reasons as the errors in weight assessments, specifically that uncertainty and unfa-
miliarity in the decision process may induce errors. The same question of additive or 
multiplicative representations follows. However, in the case of probability assessment 
errors, the small magnitude of the probabilities made assigning additive errors more 
difficult. Multiplicative errors are therefore used, generated uniformly on the interval 
[1 epr, 1 + epr], where epr is a parameter of the simulation controlling the size of 
the errors. The resulting non-idealised probabilities are standardised once more to 
sum to one. 
4.3.4 Treatment of Uncertain Outcomes 
The non-idealities raised in the previous subsection exist independently of the uncer-
tainty aspect of the problem - they are equally as valid when outcomes are deter-
ministic and certain. When outcomes are uncertain, it remains a fundamental choice 
of the decision analysis how to pursue this uncertainty. We may attempt to model 
it in its entirety, break it into 'manageable pieces', or ignore it entirely. This subsec-
tion attempts to incorporate different elements of these choices into the simulation 
environment constructed thus far. 
Ignoring the Risk 
However unsophisticated ignoring the uncertain aspects of a decision problem may 
sound, there may be adequate justification for it if time and resources are limited, 
or if a low robustness is permissible. Further, the impact of ignoring at least some 
uncertainty is an important question in its own right. It has already been argued 
that it is not so much whether uncertainty is to be ignored, but to what extent. In 
this subsection we consider two ways to model a plausible heuristic that transfers the 
decision problem from a stochastic to a deterministic framework. For simplicity in 
both cases the non-idealised value functions take the same form as the non-idealised 
utility functions, although in practical cases the different elicitation techniques are 
likely to cause differences in the resulting functional forms. 
A simple way in which to model a simplification strategy is based on the use of 
expected attribute values. In circumstances where the D.:vl wishes to avoid the com-
plexity of a stochastic MCDM method, an attempt may be made to compute the 
expected values of each Zij and use those values as inputs to a deterministic model. 
The two models developed here are based on this view. Naturally the success of this 
simplifying strategy will depend on the care taken in the construction of the expected 
attribute values. At the most conscientious level, the DM might make explicit the at-
tribute values Zijk each of the p scenarios as well as the scenario probabilities PrC k). 
Although this would seemingly negate most of the time- and effort-saving qualities 
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of the strategy, such an approach might be justified based on the easier elicitation of 
marginal value functions. In any case, this represents the best that the DM might 
do given the non-idealised information. On the other hand, the DM might simply 
perform the analysis after assuming that one of the scenarios is the deterministic 
future, discarding all other potential scenarios from the analysis. 
We may therefore use the approximation to E[Zij] as a model of the conscientiousness 
of the DM, using convex combinations of E[Zij] and ZijS*, where S* is the most likely 
scenario. Formally, 
(4.6) 
where A is a parameter increasing from 0 to 1 with the conscientiousness of the 
DM in obtaining the expected attribute values. The parameter 1 A can also be 
considered as the degree of anchoring to the most likely scenario in the estimation 
of expected attribute values. For the purposes of these simulations we consider the 
cases of A = 0.2 and A 0.8. We refer to the first model as 'ignoring risk' and the 
second as the 'expected Z' model. Finally, it should be emphasised that no claim 
is made that DM's think strictly in terms of convex combinations or even that they 
consider only the two quantities outlined above; the models above merely provide a 
mechanism for the examination of what is in all likelihood a highly complex process. 
Selection of s < p scenarios for analysis 
If p is even relatively large, the evaluation of attribute values and DM preferences 
can quickly become unwieldy, and a natural question is to what extent the selection 
of s < p 'representative' scenarios affects the rank ordering produced by the analysis. 
Two fundamental questions of this thesis relate to how best to select 'representative' 
scenarios and what number of scenarios should be selected to ensure a good approx-
imation. In this regard, the number of selected scenarios s is a parameter of the 
simulation, and four selection policies are evaluated: 
1. Scenarios are selected randomly. 
2. Scenarios are selected with probabilities proportional to their respective proba-
bilities of occurrence. 
3. Selection of the s most likely scenarios. 
4. Selection of the status quo scenario and s - 1 maximally diverse scenarios as 
determined by a forward filtering algorithm. 
Selection policy 1 (random selection) represents a worst-case scenario in which 
the best that can be achieved is a random choice of s scenarios. The DM 
may be unable to provide any information as to the relative likelihoods of the 
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scenarios, or may be unwilling to use them as a basis for selection. This policy 
may be appropriate when extremely little qualitative information is available 
on the nature of the scenarios i.e. the scenarios are considered to be nothing 
more than realisations of an unknown multivariate random variable. 
Selection policy 2 (proportional selection) characterises a policy that acknowl-
edges the importance of relative likelihoods in the selection process, but is sub-
ject to fairly large errors in this selection process. The corrupted scenario prob-
abilities are used in the selection, and although these probabilities are assumed 
known to the DM and are used in the construction of the final scores, there re-
mains some scope for other policies and other errors. The actual nature of these 
problems is not overly important, but may include a reluctance to rely only on 
probabilities, a piece of qualitative information, or a subjective 'hunch'. There-
fore although the most likely scenario is the most probable initial selection, the 
actual selection remains random. Given that the probabilities of occurrence 
are reasonably close together, the scope for error in the attempted probabilistic 
selection is substantial, and the process should probably be considered closer to 
purely random than selection of the s most likely scenarios. 
Selection policy 3 (most likely scenario selection) represents the logical end-
point of selection policy 2 - the selection of the s most likely scenarios. This 
is a deterministic selection policy that hypothesises that the DM has available 
the corrupted scenario probabilities and wishes to use them exclusively. The 
question of interest is to what extent the tactic of purely probabilistic selection 
is a valid and wise choice. Selection policies 1-3 provide a graded set of results 
intended to convey the importance of selecting scenarios on the basis of relative 
likelihood (which is not advocated by scenario planning experts [96]). 
Selection policy 4 (filtered selection) better conveys both the advice of scenario 
planners and the heuristic which we conjecture is often used by decision makers 
in practice. That is, starting from a status quo position, which we have defined 
as the first scenario i.e. k = 1, the DM selects 8-1 maximally different scenarios. 
This is most usually observed as a 'bad-average-good' design when s = 3, but is 
easily extended to incorporate more scenarios. Section 3.1.2 discusses selection 
policies in more detail. selection of divergent scenarios is likely to be a 
complex process with considerable scope for serious error; for the purposes of 
this simulation, the selection is modelled using a forward filtering algorithm to 
select scenarios which are in a sense most different to the status quo. 
The Forward Filtering Algorithm The forward filtering algorithm employed 
here uses the method of furthest point outside the neighbourhood [84]. For 
the purposes of the algorithm each scenario is considered to be represented by 
a column vector in the B matrix i.e. by a point in p-dimensional space. Taking 
as the starting point the status quo scenario i.e. Bil = 0, Vi, a hypersphere of 
radius r (a parameter of the algorithm, see [84] for more details) is constructed 
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around the point representing performance on the status quo scenario i.e. the 
origin. The scenario possessing the greatest Euclidean distance between itself 
and the status quo scenario is selected as the second scenario, provided that 
it does not lie within the hypersphere. A similar hypersphere is constructed 
around the second point, and the scenario possessing the greatest Euclidean 
distance between itself and the second chosen scenario is selected as the third 
scenario, provided that it does not lie within either the original or the second 
hypersphere. The procedure continues until no more scenarios can be selected 
i.e. all unselected scenarios lie within the radius of one of the hyperspheres sur-
rounding the selected scenarios. If the number of selected scenarios is equal to 
s, the algorithm stops, otherwise the original radius r is either increased (if the 
number of selected scenarios exceed s) or reduced (if the number of selected 
scenarios is less than s). This process continues iteratively until the number of 
scenarios selected by the forward filtering algorithm equals precisely s. 
4.3.5 Comparisons of Rank Orders 
Construction of Model Rank Orders 
For each set of non-idealities considered, eight rank orders are produced corresponding 
to 
• The additive model with no reduction of uncertainty i.e. all scenarios considered. 
• The model carelessly considering expected attribute values ignoring risk. 
• The model diligently considering expected attribute values. 
• The random scenario selection policy. 
• The proportional scenario selection policy. 
• The most likely scenarios selection policy. 
• The filtered selection policy. 
Measures of Comparison 
The results of the simulations are presented in the form of the following four measures. 
1. POSN. The average position of the true best alternative (according to the ide-
alised rank ordering) in the model rank order. 
2. RANK. The average rank of the best alternative selected by the model in the 
true rank order. 
3. Spearman's Rank Correlation coefficient calculated between the model rank 
order and the true rank order. 
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4. A rank probability matrix P with element Pqr denoting the probability that the 
alternative with rank q in the true rank order has rank r in the model rank 
order. The rank probability matrix varies between the identity matrix in cases 
of complete agreement and a matrix having all elements equal to lin in cases 
of a complete lack of agreement. 
4.4 Parameters of the Simulation Experiment 
All value function simulations were based on a problem containing n = 15 alternatives, 
m 7 criteria and P = 50 scenarios, representing as best as can be expected a 
'typical' MCDM problem. In the long run we could therefore expect a worst-case 
model randomly selecting a 'best' alternative to obtain POSN and RANK scores of 
8. 
Changing attribute values over scenarios 
Changes to the attribute values over scenarios were simulated using the additive and 
multiplicative scenario-ba..')ed modifications, Bik and ejk respectively. Larger values 
for Bik relative to ejk imply greater change in attribute values over the range of 
scenarios and a more dominant scenario effect. The values of Bik and ejk were 
adjusted with respect to the baseline score A ij , where the Aij were generated so that 
approximately 90% were less than 0.4. Since it is only the relative scaling of the 
Bik to the ejk that materially influences the attribute values, only one magnitude of 
multiplicative changes, ejk , was used, effectively lying between 80% and 120%. 
Table 4.1: Simulated levels of attribute variability 
Basic preference structure 
Four different basic preference structures were simulated in the manner of Stewart 
[86], based on the following modifications to the parameters, used in the definition 
of the utility functions, governing the reference level, Tj, and the value of the utility 
function at the reference level, Aj. 
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2 
3 
4 
D(0.15, 0.4) 
D(0.5, 0.85) 
D(0.5, 0.85) 
D(0.6, 0.85) 
D(0.I5, 0.4) 
D(0.5, 0.85) 
compensatory 
Mainly compensatory preferences, 
with a sharp preference threshold 
Limited compensation 
Limited compensation, 
with a threshold 
Table 4.2: Parameters of the four simulated preference structures 
In each case, the curvature of the utility function above the reference level, j3j, was 
generated uniformly on the interval [1,8]' and the curvature below the reference level, 
(Yj, was generated uniformly on the interval j3j + [2,8]. The effect of multivariate 
risk proneness is investigated in the first experiment by changing the value of the 
parameter /'£ {I, 3, 8}. In the subsequent experiments /'£ 3. The two degrees of 
change to the attribute values together with the four basic preference structures define 
the 8 basic problem structures for the simulated implementation of a scenario-based 
:NICDM approach. 
Simulation of Non-idealities 
simulation is defined by the following model parameters representing the non-
idealities of the decision process. The reference levels of each parameters have been 
highlighted in bold face. 
1. Number of scenarios selected for analysis. s = {3, 5, 10} 
2. Errors in weight assessment. ew {O, U(±0.05), U(±O.IO)} 
3. Errors in probability assessment. epr = {O, U(±0.3), U(±0.6)} 
4. Estimation of utility functions with piecewise linear segments. v = {I, 2, 4} 
5. Omission of criteria. 0 = {O, 1, 2} 
6. Violations of preferential independence. 1= {O, 0.1, 0.3} 
7. Shifts in reference levels. er = {O, O.I} 
Investigation of a scenario-based value function method 
Three value function experiments have been performed in order to keep computa-
tional demands manageable. The first experiment isolates for closer investigation the 
scenario issues constituting our core concern. Then, the second and third experiments 
investigate the effects of certain non-idealities known to occur in practice, with a spe-
cific view to investigating further any interactions between the non-idealities and the 
use of a scenario-based approach. 
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Experiment 1 Simulation of non-ideality 1 and the multivariate risk proneness pa-
rameter K. All other non-idealities are set at their reference levels, giving a total 
of 72 different cases. 
Experiment 2 Simulation of non-idealities 1, 2 and 3, with all other non-idealities 
set to their reference levels. For the purposes of this experiment, the set of 
basic structural parameters governing the shape of the utility function is fixed 
at case 1, so that there are only 2 basic problem structures. All combinations 
of non-idealities 1,2 and 3 are simulated, giving a total of 54 different cases. 
Experiment 3 Simulation of the non-idealities 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 previously investi-
gated by Stewart [86]. All other non-idealities are set to their reference levels, 
the shape of the utility function is fixed at case 1 and attribute variability is 
high. All combinations were used to give a total of 162 different cases. 
The results of these three experiments are presented and discussed in chapter 5. In 
the remainder of the current chapter we propose hypothetical simulation structures 
for similar investigations in the context of each of the outranking and metric method-
ologies. 
4.5 Proposed Implementation of a Simulated Met-
ric Method 
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 gave a complete and detailed account of a value function simu-
lation approach, as it was implemented for the purposes of this thesis and for which 
results appear in chapter 5. On the other hand, we did not implement the following 
proposed simulation of a metric methodology. The discussion that follows is therefore 
intended purely as an introductory and incomplete outline of the form that such a 
simulation approach might take, with the specific aim of highlighting any potentially 
troublesome modelling issues. 
In simulating a metric method the basic five-stage simulation structure would remain 
the same, and it is only the modelling of the MCDM treatment of the problem (stage 
4) that would need to change. The problem context, idealised and non-idealised 
preference structures, and comparison of true and modelled rank orders would all be 
generated as before. However, whereas in previous simulation we needed only to 
consider the single value theoretic model, there is no such consensus of opinion in the 
metric methods. We have identified three distinct metric methodologies in section 
3.3, which we to as chance-constrained GP, mean-variance GP and scenario-
based GP. The simulation framework therefore would need to consider an additional 
research question 
• How similar are the rank orders produced by the different stochastic GP meth-
ods? 
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In retaining the general simulation structure, the simulated DM is again assumed to 
possess a specific preference structure that is consistent with the 'rationality' prop-
erties of expected utility theory. This idealised preference structure is not directly 
available to the DM, but is in some sense strived towards through the haze of simu-
lated non-idealities. This is particularly important in the context of metric methods, 
where an unwillingness to confront the difficulty of eliciting utilities may often moti-
vate their use. This formulation in no way implies that metric methods are an inferior 
approximation to results obtained using expected utility theory, or that beneath a 
metric approach lies a DM thinking in terms of utilities and associated concepts. 
Rather the axioms of expected utility theory are used in the absence of any other 
normatively appealing axiomatic ba..o::;is for the comparison of MCDM methods. In 
fact these axioms play a limited role the proposed simulation of metric methods, 
being used primarily as a basis for an optional and unsophisticated revision of aspi-
rations. 
In the remainder of the section we propose a revised fourth stage of the simulation 
process appropriate for a metric approach. The basic algorithm is as follows: 
1. Elicit an initial set of a..o::;pirations. 
2. Generate the set of deviations. 
3. Apply a metric method of aggregating the deviations into a score. 
4. Rank order the alternatives and present the solution to the DM. 
5. (Optional) If the best alternative has been seen before, then stop. Otherwise, 
revise the aspirations and return to step 2. 
4.5.1 Initial Aspirations 
The main focus of the proposed simulation study is not on the revision of aspirations, 
but rather on how various metric methods accommodate uncertain outcomes in the 
presence of certain non-idealities known to occur in practice. This focuses attention on 
the quality of the initial selection of aspirations, since these aspirations will undergo 
only limited and unsophisticated revision. Further, it has been suggested that well-
selected initial aspirations considerably aid the metric process [7]. All aspirations 
would be set using the non-idealised preference structure. 
Scenario-Based GP 
Scenario-based GP approaches require that aspirations are set in each criterion-
scenario combination. The proposed modelling of the aspiration setting procedure 
is motivated by two extremes. In cases where there is very little awareness of the 
DM's preference structure, aspirations may simply set to the best performance 
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i.e. the ideal, in each criterion-scenario combination. At the other end of the scale, 
where the DM possesses perfect knowledge of all the inputs and products of the 
idealised decision process (ignoring the question as to why the analysis is then re-
quired), aspirations would be set to the performance of the true best alternative 
on each criterion-scenario combination, to ensure that the best alternative is in fact 
chosen. The competence of the DM in selecting initial aspirations could therefore 
be parsimoniously modelled by considering convex combinations of the aspirations 
corresponding to the respective selection strategies. Let the highest attribute value 
under criterion j and scenario k be denoted by z;k' and let the performance of the 
true best alternative under criterion j and scenario k be denoted by Then the 
aspiration 9jk for criterion j and scenario k would be given by 
9jk = pzJt + (1 P)Z;k (4.7) 
where p is a parameter increasing with the competence of the DM in setting initial 
aspirations (0 ::::: p ::::: 1). 
Mean-Variance GP 
The mean-variance GP approach requires that aspiration levels are specified in terms 
of the expected utility of criterion j rather than in terms of the attribute values. 
Aspirations 9j are thus set over all scenarios simultaneously. We might use the goals 
9jk constructed for the scenario-based approach and the non-idealised marginal utility 
functions to find the utility of each criterion-scenario goal Ujk(9jk). The scenario 
probabilities could then be used to form the expectation 
p 
9j L Pr[klujk(9jk) (4.8) 
k=l 
Chance-Constrained GP 
As we have mentioned before, CCGP approaches are not well-suited to discrete choice 
MCDM problems due to the requirement that aspirations be set both on attribute 
values and the probabilities of achieving these attribute aspirations. The relationship 
between the two is unclear, although this might conceivably form an additional aspect 
of the simulation. The attribute aspirations might be specified in each criterion nsing 
expectations over scenarios bj = 2::r=l Pr[k19jk. Alternatively, we may apply the same 
technique as for the scenario-based approach except that we identify the ideal perfor-
mance and the performance of the true best alternative in each criterion regardless 
of scenario. It is difficult to see any specification of the aspirational probabilities 9j 
apart from an ad hoc selection. 
4.5.2 Computation of Deviations 
In certain generalised goal programming or reference point approaches, the deviations 
are not constrained to be non-negative, so that surplus performance over and above 
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goals is also taken into consideration. For the purposes of proposed simu-
lation, the more classical notion of non-negative goal programming deviations would 
be employed. 
Scenario-Based GP 
The computation of deviations in the scenario-based GP approach would take the 
form of a trivial step based on the attribute values and the previously generated set 
of aspirations. 
(4.9) 
Mean-Variance GP 
The mean-variance approach does not consider deviations in the usual sense of the 
metric methods. The condition that 6ij - 9j 2 0 would create a feasible region 
and in doing so exclude some alternatives from further consideration. A rank order 
among the remaining alternatives would then be based on values of the variance-based 
objective function. 
Chance-Constrained GP 
To compute the deviational probabilities we would first need to calculate proba-
bility Pij that alternative i exceeds the attribute aspiration bj for criterion j. In the 
context of discrete choice, this is easily done by summing together the probabilities of 
those scenarios for which the condition is true. The deviations from the aspirational 
probabilities could then be computed as 
4.5.3 Aggregation of Deviations 
Scenario-Based GP 
The scenario-based approach is unique in this context in that it requires two 
( 4.10) 
of aggregation. We limit consideration to the Archimedean or Tchebycheff 
gations applied at either of the criterion-wise or scenario-wise aggregation stages, 
giving a total of 4 possible combinations. A detailed motivation for the consideration 
of these aggregations is discussed in section 3.3.3; here we present only the form of 
the final score for each alternative i given by the aggregation combination denoted 
by {criterion-wise aggregation; scenario-wise aggregation}. 
{Archimedean; Archimedean} 
L Pr( k) L w j 6ij k (4.11) 
k j 
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{Archimedeanj Tchebycheff} 
m,rx[pr(k) LWj8ijk] 
J 
(4.12) 
{Tchebycheff, Archimedean} 
L PrCk) [m~x[Wj8ijk] + E L Wj8ijk] 
k J j 
(4.13) 
{Tchebycheff; Tchebycheff} 
m,rx [pr(k) [m:x[wj8ijk] + E L Wj8ijk]] 
J 
( 4.14) 
where E is a small positive constant of order 0.01 used in order to avoid the possibility 
of non-efficient solutions. Note that the scenario-wise aggregation takes into account 
the relative likelihoods of each scenario; the advantages of this extension are discussed 
in section 3.3.3. 
Mean-Variance GP 
As we have mentioned in the previous section, the mean-variance GP approach does 
not make use of deviations in the conventional sense; the aggregation stage does 
not involve deviations at all but rather, for an alternative a, the computation of the 
variance measure E~111}jRj(zj(a))(72(zj(a)). The value of the local risk aversion at 
the expected attribute value (a) could be calculated from the non-idealised marginal 
utility functions. 
Chance-Constrained GP 
The aggregation procedure for the CCGP approach is the most straightforward of the 
three; because we have a set of Tn aspirations 9j and a set of Tn deviations 8j we may 
use the conventional G P aggregation making use of a single metric a 
m 1 
[L[wj 8ij ]Q] a (4.15) 
j=l 
4.5.4 Revision of Aspirations 
Previous simulations [90] have shown that the revision of aspirations is crucial to 
the success of a metric MCDM approach. However, we do not pursue in detail the 
proposed simulation of aspiration revisions for two reasons. Firstly, the model de-
scribed thus is quite broad in scope; it would test the effects of GP methodology, 
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uncertainty, and non-idealities. Furthermore, there may be significant interactions 
between these effects. The importance of not constructing overly complex or detailed 
simulation models has already been discussed, and it is with respect to this balance 
that we choose not to include the considerable further aspect of revising aspirations. 
Secondly, there has been little axiomatic or empirical work done on how decision 
makers may adjust their aspirations in light of a particular solution. This compli-
cates the simulation process by necessitating the conjecturing of the process governing 
aspiration revision. Of course such conjectures, once developed, are useful ways to 
investigate which aspects of the revision might be more important. These may then 
form the bases for later empirical studies. 
Stewart [90] has proposed a simulated revision procedure in a deterministic GP con-
text. By considering each criterion-scenario combination as a deterministic 'criterion', 
this procedure may be implemented in the scenario-based GP approaches with lit-
tle modification. The mean-variance approach is more problematic in that revisions 
would have the effect of reducing or enlarging the set of feasible options; more 
gressive revisions might therefore be necessary to induce changes in the alternative 
selected by the model. However, because the goals of the mean-variance approach 
are derived directly from those in the scenario-based approaches, it should be pos-
sible to again use the procedure proposed by Stewart. The chance-constrained GP 
approaches present the biggest challenge based on the dual aspirations over attributes 
and probabilities. Specifically the process by which one might revise the aspirational 
probabilities is very unclear. One idea is therefore to only the attribute aspira-
tions based on the procedure of Stewart, while keeping the aspirational probabilities 
fixed. Although as a cognitive model this revision is unlikely to be realistic, it would 
provide a way forward when few appear to exist. 
4.6 Proposed Implementation of a Simulated Out-
ranking Method 
The simulation of an outranking method is overshadowed by two complications: the 
lack of an axiomatic basis governing behaviour, and the difficulty in reconciling the 
only available axiom system MAUT, with a model designed specifically to avoid 
complying with those axioms. In particular it is no longer only the fourth stage 
in the generalised five-stage simulation process that would require modification. The 
possible incorporation of incomparability implies that the generated model rank order 
would not necessarily be complete. The comparison of this model rank order to the 
true rank order might therefore require some modifications. problem context 
and non-idealities, however, would be generated as before. The modelling is further 
complicated by the lack of an accepted method of treating uncertainty. Four broad 
treatments were identified by the literature survey: direct comparison of probability 
distributions, construction of a distributive outranking relation, construction of a 
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stochastic dominance relation, and a scenario-based approach. In this section we 
again discuss only a proposed simulation structure, in order to give a flavour of how an 
outranking approach might be simulated without going into the amount of detail that 
would be required for actual implementation. Furthermore we limit our attention to 
the implementation of a scenario-based simulation approach. In any case, simulations 
of the other three treatments of risk are likely to be at least similar in nature, differing 
mainly in the definitions of concordance and discordance. The basic algorithm is as 
follows: 
1. Define the concordance and discordance indices in each criterion-scenario com-
bination. 
2. Aggregate the concordance and discordance indices over criterion-scenario com-
binations to arrive at global concordance and discordance measures. 
3. Synthesise the global concordance and discordance measures to construct the 
outranking relation. 
4. Exploit the outranking relation in order to arrive at a (not necessarily complete) 
rank order. 
\Ve discuss first the initial definitions of concordance and discordance in the pro-
posed simulation model, before discussing the final three steps under the heading of 
aggregation and exploitation. 
4.6.1 Concordance and Discordance 
The first question that needs to be answered relates to which of the outranking meth-
ods to use. The built-in fuzziness of the later ELECTRE and PROMETHEE methods 
model aspects of imprecision not included in either the value function or proposed 
metric method simulations. The focus needs to remain on the treatment of risk rather 
than imprecision. On the other hand it does seem essential not to oversimplify the 
outranking methods by restricting them to an ELECTRE I or II form. The proposed 
simulation would make use of the more advanced ELECTRE III methodology, which 
requires the definition of a set of pseudocriteria using appropriate indifference and 
preference thresholds. The most important aspect of the proposed simulation is the 
way that the pseudo criteria are used to form a bridge to the idealised utility functions. 
Rather than the usual approach that defines the concordance index cjk(a,b) over the 
domain zjk(b) Zjk(a), we propose to use the domain ujk(b) - Ujk(a}. This would at 
least achieve some fidelity to the assumed underlying preference structure. 
In order to remain consistent with the other simulations (which did not impose any in-
transitivity of indifference), it would be necessary to set each indifference threshold tjk 
to zero, although conceivably it too could be left as a model parameter. Thus the con-
cordance index Cjk(a, b) would begin to decrease from one as soon as ujk(b) > tljk(a). 
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The specification of the preference threshold t~k is less clear: in the absence of psy-
chological guidelines it seems necessary to eA-periment with various parameter values 
in an ad hoc fashion. It is important to note that both thresholds must be expressed 
in terms of utilities rather than attribute values. The proposed concordance index is 
then given by 
if Ujk(a) 2-: ujk(b), 
if Ujk(a) S ujk(b) S Ujk(a) + t~k' 
if Ujk(a) + t~k S ujk(b). 
(4.16) 
The notion of discordance is more problematic. As it has no analogue in the other 
MCDM schools it does seem plausible to simply exclude it from consideration, as done 
in [53]. If it is to be included, due care needs to be taken to ensure that discordances 
only occur in severe situations. For example, even a difference of ujk(b) -Ujk(a) = 1 
might be considered insufficient to induce discordance unless both the criterion j and 
scenario k are important. A proposal is then to set the veto threshold tj using a 
weighted difference so that discordance would not occur in less important criterion-
scenario combinations. Although this does run contrary to the spirit of discordance, 
it does not seem unrealistic to expect that similar thinking may occur in practice. A 
possible discordance index is therefore given by 
if WjkUjk(b) S WjkUjk(a) + t~k' 
if WjkUjk(a) + t~k S WjkUjk(b) S WjkUjk(a) + tjk) 
if WjkUjk(b) 2-: WjkUjk(a) +tjk' 
( 4.17) 
At this point it is probably necessary to warn against the introduction of excessive ad 
hoc simulation elements. The major problem when simulating an outranking approach 
is the lack of solid physical interpretation for several crucial model aspects, including 
concordance and discordance. This lack of interpretation makes it considerably more 
difficult to operationalise the outranking method without giving a very subjective 
and possibly even arbitrary appearance to the simulation. Some degree of ad hoc 
modelling seems unavoidable, but it is important to limit it as much as possible. 
4.6.2 Aggregation and Exploitation 
The aggregation of the marginal concordance and discordance indices into global mea-
sures to be used as inputs to the so-called credibility index S( a, b) might proceed as 
outlined in section 3.2.3. The criterion weights present the only difficulty: the differ-
ent interpretations of the weights in the value function and outranking schools is well 
known. Previous studies [53] have shown that no clear relationship exists between 
the criterion weights of the two approaches. However, because the problem context 
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generates the attribute values so that each criterion is defined over the same unit 
range, the swing weights of the value function approach have no range component i.e. 
they reflect purely the esoteric notion of importance. In light of this fact, it seems 
reasonable to use the same numerical weights in both the idealised preference struc-
ture and the outranking model. 
Simulating the further aggregation of the ascending and descending distillations re-
sulting from the exploitation of the credibility index is highly problematic, but essen-
tial in order to arrive at a final rank order for comparison. The only help in this regard 
appears to be using a PROMETHEE aggregation procedure, based on computation 
of two global scores: a positive outranking flow Q+(a) indicating the extent to which 
a outranks all other alternatives, and a negative outranking flow Q-(a) indicating 
the extent to which a is outranked by all other alternatives. The flows are defined by 
Q+(a) L S(a, b) (4.18) 
bfa 
Q-(a) L S(b, a) ( 4.19) 
bfa 
Each of these flows defines a complete preorder, from which the outranking relation 
can be obtained in two ways. The PROMETHEE I method uses the intersection of the 
preorders (see [7]), while the PROMETHEE II method first computes a net outranking 
flow Q(a) Q+(a) Q-(a) before concluding that a outranks b if Q(a) > Q(b). The 
latter results in a complete preorder, which allows the comparisons of 
idealised and modelled rank orders to take place unhindered, but is perhaps slightly 
contrary to the philosophy of outranking as no incomparability is permitted. for-
mer aggregation is more faithful to the outranking philosophy, but would necessitate 
some difficult modifications to the comparison stage. 
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Chapter 5 
Simulation of Value Function 
Methods 
5.1 Results of Simulation Experiment 1 
Simulation experiment 1 is intended to investigate the impact of the more basic 
aspects of the value function framework, in the absence of other non-idealities. The 
fundamental features of any value function model are a set attribute values, a set 
of marginal utility functions, and an aggregation method governed by a functional 
form. Accordingly, there are five main effects, two corresponding to the shape of the 
marginal utility function (Tj and Aj), one corresponding to the variability of attribute 
values over the scenarios (B), one corresponding to the level of multivariate risk 
proneness (/'t:) and one corresponding to the number of scenarios chosen (s), taking 
on the following values to give a total of 72 cases. 
Aj low, high 
B low, high 
/'t: 1,3,8 
s 10 
Table 5.1: Parameters of experiment 1 
In this experiment as well as the two experiments that follow it, we begin by briefly 
discussing an analysis of variance (AN OVA) comprising the main effects and all higher 
order interactions in the particular experiment. The analysis of variance is used as a 
quick and concise way to summarise the effects in terms of statistical significance, so 
as to provide a broad overview of the results obtained. Vve perform separate ANOVA's 
for each of the POSN and RANK statistics. In the detailed ANOVA tables that are 
presented at the end of each of section 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 it is our convention to identify 
those effects that are significant at the 5% level by a single asterisk and those effects 
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that are significant at the 0.5% level by a double asterisk. Following the discussion of 
the ANOVA results, we consider in more detail the actual nature of each effect and 
its potential relevance to practical decision making. 
5.1.1 ANOVA Results 
Detailed ANOVA tables for experiment 1 are presented at the end of section 5.1 in 
tables 5.12 and 5.13, for the POSN and RANK scores respectively. All main effects 
are identified as significant at the 0.5% level by the majority of the models. There is 
a general consensus among the models examined that the reference level exercises the 
most significant main effect, with F-statistics upwards of 3000. The effect of attribute 
variability is also identified as highly significant in all cases with the exception of the 
additive POSN scores. The of the number of scenarios chosen will clearly be 
entirely due to chance in models that operate outside the scenario environment, but 
within the scenario models it is of a similar magnitude to the effect of attribute vari-
ability. The other two main effects, that of the multivariate risk proneness and the 
utility at the reference level, remain significant at the 0.5% level but are considerably 
less significant than the other main effects, with F -statistics generally around 100. 
There is less consistency between the value function models with regard to the signif-
icant interaction effects. There are four second-order interactions that are significant 
in the majority of the models: between the effect of reference levels and each of the 
four other effects. Although there are several other interactions identified as statis-
tically significant by some of the models, further investigation into the nature of the 
interactions revealed little systematic behaviour. These interactions are therefore not 
of broader practical interest, and are not considered further. 
Contrary to the consistency of the main effects and to a lesser degree the second-order 
effects, the higher-order interactions are usually inconsistent and model-specific where 
they are significant at all. There is a potentially significant higher order interaction 
between preferences (jointly represented by Tj and A.j) and the effect of attribute 
variability, which is significant in all models with the exception of the model ignoring 
risk. 
5.1.2 Characterisation of Effects 
The general performances of each of the 7 models is reflected in the following table, 
which shows the grand average POSN and RANK scores as well as the average rank 
correlations. 
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Model POSN RANK SRC 
5.02 4.33 0.37 
Expected Z 2.46 2.21 0.75 
Scenario R 4.17 3.96 0.50 
Scenario P 4.00 3.81 0.52 
Scenario ML 3.46 3.33 0.59 
Scenario F 4.36 4.03 0.48 
Table 5.2: Grand average performance measures for experiment 1 
The additive model, which is the only model that includes a full treatment of the un-
certain outcomes, clearly outperforms all the other models, with POSN and RANK 
scores indicating that the true best alternative is located on between the first 
and second model ranks (out of 15 alternatives), and that the alternative identified by 
the model as best is also between first or second in the true rank order. Although we 
have not yet incorporated any non-idealities, the results so far mirror those of Stewart 
[85] to the effect that an additive representation provides an excellent approximation 
to the true rank order obtained from a multiplicative utility function. The true best 
alternative is identified as best by the additive model in 75% of simulations, and 
among the top two alternatives in 90%. Similar results hold for the alternative iden-
tified as best by the model, so that it occupies one of the top two ranks in the true 
rank order with probability 90%. particular therefore, a strategy of employing an 
additive approximation to produce a shortlist of two or three alternatives might be 
very useful. 
two models attempting to reduce risk to an expected attribute value perform 
very differently. If sufficient care is taken to approximate the expected attribute val-
ues closely, then the results are good even if some anchoring or other contamination 
occurs. The expected Z model identifies the true best alternative as either first or 
second in 70% of the simulations. However, if a lack of rigour and effort allow for a 
Qe'grE~e of contamination, then the results are generally poorer than any of the 
other models. In particular the model ignoring risk places the true best alternative in 
the top three ranks in less than 50% of the simulations. This highlights the need for 
caution whenever risk is reduced to a single measure, but does not rule out or even 
discourage the use of such simplifying heuristics. On the contrary, it appears as if a 
diligent estimate of the expected value may produce excellent results. As mentioned 
before, however, if this can only be done by making explicit all possible future perfor-
mances, then the additive model might as well be used since it remains comfortably 
superior. 
The scenario-based models perform only averagely in terms of the relative quality of 
the approximations to the rank orders. Average POSN scores range between 3.5 and 
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4.4, while the average RANK scores are marginally better and are between 3.3 and 
4. The relatively poor level of performance is not overly surprising if one considers 
that the scenario-based models ignore between 80% and 95% of the attribute infor-
mation. However, there does appear a real danger that applying a scenario model 
will provide the DM with an inferior alternative as well as a false sense of security at 
having incorporated uncertainty into the analysis. The true best and modelled best 
alternatives appear in the top three of each other's rank orders between 55% and 70% 
of the time, depending on the scenario selection strategy. The true and modelled best 
alternatives coincide in only 30% of the simulations. Despite the relatively efficient 
use of information, these results do not therefore support the general use of scenarios 
as a viable alternative to a full additive or otherwise. 
Further, the probabilistic selection policies consistently and comprehensively outper-
form the filtered selection policy, which in fact performs slightly worse than even a 
random selection. The policy selecting the most likely scenarios performs comfortably 
better than the other selection policies, and the rank and probabilistic information 
indicate that such a model may be plausible when accuracy is not a crucial consid-
eration. The probabilistic selection model is consistently but only marginally better 
than random scenario selection. As a result, it appears necessary not only to select 
the most likely scenarios, but to do so with a fair degree of accuracy. In practice 
one might hope to achieve a degree of accuracy somewhere between that of the most 
likely and probabilistic selection policies. The poor performance of the filtered selec-
tion model may in part be due to the imposed constraint that the status quo scenario 
be selected first. Kevertheless, the results provide at least an initial warning that a 
selection policy based on the ideas of diversity advocated in scenario planning might 
not be a panacea. 
It should be emphasised that these observations about the scenario models are drawn 
solely from the numerical results indicating the quality of approximation of the ide-
alised rank order. \Ve do not take into account other advantages which may accrue 
to the scenario models, for example those cause-and-effect relationships identified in 
the construction of the scenarios, which may be of considerable benefit as additional 
learning tools. The results are therefore not presented as conclusive evidence of any 
universal inferiority of scenario models. In fact, in the same way as different 
MCDJ.1 methodologies emphasise different aspects of the problem, so do the 
scenario-based approaches. However, the results are meant to warn that there are 
consequences for ignoring part of the decision problem, and these consequences 
are often severe. An explicit warning such as this one is missing from appli-
cations of scenario-based models. In many conventional choice problems, a model 
selecting an alternative which is only fourth or fifth best out of is simply not 
good enough. In all ca."les the final decision as to whether resulting loss of accu-
racy is sufficient to offset the time and structural advantages can only taken after 
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considering the context of the problem and the needs of the DM. 
Shape of Utility Function 
The shape of the utility function is determined by the reference level, Tj, and the value 
of the utility function at the reference level, Aj. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show the effect of 
Tj and Aj respectively, while table 5.5 shows increase in POSN and RANK scores 
when Aj moves from the low interval to high interval under conditions of low or 
high reference levels. 
position of the reference level exerts a tremendous infiuence over the results. 
The quality of the rank approximation is considerably worse when reference levels 
are low i.e. the DM views most of the attribute domain as a gain. This deterioration 
is true in all models, but is particularly severe in the scenario-based models and the 
model ignoring risk, for which both the POSN and RANK scores increase by between 
1.5 and 2 positions when reference levels are low. This deterioration is particularly 
important: the performance of the scenario-based models when reference levels are 
high is mediocre but adequate for certain applications, with POSN and RANK scores 
around 3. In such circumstances the true best alternative is located among 
top two model ranks in approximately 60% of the simulations. However, when 
rOT,:>r£>lnl'O levels are low, the average POSN and RANK scores are closer to 5 out of 15, 
which would almost certainly be deemed unacceptably poor. In fact the extent of the 
deterioration is such that the true best alternative is located outside of the top five 
model ranks in at least 30% of the simulations. The use of scenario models can 
arC,T,,"a at this stage only be advocated if reference levels are high. In contrast, the 
additive model is the least affected and shows a large degree of robustness, although 
even then the POSN and RANK scores increase by nearly 0.5 when reference levels 
decrease from high to low. Nevertheless, even where reference levels are low top 
two model contain the true best alternative with a probability of 85%. 
The reason results appears to be due to the limited compensation implied 
by a high reference level, which is sometimes extreme due to the model requirement 
that the slope of the utility function be greater below the reference leveL This (of-
ten severely) limited compensation has the effect of more clearly separating out the 
performances of alternatives, so that mediocre alternatives are firmly excluded from 
consideration. is particularly important for the scenario approaches, which rely 
on limited information. 
The value of the utility function at the reference level exerts a far lesser infiuence, and 
although there is a definitive relationship, the effects on the rank orders are marginaL 
The average POSN and RANK scores are both lower when Aj is low relative to when 
it is high. The order of magnitude of this effect does not exceed 0.3, and is again 
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least evident in the additive model, for which the scores differ by less than 0.1. The 
general influence of the Aj is therefore unlikely to be of significant interest. 
There is an interesting but modest interaction between the Ij and Aj. Essentially, 
increases in the Aj result in the increased scores mentioned above only when reference 
levels are high. When reference levels are low, any increases are of a lower order of 
magnitude if observed at all. This interaction is consistent over all models, although 
it is more evident in the POSN scores than in the RANK scores. As mentioned, 
the interaction is modest in terms of the difference in rank orders. For the scenario 
models in which the effect is most visible, in the Aj result in increases of 
0.1 in POSN scores when reference levels are low, compared to increases of 0.4 when 
reference levels are high. 
I low low high 
Additive 1.60 1.64 1.19 
Ignore 5.73 4.32 5.00 3.66 
Expected Z 2.99 1.92 2.67 1.75 
Scenario R 5.16 3.17 4.95 2.98 
Scenario P 4.91 3.09 4.69 2.93 
Scenario ML 4.14 2.77 4.04 2.62 
Scenario F 5.40 3.32 4.98 3.08 
Table 5.3: Effect of reference level (Ij) 
POSN RANK 
A low high low high 
Additive 1.36 1.44 1.37 1.45 
Ignore 4.93 5.11 4.24 4.42 
Expected Z 2.41 2.50 2.11 2.31 
Scenario R 4.05 4.28 3.83 4.10 
Scenario P 3.88 4.12 3.67 3.95 
Scenario ML 3.37 3.54 3.20 3.45 
Scenario F 4.25 4.47 3.90 4.16 
Table 5.4: Effect of utility at reference level (Aj) 
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POSN RANK 
Additive low Tj +0.03 +0.04 
high Tj +0.12 +0.12 
Ignore low Tj +0.06 +0.06 
high Tj +0.30 +0.30 
Expected Z low Tj -0.02 +0.21 
high Tj +0.21 +0.19 
Scenario R low Tj +0.04 +0.09 
high Tj +0.41 +0.44 
Scenario P low Tj +0.09 +0.15 
high Tj +0.41 +0.42 
Scenario ML low Tj +0.10 +0.18 
high Tj +0.25 +0.32 
Scenario F low Tj +0.06 +0.13 
high Tj +0.38 +0.40 
Table 5.5: Effect of interaction between reference level (Tj) and utility at the reference 
level (Aj) 
Attribute Variability 
The POSN and RANK scores for each simulated degree of attribute variability are 
shown in table 5.6, while table 5.7 shows the relative increases in POSN and RANK 
scores when attribute variability increases under conditions of low or high reference 
levels. The variability of the attribute values also exerts a strong influence over the 
results. Increased attribute variability results in some large deteriorations in the qual-
ity of the rank approximations. Excluding the additive model, which is not influenced 
by the different levels of variability, the magnitude of the deteriorations ranges from 
0.5 for the expected Z model to over 1 position for the filtered scenario model. The 
deteriorations are fairly consistent over both the POSN and RANK scores, and are 
large enough to warrant further attention. The deterioration manifests itself in the 
rank probability matrix by decreasing the probability that the true and modelled 
best alternatives coincide by around 10% when attribute variability increases. Such 
deteriorations are relatively more harmful to the scenario-based methods, where the 
probability that the best alternative is agreed upon is only 35% when attribute vari-
ability is low. By way of comparison the same event has a probability of 55% when 
the expected Z model is used. 
It seems fairly clear that the level of variability would have a significant effect for 
those methods which consider only a fraction of the total information: the smaller 
the variability, the smaller the sample size required to capture the essence of the to-
tal population. A less obvious and possibly more interesting observation is derived 
from the poor performance of the filtered scenario model when attribute variability 
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is high. It is often argued from a scenario planning standpoint that, when future 
outcomes are highly divergent, the scenario planning techniques become superior to 
the probabilistic methods (for example, [101]). Yet the results show that the relative 
deteriorations due to increased attribute variability are most keenly felt in the filtered 
scenario model. This is another early indication that uncritical application of scenario 
planning techniques to MCDM might be misguided and detrimental to results. 
There is a small but fairly consistent interaction between the effects of attribute vari-
ability and reference levels in the POSN scores. It appears that the deterioration in 
results due to increased attribute variability is more pronounced when reference levels 
are high than when they are low. This observation is only true for the model ignoring 
risk and the scenario models; table 5.7 therefore excludes the additive and expected 
Z models. Again the magnitude of the interaction effect is marginal; deteriorations 
are between 0.3 and 0.4 positions more severe when reference levels are high. 
POSN RANK 
B low high low high 
Additive 1.38 1.42 1.39 1.44 
Ignore 4.65 5.40 3.92 4.74 
Expected Z 2.18 2.73 2.00 2.42 
Scenario R 3.67 4.66 3.49 4.43 
Scenario P 3.55 4.46 3.35 4.27 
Scenario ML 3.12 3.79 2.98 3.68 
Scenario F 3.82 4.91 3.52 4.55 
Table 5.6: Effect of attribute variability (B) 
POSN RANK 
Ignore low Tj +0.45 +0.80 
high Tj +1.05 +0.84 
Scenario R low Tj +0.88 +0.96 
high Tj +1.08 +0.92 
Scenario P low Tj +0.76 +0.91 
high Tj +1.06 +0.95 
Scenario ML low Tj +0.47 +0.61 
high Tj +0.88 +0.79 
Scenario F low Tj +0.95 +0.99 
high Tj +1.22 +1.06 
Table 5.7: Effect of interaction between reference level (Tj) and attribute variability 
(B) 
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Multivariate Risk Proneness 
The degree of multivariate risk proneness is determined by the parameter /'i,. Table 
5.8 shows the effect of various values of /'i, on the performance measures. The level 
of multivariate risk proneness has only a moderate effect on results for even quite 
large degrees of proneness. The quality of the average POSN scores do deteriorate as 
the multivariate risk proneness coefficient /'i, increases in magnitude, but the effects 
of such deteriorations are not materially experienced until /'i, = 8. Even then, the 
deteriorations relative to the case when /'i, = 1 are only of order 0.3, and so can be 
considered modest. Deteriorations in RANK scores are only exhibited by the additive 
model. In contrast to the previously mentioned effects, the additive model is subject 
to the most severe deteriorations due to increases in multivariate risk proneness. The 
relative frequency with which the true and modelled best alternatives coincide in the 
additive model decreases from 85% when /'i, = 1 to 65% when /'i, = 8. However, the 
additive approximation remains excellent, the true best alternative still being ranked 
either first or second with probability greater than 80%, and the modelled best alter-
native also being either first or second in the true rank order with similar probability. 
This is true even for large /'i" which supports similar results reported by Stewart [85]. 
There is a strong interaction between the effects of reference levels and /'i, for the 
additive model only. Table 5.9 therefore shows the POSN and RANK scores result-
ing from the interaction between multivariate risk proneness and reference levels for 
the additive model only. The deterioration due to increasing multivariate risk prone-
ness is far greater when reference levels are low. In fact, increasing multivariate risk 
proneness has little or no impact when reference levels are high, resulting in deterio-
rations in both the POSN and RANK scores of order 0.1 when /'i, increases from 1 to 
8. However, those same increases result in deteriorations of order 0.8 when reference 
levels are low. As a result, some fairly average results are observed when /'i, = 8 and 
reference levels are low, with the true best alternative being first in the modelled rank 
order in only 50% of the simulations and outside the top two ranks in 30%. There 
is no obvious explanation for the behaviour resulting from this interaction. We may 
observe that when reference levels are low, the greater part of the partial utility func-
tions are concave i.e. risk averse. Without confusing the notions of risk aversion in 
the mono criterion and multivariate senses, it is possible that increasing multivariate 
risk proneness conflicts with the criterion-wise risk aversion, resulting in the deterio-
rations that are experienced. The general nature of this interaction is evident in the 
POSN scores of the other models, albeit to a far lesser degree. The magnitude of 
the interactions in these other models is not considered sufficient to warrant deeper 
investigation. 
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Table 5.9: 
proneness (f'l,) 
RANK 
f'l, 1 3 8 
Additive 1.21 1.31 1.32 1.70 
Ignore 4.98 4.98 4.31 4.23 
Expected Z 2.34 2.38 2.16 2.29 
Scenario R 4.07 4.13 3.95 3.93 
Scenario P 3.91 3.93 4.17 3.76 3.83 
Scenario ML 3.37 3.40 3.60 3.31 3.33 
Scenario F 4.23 4.33 4.53 4.01 4.02 
Table 5.8: Effect of multivariate risk proneness (f'l,) 
POSN RANK 
f'l, 1 3 8 1 3 8 
Additive low Tj 1.29 1.46 2.06 1.30 1.49 2.12 
high Tj 1.13 1.15 1.30 1.13 1.15 1.29 
of interaction between reference level (Tj) multivariate risk 
N umber of Scenarios 
The number of chosen, denoted by s, will obviously affect only those models 
which are dependent on the scenario selection policies. As a result we exclude the 
other three models from consideration in table 5.10, which gives the POSN and RANK 
scores for each value of s. For the scenario models, the number of scenarios selected 
exercises a considerable influence over results. Increasing the number of scenarios 
included in the analysis from three to five results in improvements scores of 
both rank orders of order 0.5. Increasing the number to ten scenarios results in further 
improvements of order 0.9. Generally though, the performance of the scenario-based 
models remains poor. If 5 out of the 50 possible scenarios are considered, the true 
best alternative is on ranked fourth or worse in all scenario models except 
that which considers the most likely scenarios. The performance is considerably more 
acceptable in the scenario model selecting the most likely scenarios, with POSN and 
RANK scores as low as 2.5 when 10 scenarios are considered. In such circumstances 
the true best alternative is located either first or second in the modelled rank order 
in nearly 70% of simulations. in the other selection models, the same event 
occurs with a probability approaching 60%. Although it is doubtful whether adequate 
attention can be given to 20% of the scenarios, the results do give at least some 
numerical justification for using some kind of scenario-based approach where the aim 
is the production of a shortlist of 2 or 3 alternatives. Nevertheless, it should be 
reiterated that the performance the scenario models is in most circumstances poor. 
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An interesting feature is that although the initial improvements due to increasing the 
number of scenarios from three to five is quite different across the selection policies, 
the further gains obtained by increasing the number of scenarios to ten is almost 
exactly the same in all selection policies. The rates of marginal improvement are 
thus greatest in those selection policies relying on the probabilities of occurrence. 
In particular it appears that in such models the improved results justify the effort 
involved in constructing five scenarios instead of three. 
POSN RANK 
s 3 5 10 3 5 10 
Scenario R 4.84 4.26 3.40 4.58 4.05 3.26 
Scenario P 4.73 4.07 3.20 4.47 3.86 3.10 
Scenario ML 4.22 3.51 2.64 4.02 3.40 2.56 
Scenario F 4.92 4.52 3.64 4.36 4.25 3.50 
Table 5.10; Effect of the number of selected scenarios (s) 
General Robustness of Results 
Having examined the significant and important effects, we may make some state-
ments about the general robustness of the models towards the parameters of this 
simulation experiment. As a simple vehicle for these statements we make use of the 
rank probability matrix to construct the probability that the true best alternative is 
located either first or second the modelled rank order. It is then possible to see 
to what extent results may deteriorate or improve if the effects previously discussed 
conspire to form 'worst' and 'best' cases. For example, the previous discussions indi-
cated that the worst results the aforementioned 'worst' case, would occur if the 
set of parameters combined so that reference levels were low, utilities at the reference 
levels were high, attribute variability was high, multivariate risk proneness was high 
and the number of scenarios chosen was low. Similarly, a 'best' case can be found by 
considering the performance measures when, simultaneously, reference levels are high, 
utilities at the reference levels are low, attribute variability is low, multivariate risk 
proneness is low and the number of scenarios chosen is high. An 'average' performance 
is constructed as before by averaging over all cases. Table 5.11 shows the resulting 
worst, average, and best possible probability that the true best alternative is among 
the top two alternatives in each of the model rank orders. The non-scenario models 
are by definition independent of the number of scenarios chosen, while the scenario 
models themselves are obviously non-robust to such changes. In order to make mean-
ingful comments about the relative robustness of the models it is therefore necessary 
to avoid penalising the scenario models on the basis of a parameter that must be 
fixed at the outset of the analysis. Furthermore, the issue of comparing robustness 
is complicated by the different levels of general performance. In such circumstances, 
it is not clear to what extent the apparent insensitivity of a weaker model is due to 
actual notions of robustness or just general poor performance. Therefore, although 
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it implies ignoring all interactions involving the number of scenarios, the number of 
selected scenarios is held constant at the maximum of 10 in order firstly to avoid 
understating the robustness of the scenario models and, secondly, to minimise any 
effects of poor performance that might cloud the robustness relationships. 
Worst Average Best 
Additive 0.72 0.91 0.99 
Ignore 0.27 0.37 0.51 
Expected Z 0.50 0.69 0.86 
Scenario R 0.33 0.55 0.80 
Scenario P 0.38 0.58 0.81 
Scenario ML 0.48 0.65 0.83 
Scenario F 0.31 0.52 0.78 
Table 5.11: Probabilities that the true best alternative is placed first or second in the 
model rank order 
It is generally the best performing models that are also the most robust to changes 
in the parameters. In particular, the additive model appears to be comfortably supe-
rior to all the other models under any circumstances. The expected Z and scenario 
ML models are subject to slightly larger deteriorations than the additive model as 
the parameters take on less favourable values, but remain fairly robust, performing 
adequately until conditions become fairly extreme. The most striking aspect of the 
results is the poor robustness of the other scenario models. In fact, all the scenario 
models perform well when conditions are most favourable, with results only mar-
ginally worse than the expected Z model. Moreover, the relative performances of the 
four selection policies are similar. However, as the parameters take on less favourable 
values the performances of the three scenario models deteriorate far quicker than the 
other models, probably due to their sensitivity to reference levels. Furthermore, as 
conditions deteriorate the superiority of probabilistic scenario selection, and in par-
ticular the most likely selection policy, becomes increasingly evident. As a result 
we observe that the robustness of the scenario models increases with an increasing 
reliance on probability as a selection criterion. 
Finally, it is evident that the model ignoring risk is subject to the least deterioration, 
at least from an absolute point of view. However, a label of robustness is hesitantly 
used, as it is not clear to what extent the apparent robustness is a product of the 
general poor performance of this model. It certainly appears to be genuinely more 
robust than the scenario approaches, as the relative superiority of the scenario models 
decreases markedly as conditions move away from the ideal. Comparisons to the ad-
ditive and expected Z models with regard to robustness appear less important given 
the magnitude of superiority enjoyed by those models under all conditions. 
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5.1.3 Summarised Inferences 
In conclusion, the following messages are observed in the results and formalised as 
summarised inferences: 
• The quality of approximation is considerably worse when preferences are mainly 
compensatory i.e. reference levels are low. The result is particularly strong in 
the scenario models, which exhibit very poor performance when reference levels 
are low. 
• A slightly less powerful but still important effect is related to the variability 
of the attribute values over scenarios. Results are materially degraded when 
attribute variability is high all models except the additive model. 
• Contrary to conventional scenario planning wisdom, when attribute values be-
come more variable the selection of divergent scenarios results in a relatively 
greater degradation of results than if scenarios are selected probabilistically. 
• Results are unlikely to be substantially affected by multivariate risk proneness 
unless such proneness is extreme and reference levels are low. 
• There are quite substantial marginal improvements resulting from considering 
five rather than three scenarios. marginal improvements are where 
the most likely scenarios are and become less attractive as the proba-
bility of occurrence is replaced by diversity as the basis for scenario selection. 
• most successful models, particularly the additive model, are also the most 
robust to changes in the parameters of experiment 1. The scenario models, 
with the exception of the most likely selection policy, are particularly sensitive 
to changes in the parameters, performing well under favourable conditions but 
poorly or very poorly under others. 
• Robustness in the scenario models increases with dependency on the probability 
of occurrence as a basis for scenario selection. 
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Effect DoF Additive Ignore Expected Z R Scenario P Scenario ML F 
Tj 1 3619.70** 2690.20** 5526.64** 5527.69** 4302.61 ** 
1 125.37** 44.03** 43.82** 99.14** 101.99** 70.73** 77.63** 
B 1 767.03** 1468.68** 1833.27** 1:181.88** 1035.10** 1944.23** 
s 2 0.31 0.06 0.94 1331.34** 1:119.02** 1898.58** 938.22** 
k 2 1745.81** 10.46** 171.24** 35.00** 45.79** 46.36** 51.87** 
Tj x Aj 1 38.90** 18.61 ** 59.72** 64.17** 42.14** 12.39** 
Tj x B 1 28.80** 120.93** 4.81* 19.56** 35.43** 93.96** 30.12** 
Aj x B 1 0.29 5.29* 6.71* 0.53 0.36 2.23 0.00 
Tj x S 2 0.36 0.85 1.31 6.84** 4.74* 21.24** 1.04 
Aj x S 2 1.31 2.24 1.51 2.73 0.56 0.49 0.38 
B x s 2 0.35 1.85 1.99 2.47 2.63 
Tj x k 2 704.46** 0.76 1.57 12.97** 12.60** 33.97** 
Aj x k 2 0.77 1.99 0.69 0.04 0.33 0.13 
B x k 2 28.05** 0.70 8.11** 0.68 0.21 0.60 0.48 
....... sxk 4 0.15 0.12 0.66 1.56 1.46 2.11 0.86 0 
(ll Tj X Aj x B 1 1.98 76.79** 7.64* 22.58** 5.39* 33.58** 
Tj Aj x s 2 1.54 1.71 2.75 0.13 3.06* 0.24 0.12 
Tj x B x s 2 0.03 0.96 1.90 14.04 ** 21.:18** 6.56** 12.89** 
B x s 2 0.07 0.22 0.22 0.46 2.60 1.43 0.63 
x xk 2 92.79** 4.47* 34.53** 6.81** 3.75* 0.74 0.28 
Tj x B x k 2 4.99* 0.11 13.15** 5.57** 2.56 0.62 0.27 
Aj x B x k 2 0.07 0.33 0.66 0.93 0.33 0.56 2.61 
Tj x s x k 4 0.05 0.62 1.12 0.95 0.57 1.72 
Aj x s x k 4 2.44* 2.16 2.39 0.63 1.55 1.20 0.93 
Bxsxk 4 0.05 1.21 1.51 0.60 2.18 2.16 0.91 
Tj x Aj x B x s 2 0.65 0.68 2.13 2.47 0.08 2.16 0.36 
Tj x Aj x B x k 2 14.33** 0.25 8.60** 1.43 0.80 0.43 0.36 
x Aj x s x k 4 0.99 0.41 1.46 2.02 0.26 1.19 1.88 
Tj x B x s x k 4 0.32 1.07 0.92 0.75 0.31 0.65 0.81 
Aj x B x s x k 4 0.93 1.64 1.41 1.38 0.63 0.05 1.11 
xBxsxk 4 0.06 2.18 1.75 1.07 0.08 1.47 0.46 
5.12: ANOVA results for POSN scores in experiment 1 
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Effect DoF Additive Ignore Expected Z Scenario R Scenario P Scenario ML Scenario F 
Tj 1 3804.15** 3272.04** 5408.81 ** 7340.84** 5444.96** 5328.90** 6958.18** 
1 115.73** 61.40** 249.79** 135.14** 14:i.15** 162.58** 132.82** 
B 1 39.81 ** 1234.40** 1123.92** 1657.13** 1504.09** 1295.06** 2028.15** 
s 2 1.12 0.07 3.39* 1092.38** 1106.20** 1899.25** 563.:i3** 
k 2 1664.75** 30.20** 38.20** 5.05* 4.47* 0.72 2.08 
T" x),· 
.1 .1 1 27.96** 27.44** 0.39 56.80** 33.28** 12.36** 34.96** 
Tj X B 1 16.97** 0.62 6.50* 0.61 0.65 19.63** 2.79 
),j x B 1 1.93 15.02** 0.06 7.26* 1.74 3.99* 22.78** 
Tj x s 2 0.45 1.60 0.28 11.55** 11.51 ** 54.37** 
),j x S 2 0.23 0.83 0.91 6.25** 2.13 2.59 2.90 
B x S 2 1.39 0.14 1.41 1.75 8.20** 21.53** 1.86 
Tj x k 2 750.84** 12.67** 19.89** 0.44 2.43 0.17 4.90* 
),j x k 2 5.49** 0.82 4.46* 0.91 0.23 0.77 0.56 
B x k 2 30.33** 1.60 0.94 1.37 0.62 0.89 0.98 
sxk 4 0.33 0.70 1.85 1.76 3.10* 1.72 
Tj x ),j x B 1 29.10** 0.93 10.76** 10.46** 6.57* 6.19* 
Tj x ),j x .s 2 0.82 0.93 0.55 1.35 4.85* 0.85 2.69 
Tj x B x .9 2 0.51 0.60 1.58 2.43 4.18* 5.04* 7.26** 
),j x B x .9 2 0.68 0.07 0.02 0.34 0.41 1.07 1.98 
Tj x ),j x k 2 71.82** 1.57 25.70** 0.22 0.98 0.22 0.11 
Tj x B x k 2 3.65* 1.22 11.83** 0.21 0.91 0.83 0.08 
),j x B x k 2 1.83 0.93 0.69 0.14 1.12 1.13 2.15 
Tjx.9xk 4 0.30 0.95 0.33 1.48 0.74 2.43* 0.23 
),j x .s x k 4 0.47 1.01 1.23 0.81 0.71 0.80 0.38 
Bx.sxk 4 0.62 0.69 0.37 0.59 0.24 0.73 0.22 
Tj x ),j x B x .9 2 0.65 0.85 0.78 0.63 0.05 3.22* 2.47 
Tjx),jxBxk 2 18.18** 5.31 * 0.30 0.44 0.55 0.39 1.55 
Tj x ),j x S x k 4 0.17 0.45 1.31 0.78 0.30 0.48 0.71 
TjxBxsxk 4 0.28 2.17 0.18 0.62 1.52 0.27 0.30 
),j x B x s x k 4 1.41 2.60* 1.56 0.28 0.12 0.24 0.41 
xBxsxk 4 0.92 0.89 0.93 1.89 0.46 0.57 0.11 
5.13: AN OVA results for RANK scores experiment 1 
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5.2 Results of Simulation Experin1ent 2 
Simulation experiment 2 investigates the impact of two non-idealities relating to elic-
itation or assessment: errors in the assessment of the criterion weights, and errors in 
the assessment of the scenario probabilities. There are therefore four main effects, 
one corresponding to the variability of the attribute values (B), one corresponding to 
the number of scenarios chosen (s), and two corresponding to the assessment errors 
(ew and epr.). The shape of the utility function is at case 1 in order to limit 
the scope of the investigation to the 54 cases corresponding to combinations of the 
following parameters 
ew 0, U(-0.05, 0.05), U(-O.I, 0.1) 
ePr 0, U(-0.3, 0.3), U(-0.6, 0.6) 
s 3,5, 10 
Table 5.14: Parameters for experiment 2 
5.2.1 ANOVA Results 
The detailed ANOVA tables for experiment 2 can be found at the end of section 5.2 
in tables 5.22 and 5.23, for the POSN and RANK scores respectively. There is again 
a high degree of consistency between the models in terms of significant main and 
higher-order effects. T'he most significant effects are those relating to the variability 
of the attribute values and the number of scenarios selected. As in experiment 1, the 
F-statistics of these effects are of similar magnitude. However, as they have already 
been discussed, their role in this experiment is limited to any interactions they may 
be involved in with the assessment errors. Of the assessment errors, those relating to 
criterion weights have the most significant effect. The F -statistics vary quite consid-
erably between models, being most significant in the additive and expected Z model, 
but are significant at the 0.5% level in all models. The effect of probability as-
sessment errors is significant, with F -statistics generally around 10, and there is 
some inconsistency between the POSN and RANK results, with the errors generally 
being less significant in the RANK results. 
There are two clear systematic two-way interaction effects: between attribute vari-
ability and weight assessment errors, and between the number of scenarios and weight 
assessment errors. former is significant all models, while the latter, involving 
the number of scenarios, is significant only the probabilistic scenario-based models. 
The interaction is not significant for the filtered scenario selection policy. Further, 
there are no higher-order interactions. 
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5.2.2 Characterisation of Effects 
An overview of the effects of assessment errors can be obtained by comparing the 
grand scores in simulation 2 with results when no assessment errors are made. 
To this end we make use of the results of simulation 1, in which all assessment errors 
were fixed at zero. In order to ensure that the displayed results differ only with 
respect to the presence or absence of assessment errors, it is necessary to consider 
only certain cases in the first simulation i.e. those for which Tj and Aj are low and 
/'i, 3. The following table shows the POSN and RA:"rK scores in both circumstances, 
together with the rank correlations. 
Model POSNno error POSNerror RANKno error RANKerror 
1.42 2.07 1A5 2.13 
Ignore 5.69 5.75 4.96 5.16 
Expected Z 2.91 3.24 2A9 2.93 
Scenario R 5.10 5.25 4.86 5.04 
Scenario P 4.73 4.97 4.51 4.77 
Scenario .ML 4.04 4.27 3.94 4.24 
Scenario F 5.32 5A5 4.87 5.05 
Table 5.15: Average POSN and RANK scores for experiment 2 (error) and corre-
sponding experiment 1 (no error) problem contexts 
Model SRCnoerror SRCerror 
Additive 0.95 0.83 
Ignore 0.30 0.29 
Expected Z 0.70 0.65 
Scenario R OAO 0.37 
Scenario P OA4 OA1 
Scenario ML 0.52 OA8 
Scenario F 0.37 0.35 
Table 5.16: Average rank correlations for experiment 2 (error) and corresponding 
experiment 1 (no error) problem contexts 
The magnitude of the general deteriorations are not particularly pronounced relative 
to the effects already discussed, although they clearly need to be further categorised 
by the size of the actual assessment errors to gain an insight into how large the 
potential deteriorations might be. The deterioration in the results of the additive 
model is the most marked; for all other models the deteriorations are fairly limited. 
The deteriorations in the rank correlations are particularly small. This is an early 
indication that errors in the assessments of criterion weights and scenario probabilities 
may not be crucial to the accuracy of results. 
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Errors in Criterion Weight Assessment 
The POSN and RANK scora'S resulting from various degrees of error in assessing 
criterion weights are shown in table 5.17. Further, two interaction effects involving 
weight assessment errors are discussed: table 5.18 shows the deterioration of results 
when assessment errors are present relative to the case where none are made, under 
high and low attribute variability, and table 5.19 shows the deterioration of results 
due to weight assessment errors relative to the case where no errors are made, when 
different numbers of scenarios are selected. 
The weight assessment errors exert quite different degrees of influence over the various 
models. In general, the weight assessment errors cause marginally greater increases 
in the RANK scores than the POSN scores. The additive model experiences notable 
increases of order 0.4 in both POSN and RANK scores for even moderate errors, while 
scores are further downgraded by 0.85 when assessment errors are more substantial. 
"While for moderate assessment errors the probability that the additive model ranks 
the true best alternative first or second remains over 75%, the figure drops to 60% 
when greater errors are made. Under such circumstances, the third-ranked alterna-
tive would need to be included in the shortlist in order to push the probability of 
including the true best alternative to 75%. 
On the other hand, deteriorations in the quality of results in the scenario-based mod-
els and the model ignoring risk are very limited for moderate assessment errors. For 
assessment errors of the order 0.05, the scores increased by less than 0.1. Small er-
rors in the weight assessment process therefore seem particularly inconsequential in 
a scenario-based environment. Even for more substantial errors of order 0.1, the re-
sultant deterioration was marginal at between 0.2 and 0.3. Regardless of weighting 
errors, the relative frequency with which the true and modelled best alternatives coin-
cide hovers around only 25%, while the true best alternative is ranked outside the top 
five model ranks in between 30% and 40% of the simulations. The probability-based 
selection models were slightly more sensitive to the weighting errors than were either 
the random or filtered models. The influence of weighting errors on the expected Z 
model is somewhere between that of the additive model and the model ignoring risk. 
For smaller errors, deteriorations are of order 0.25 and may be considered modest. 
However, when assessment errors are more pronounced, some fairly substantial de-
teriorations (0.65 for POSN, 0.85 for RANK) can arise. Under such conditions the 
performance of the expected Z model becomes relatively closer to that of the additive 
model, and the probability of identifying the true best alternative among top two 
model ranks is only 10% lower than the additive model at just over 50%. What is 
therefore evident is that it is the more accurate models that are more to 
weight assessment errors. 
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An interaction between the effects of attribute variability and the errors in assessing 
the weights is observed as a consistent but small-scale result: errors in the assessment 
of weights are felt more strongly when attribute variability is low. Although in most 
instances the magnitude of these differences might not be of practical importance, 
they are consistently observed in all the scenario models and expected Z model. 
In these models, the deterioration of scores due to weight assessment errors is between 
0.3 and 0.4 positions worse when attribute variability is low. The other two models, 
the additive model and the model ignoring risk, experienced no such interaction ef-
fect, and are consequently excluded from table 5.18. 
The other observed interaction occurs between the effects of the number of selected 
scenarios and the errors in assessing the weights, although the consistent progression 
of the results makes for more convincing interpretation: the effects of errors in the 
assessment of weights are felt more strongly when a larger number of scenarios are se-
lected for analysis, regardless of which selection strategy is employed. The differences 
due to the interaction effect are of order 0.4 for the probabilistic selection policies and 
0.2 for the filtered selection policy, and so cannot be expected to playa crucial role 
in quality of results. 
POSN RANK 
ew 0 0.05 0.1 0 0.05 0.1 
Additive 1 1.91 2.76 1.53 1.97 2.90 
Ignore 5.67 5.72 5.86 5.02 5.12 5.33 
Expected Z 2.97 3.15 3.61 2.54 2.83 3.41 
Scenario R 5.13 5.16 5.45 4.92 4.98 5.23 
Scenario P 4.84 4.92 5.15 4.64 4.66 4.99 
Scenario ML 4.14 4.21 4.45 4.10 4.15 4.46 
Scenario F 5.35 5.43 5.56 4.87 5.00 5.29 
Table 5.17: Effect of errors in assessment of criterion weights (ew ) 
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POSN RANK 
ew 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.1 
Expected Z low B +0.22 +0.56 +0.35 +0.69 
high B +0.14 +0.35 +0.24 +0.45 
Scenario R low B +0.07 +0.44 +0.15 +0.34 
high B +0.01 +0.13 -0.03 +0.17 
Scenario P low B +0.09 +0.33 +0.01 +0.46 
high B +0.08 +0.11 +0.03 +0.20 
Scenario ML low B +0.14 +0.29 +0.12 +0.36 
high B +0.00 +0.19 -0.02 +0.25 
Scenario F low B +0.23 +0.14 +0.21 +0.41 
high B -0.08 +0.14 +0.05 +0.17 
Table 5.18: Effect of interaction between attribute variability (B) and weight assess-
ment errors (ew ) 
POSN RANK 
ew 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.1 
Scenario R 3 -0.07 +0.17 -0.03 +0.18 
5 +0.05 +0.23 +0.03 +0.23 
10 +0.14 +0.47 +0.17 +0.36 
Scenario P 3 +0.03 +0.13 -0.05 +0.24 
5 +0.04 +0.21 -0.03 +0.33 
10 +0.19 +0.32 +0.13 +0.41 
Scenario ML 3 -0.03 +0.14 -0.05 +0.22 
5 +0.14 +0.20 +0.01 +0.28 
10 +0.10 +0.38 +0.19 +0.42 
Scenario F 3 +0.14 +0.01 +0.11 +0.27 
5 +0.00 +0.14 +0.08 +0.25 
10 +0.08 +0.27 +0.20 +0.34 
Table 5.19: Effect of interaction between the number of selected scenarios (s) and 
weight assessment errors (e w ) 
Errors in Scenario Probability Assessment 
In contrast to the weight assessment errors, errors in the assessment of the scenario 
probabilities exercise only a trivial influence. Table 5.20 shows the POSN and RANK 
scores under various degrees of probability assessment error. The largest errors of 
0.6 in the assessment of probabilities resulted in deteriorations in scores of not more 
than 0.25, and were in most cases closer to 0.1. Smaller errors had almost no effect 
at all. The most sensitive models are the additive model, the expected Z model and 
the scenario model selecting the p most likely scenarios. The sensitivity of the first 
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two models has been explained previously as a type of diminishing marginal return, 
so that the best performing models suffer more from non-idealities. The deterioration 
of the results using the most likely selection policy also might be expected given the 
extreme dependence of this method on the probabilities of occurrence. Nevertheless, 
it still comfortably outperforms all other scenario models. In any case the marginal 
deteriorations in the models are unlikely to be sufficiently large to be of practical 
importance. 
POSN RANK 
epr 0 0.3 0.6 0 0.3 0.6 
Additive 1.99 2.04 2.19 i 2.05 2.11 2.23 
Ignore 5.71 5.78 5.76 • 5.13 5.16 5.18 
Expected Z 3.16 3.25 3.32 i 2.85 2.92 3.01 
Scenario R 5.22 5.21 5.31 5.03 5.05 5.05 
Scenario P 4.91 4.93 5.06 4.76 4.73 4.80 
Scenario ML 4.14 4.30 4.37 4.14 4.23 4.34 
Scenario F 5.41 5.44 5.49 5.01 5.05 5.10 
Table 5.20: Effect of errors in the assessment of scenario probabilities (e Pr) 
General Robustness of Results 
Again we conclude the discussion of this simulation experiment by examining the 
ative robustness of each modeL The discussions in the section thus far have identified 
that the quality of the rank approximation deteriorates when attribute variability 
is high, errors in the assessment of criterion weights and scenario probabilities are 
highest and the number of scenarios included is lowest. Table 5.21 shows the corre-
sponding worst-case probability that the true best alternative is ranked in the first 
or second model positions, with similar average and best-case probabilities for each 
model. 
Worst Average Best 
Additive 0.58 0.76 0.91 
Ignore 0.25 0.30 0.34 
Expected Z 0.46 0.56 0.67 
Scenario R 0.31 0.40 0.49 
Scenario P 0.36 0.43 0.53 
Scenario ML 0.44 0.52 0.62 
Scenario F 0.28 0.37 0.46 
Table 5.21: Probabilities that the true best alternative is placed first or second in the 
model rank order 
It appears that the better-performing models are no longer more robust to the changes 
in parameter values, and all models experience roughly similar relative deteriorations 
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of 30%. There are some marked changes in the relative order of robustness: the 
additive model is now one of the least robust models, while the scenario ML model 
is one of the most robust. In fact, there are two conflicting robustness relationships 
in operation. From experiment 1 it was possible to conclude that the scenario-based 
models were more sensitive to changes in attribute variability, which is also simulated 
in experiment 2. However, the previous discussions relating to this experiment have 
identified that it is the additive and expected Z models that are more sensitive to the 
other two assessment error effects. It is this increased sensitivity that results in the 
relatively robust behaviour of the additive and expected Z model. In fact, the 
additive model is particularly adversely affected, so that there is little to choose from 
between the additive and expected Z models when both assessment errors are high. 
The scenario models are far more robust than in experiment 1 due to the exclusion 
of the reference levels to which they were particularly sensitive, as well as their rela-
tive robustness to assessment errors. The increased robustness of poorly-performing 
models to the assessment errors means that the robustness of the scenario model se-
lecting the most likely scenarios has declined relative to the other models. However, 
the consistent superiority of the scenario ML model in the context of experiment 2 
makes it difficult to explore the robustness relationships more deeply. Even worse is 
the performance of the model ignoring risk, which although appearing as the most ro-
bust of the models performs so badly under even favourable conditions that practical 
acceptability is unlikely. 
5.2.3 Summarised Inferences 
The results of simulation experiment are condensed into the following inferences: 
• The criterion weight assessment errors must be fairly severe before marked 
deterioration in the rank orderings occur. Small to moderate assessment errors 
have only marginal effect on the results. 
• The deteriorations caused by errors in the assessment of scenario probabilities 
are too small to have any practical effect on quality of the results. 
• Deteriorations due to weight assessment errors are more prominent when at-
tribute variability is low. 
• In the scenario models, deteriorations due to weight assessment errors are more 
prominent when a set of scenarios is included in the analysis. 
• Models which generally perform better, specifically the additive and expected 
Z model, are more sensitive to both assessment errors than those models that 
perform poorly. 
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Effect DoF Additive Ignore Expected Z Scenario R Scenario P Scenario ML Scenario F 
B 1 0.81 174.59** 792.63** 536.76** 682.25** 280.75** 695.66** 
Cw 2 2438.44** 10.:39** 286.38** 32.17** 36.69** 44.74** 12.22** 
CPr 2 66.57** 1.47 16.97** 3.33* 9.70** 22.58** 1.82 
s 2 1.16 0.54 0.49 519.51 ** 771.19** 1094.72** 384.54** 
B X ew 2 4.28* 0.02 14.73** 10.05** 6.12** 6.77** 8.88** 
B X CPr 2 7.70** 3.02 1.51 0.43 0.58 0.49 0.92 
Cw X CPr 4 0.83 0.04 0.07 0.72 2.94* 0.81 0.03 
B X s 2 0.50 2.69 0.34 2.96 0.28 0.59 1.46 
Cw X s 4 1.82 1.37 2.15 5.85** 5.56** 2.16 
CPr X S 4 0.65 0.50 0.41 0.62 2.46* 0.38 0.87 
B X Cw X epr 4 0.85 0.45 1.14 0.30 0.84 0.17 0.82 
B X ew X.5 4 0.03 0.25 0.69 0.46 1.01 1.37 0.31 
B X CPr X S 4 0.79 1.14 1.06 2.23 1.01 2.29 1.43 
ew X epr X s 8 0.91 0.97 1.17 1.31 0.92 0.99 1.42 
i-' B X Cw X epr X s 8 1.05 1.34 0.95 1.38 1.18 0.54 0.58 
ANOVA results for POSN scores in experiment 2 
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ew 2 2575.25** 38.72** 613.70** 40.45** 54.21 ** 59.32** 66.46** 
epr 2 41.98** 0.92 19.16** 0.29 1.84 15.88** 3.33* 
s 2 1.80 0.47 0.34 660.71 ** 661.62** 942.71** 256.71 ** 
B x ew 2 5.70** 4.36* 25.94** 10.66** 7.23** 6.03** 14.82** 
B x epr 2 2.88 0.16 0.70 0.48 0.73 0.02 0.71 
ew x epr 4 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.63 0.37 1.71 1.12 
B x s 2 0.40 3.26* 1.41 0.40 0.22 0.25 3.45* 
ew x s 4 0.92 0.43 1.69 4.75** 3.98** 6.56** 1.45 
epr x s 4 1.69 2.36 1.85 2.40 0.68 2.07 0.48 
B x ew x epr 4 0.31 0.97 0.64 1.31 2.41 1.05 0.46 
Bxewxs 4 1.48 0.51 1.57 0.85 1.18 2.45* 1.82 
B x ePr x s 4 1.26 0.62 1.99 0.25 0.04 1.72 0.38 
ew x epr x s 8 1.62 1.44 2.11* 0.65 1.04 1.58 0.48 
f--" B x ew x e Pr X S 8 0.97 1.13 f--" 0.83 1.42 0.83 0.21 2.99** 
c.n 
Table 5.23: ANOVA results for RANK scores in experiment 2 
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5.3 Results of Simulation Experiment 3 
The third and final simulation experiment investigates the influence of four well-
known non-idealities that may during practical applications: omission of cri-
teria, violations of independence, shifts in the reference levels, and insufficiently de-
tailed modelling of the partial utility functions, These non-idealities were previously 
analysed by Stewart [86], although not in a scenario-based environment, The aim 
here is therefore to contrast those with results obtained from a scenario-based 
approach, and to provide a benchmark against which to judge the other non-idealities 
specific to this study, There are five effects, four of which correspond to the 
non-idealities: the number of omitted (0), the mixture of criteria used to in-
duce independence violations (,), the the reference level (er ), and the number 
of segments used to model the partial utility functions (v), The fifth and final main 
effect relates to the number of scenarios used in the analysis (s), The values assumed 
by the simulation parameters are indicated in following table. 
1, 2, 
er 0,0,1 
I 0,0.1,0.3 
0 0, 1,2 
s 10 
Table 5.24: Parameters for experiment 3 
5.3.1 AN OVA Results 
Full ANOVA tables for experiment 3 can be found at the end of section 5,3 in tables 
5.34 and 5.35. The ANOVA results show a fairly high of consistency between 
the significant factors affecting the POSN and RANK scores, albeit with some ex-
ceptions. The RANK scores are generally associated with F -statistics than the 
POSN scores, so that the non-idealities have a more significant on the relative 
performance of the alternative selected by the models, The omission of criteria and 
violations of preferential independence are the two most significant effects, The F-
statistics for the effect of independence violations are more consistent over the models 
used, generally being around 200 for the POSN scores and 300 the RANK scores, 
Although the F -statistics corresponding to the effect of omitting are generally 
slightly lower, they are also more variable, and are particularly the additive 
and expected Z models, The effect of the number of segments used to model the util-
ity functions is also significant at the 0,5% level in all the models, with F -statistics 
generally of the same order as the omission of criteria. There is less agreement re-
garding the significance of the effect of shifts in the reference levels. The shift effect 
is significant at the 0.5% level in both POSN and RANK scores in only three of the 
models, while the other four models have conflicting POSN and RANK results. The 
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effect is also on occasion identified as non-significant. 
There is generally only little consistency for the second-order effects. All the second-
order effects are identified as significant by at least one modeL However, there are 
only three effects that are consistently significant: between the number of segments 
and reference shifts, between the number of segments and independence violations, 
and between the number of scenarios and criteria omissions. Although again there 
are several higher-order interactions of varying significance levels, they are generally 
inconsistent over model types and the type of score used, and are therefore not of 
broader interest. 
5.3.2 Characterisation of Effects 
The four non-idealities considered in this simulation must in some sense cause a dete-
rioration in the quality of the rank approximations. The comparison of the aggregate 
results obtained in this simulation with the appropriate 'ideal' results obtained from 
simulation 1 is an informative introduction to the analysis, answering the question as 
to what extent these non-idealities affect the results in the broadest manner possible. 
As for the previous simulation experiment, we must consider only certain cases from 
the first simulation in order to ensure that the results differ only with respect to the 
presence or absence of the appropriate non-idealities. Table 5.25 shows the grand 
average POSN and RANK scores for each model under simulation 3 and the part of 
simulation 1 using low T, low).., high Band K, 3. Table 5.26 shows similar results 
the rank correlations. 
Model POSNideal POSN non-ideal RANKideal RANKnon-ideal 
Additive 1.44 3.56 1.47 3.25 
Ignore 5.95 6.25 5.25 5.67 
Expected Z 3.30 4.56 2.74 4.00 
Scenario R 5.67 6.11 5.37 5.80 
Scenario P 5.21 5.81 4.99 5.57 
Scenario ML 4.28 4.92 4.25 4.79 
Scenario F 5.92 6.32 5.32 5.94 
Table 5.25: Average POSN and RANK scores for experiment 3 (non-ideal) and cor-
responding experiment 1 (ideal) problem contexts 
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Model SRCideal SRCnon-ideal 
Additive 0.94 0.62 
Ignore 0.27 0.22 
Expected Z 0.65 0.46 
Scenario R 0.34 0.26 
Scenario P 0.37 0.29 
Scenario ML 0.48 0.38 
Scenario F 0.30 0.23 
Table 5.26: Average rank correlations for experiment 3 (non-ideal) and corresponding 
experiment 1 (ideal) problem contexts 
The most striking feature of both the scores and correlations is the different magni-
tudes of impact that the non-idealities have on the different models. The additive 
model is particularly hard-hit, with deteriorations of approximately 2 rank positions 
in both the POSN and RANK rank orders. Large deteriorations of around 1.3 posi-
tions are also observed in the expected Z model. The rank correlation of each model 
deteriorates by around 30%. The scenario-based models are subject to far smaller de-
teriorations, generally between 0.5 and 0.6 positions, as a result of the non-idealities. 
The model ignoring uncertainty is the least influenced by non-idealities, with deterio-
rations of around 0.3 positions. There are two possible explanations for the different 
degrees of deterioration. Firstly, the scenario-based models and the model ignoring 
uncertainty may genuinely be more robust to the non-idealities than the additive and 
expected Z models. Otherwise, the poor general performance of the former models 
may imply a diminished sensitivity to further non-idealities. We return to this ques-
tion at a later stage; at this point it is sufficient to mention that the robustness of a 
model seems rather a moot point when the average performance is only marginally 
better than a random guess. 
Number of Segments Modelling the Partial Utility Functions 
The importance of sufficiently detailed modelling of the partial utility functions is 
not immediately clear from the simulation results. Table 5.27 shows the POSN and 
RANK scores for different values of v, the number of piecewise linear segments used. 
Fairly significant deteriorations of between 0.4 and 0.5 are experienced in the addi-
tive and expected Z models when using a single linear segment relative to using four 
segments. The rank probabilities show less substantial changes, with the increasing 
of segments from one to four resulting in only a 10% improvement in the frequency of 
the top ranks coinciding. The deteriorations when reducing the number of segments 
from four to two are generally similar to those obtained by reducing the number of 
segments from two to one. However, deteriorations of a similar nature are extremely 
limited in the other models, generally around 0.15 for the POSN scores and 0.3 for 
the RANK scores. Furthermore, the deteriorations only occur when moving from four 
to two segments. No further deteriorations are exhibited when further reducing the 
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number of segments to one. 
These results conflict quite markedly with those obtained by Stewart in [86]) where in 
particular it was observed that using only one segment led to extremely poor results. 
The most likely reason for these discrepancies lies in the fixing of the shape of the 
partial utility functions in this simulation study. All four forms of utility functions 
were simulated by Stewart, while only the first form is used here. Furthermore, that 
shape turns out to be conducive to linear interpolation between worst and best. The 
functional form generates 7j and Aj from the same interval [0.15,0.4], so that the 
utility function lies below the linear segment below the reference point and above the 
linear segment above the reference point. This is in contrast to cases 2 and 3, where 
the different intervals for generating the and Aj imply a utility function wholly 
below or above the linear segment respectively. Also, the utility functions have been 
simulated with the assumption that the slope of the utility function is greater in the 
domain of losses i.e. below the reference point, implying that the utility function is 
relatively more non-linear below the reference point. For the utility functions belong-
to case 1, the low reference level means that this highly non-linear portion of the 
utility function is small relative to the utility functions generated according to case 4, 
for which the majority of the domain is represented by the more strongly non-linear 
convex utility function. 
As a result of these functional considerations, the simulation results obtained here 
should not be interpreted as contradicting those obtained by Stewart. More specif-
ically, they contribute by providing supplementary evidence that results are not 
severely downgraded by the use of a single segment, providing that the underlying 
preferences are represented by the utility functions in case 1. If underlying preferences 
are represented by any of the other cases, then, following the results of Stewart, re-
sults are likely to be considerably degraded. This appears particularly true in the case 
of convex or concave utility functions. The practical implications of these findings 
are hampered somewhat by the fact that we need to know the form of the underlying 
utility functions before we can make a judgement about the necessary level of approx-
imation required for adequate representation. This would defeat the purpose of the 
approximation. vVe may, however, elicit the reference level and the preference for the 
reference level relative to the worst and best outcomes using questions inspired by 
some sort of thermometer-scale. doing so it may be possible to classify the utility 
function to one of the four functional forms. On the basis of this classification, it 
might then become more apparent to what extent a multi-segment approximation is 
required. 
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POSN RANK 
v 1 2 4 1 2 4 
Additive 3.74 3.56 3.38 3.55 3.22 2.99 
Ignore 6.30 6.30 6.15 5.80 5.65 5.55 
Expected Z 4.68 4.63 4.36 4.28 3.99 3.75 
Scenario R 6.15 6.17 6.02 5.90 5.83 5.66 
Scenario P 5.85 5.85 5.72 5.66 5.59 5.44 
Scenario ML 4.96 4.99 4.80 4.89 4.83 4.66 
Scenario F 6.33 6.38 6.25 6.05 5.98 5.78 
Table 5.27: of number of segments modelling the partial utility functions (v) 
Shifts in Reference Level 
The deteriorations due to shifts in the reference levels are comfortably the smallest 
of the non-idealities, and in the scenario models and the model ignoring risk exert a 
negligible influence on the results. Although larger deteriorations are experienced in 
the additive and expected Z models, the magnitude of these remains at most 
moderate and is unlikely to be of any kind of critical importance. Table 5.28 gives 
the POSN and RANK scores for different shifts in the reference levels, er . 
There is one two-way interaction between reference shifts and the number of segments 
that, although of only moderate magnitude, is systematic enough to motivate further 
investigation. Table 5.29 displays the deteriorations in scores due to shifts in the 
reference level categorised by the number of segments used. The deteriorations due 
to shifts in the reference are more prominent when more linear segments are 
used to approximate partial utility functions. This is observed in all the models, 
but due to the generally reference shift effect, it is only in the additive 
and expected Z models that the interaction is of any importance. is in fact 
a simple and uninteresting reason for the interaction: the closer the approximations 
to the utility functions are, the more dependent they become on the form 
of the utility functions, becoming more sensitive to changes in the utility 
functions. As a result the four-segment approximation picks up the reference shift 
more accurately than the two-segment or one-segment approximations. In fact the 
interpolation between worst and best attribute values using a single linear segment 
makes no use of the underlying form of the utility function, and hence is not influenced 
by reference levels or shifts thereof. Table 5.29 therefore excludes the case of a single 
linear segment. 
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POSN RANK 
er 0 0.1 0 0.1 
Additive 3.43 3.69 3.08 3.42 
Ignore 6.23 6.27 5.71 5.62 
Expected Z 4.45 4.66 3.93 4.08 
Scenario R 6.10 6.12 5.84 5.75 
Scenario P 5.78 5.84 5.60 5.53 
Scenario ML 4.89 4.94 4.80 4.78 
Scenario F 6.32 6.32 5.97 5.91 
Table 5.28: of reference level shifts (er ) 
Ignore 
Expected Z +0.19 +0.11 
Scenario R +0.00 -0.13 
Scenario P +0.05 +0.14 -0.18 
Scenario ML +0.00 +0.16 -0.10 +0.04 
Scenario F +0.00 +0.08 -0.17 +0.00 
Table 5.29: Effect of interaction between the number of segments (v) and reference 
level shifts (er ) 
Independence Violations 
Some fairly substantial deterioration of results is possible as a result of independence 
violations, particularly when these violations become large. A 10% mixing of criteria 
results in increases in the average scores of between 0.1 and 0.2, and so can be 
considered marginal and of limited practical interest. However, increasing the mixing 
of criteria to 30% results in further deteriorations of between 0.35 and 0.45 positions. 
Large violations of independence may therefore have quite significant impacts, up 
to 0.7 positions in this case. The magnitude of the effects is remarkably consistent 
over models in both the POSN and RANK scores. Furthermore the deteriorations in 
POSN and RANK scores are also very similar. In contrast, violations of independence 
have only modest effects on the rank probability matrix. Severe violations lead to 
decreases of up to 10% in the frequency that the true best alternative is the same as 
the alternative proposed by the model. 
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RANK 
I 0 0 0.1 0.3 
Additive 3.33 3.46 3.89 3.07 3.14 3.55 
Ignore 6.11 6.23 6.42 5.47 5.61 5.92 
Expected Z 4.26 4.46 4.94 3.73 3.87 4.41 
Scenario R 5.88 6.04 6.41 5.55 5.71 6.12 
Scenario P 5.60 5.74 6.09 5.33 5.46 5.90 
Scenario ML 4.70 4.85 5.20 4.57 4.70 5.12 
Scenario F 6.11 6.25 6.60 5.70 5.86 6.25 
Table 5.30: Effect of violating independence (I) 
Omission of Criteria 
The number of criteria omitted from the analysis is modelled by the parameter o. 
Table 5.31 shows the POSN and RANK scores when different numbers of criteria 
are omitted. An interaction between the number of omitted criteria and the number 
of scenarios selected is shown in table 5.32, which displays the increases in POSN 
and RANK scores relative to the case when no criteria are omitted, when different 
numbers of scenarios are selected. 
The omission of even one criterion leads understandably to a fairly large deteriora-
tion in the quality of the results, for both the additive and the expected Z model. 
The additive model is particularly badly affected, with a deterioration of 1.6 in the 
POS::.J ranking and 0.8 in the RAKK ranking. In such circumstances the probability 
that the true best alternative is among the first three model ranks drops from an 
acceptable 85% to 65%, and the best alternatives coincide in less than 30% of simula-
tions. The deteriorations are much less pronounced for the other models, and in fact 
for the POSN and RANK scores are generally quite marginal at around 0.15. Any 
changes in the rank probability matrix are negligible. Again, this may be interpreted 
as an indication of the relative robustness of the scenario-based models towards cri-
teria omissions, but is also explained as the effect of decreasing marginal sensitivity 
towards non-idealities when model performance deteriorates, and therefore as a re-
flection of the relatively poor performance of the scenario models. 
The progressive deterioration is fairly linear in the number of criteria omitted, so that 
results are proportionately worse when two criteria are omitted. However, the rela-
tively greater degeneration of the additive model means that, when two criteria are 
omitted, the performance of this model is closer to the other models than before. In 
particular the additive model outperforms the expected Z model by only 0.3 positions 
in the POSK and RAKK scores when 2 criteria are omitted. Under these conditions, 
the probability that the top three model ranks contain the true best alternative is 
generally poor: 52% in the additive model, 47% in the expected Z model, and 51% 
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in the scenario model selecting the ten most likely scenarios. The relatively better 
performance of the scenario model provides some evidence of genuine robustness to 
criteria omissions rather than any diminished sensitivity. The practical implications 
are obvious: the additive model is not particularly robust to omissions of criteria, 
and due care needs to be taken to ensure that such omissions do not occur. 
A clear interaction exists between the effects of the number of scenarios selected and 
the number of criteria omitted, although the magnitude of the effect is not partic-
ularly large due to the limited effect of criteria omissions in the scenario models. 
Nevertheless, the interaction is of interest for its systematic behaviour rather than 
any crucial importance to the integrity of results. Essentially, the deteriorations due 
to criteria omissions are greater when more scenarios are included the analysis. 
In fact, if only 3 out of the 50 scenarios are considered, omitting 2 criteria causes 
only a 0.1 position deterioration in results. This is taken as further evidence of the 
diminishing sensitivity to non-idealities as performance worsens. If 10 scenarios are 
considered, the magnitude of the deteriorations is approximately equal to that of the 
expected Z modeL 
POSN RANK 
0 0 1 2 0 1 2 
Additive 2.18 3.74 4.75 2.41 3.22 4.12 
Ignore 6.19 6.26 6.31 554 5.66 5.79 
Expected Z 4.06 4.58 5.02 ! 3:52 4.01 4.49 
Scenario R 5.98 6.12 6.23 5.73 5.79 5.87 
Scenario P 5.67 5.82 5.94 5.48 5.56 5.65 
Scenario ML 4.70 4.91 5.13 4.66 4.78 4.94 
Scenario F 6.21 6.31 6.44 5.85 5.93 6.03 
Table 5.31: Effect of omitting criteria (0) 
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POSN RANK 
s omit 1 omit 2 omit 1 omit 2 
-_ ..
Scenario R 3 +0.10 +0.11 +0.05 +0.06 
5 +0.11 +0.15 -0.04 +0.01 
10 +0.22 +0.50 +0.14 +0.34 
Scenario P 3 +0.10 +0.11 +0.00 +0.06 
5 +0.13 +0.22 +0.04 +0.08 
10 +0.19 +0.47 +0.19 +0.37 
Scenario ML 3 +0.09 +0.17 +0.06 +0.10 
5 +0.21 +0.35 +0.07 +0.20 
10 +0.32 +0.77 +0.22 +0.52 
SrRnR. F 3 +0.05 +0.07 +0.11 +0.17 
5 +0.09 +0.19 +0.06 +0.14 
10 +0.17 +0.41 +0.05 +0.24 
Table 5.32: Effect of interaction between the number of selected scenarios (s) and 
omission of criteria (0) 
General Robustness of Results 
The discussion of relative robustness concludes the presentation of the results of 
simulation experiment 3. From the previous sections we may infer that the accuracy of 
results will deteriorate as the number of piecewise segments used decreases, reference 
shifts increase, violations of independence increase, the number of omitted criteria 
increases and the number of scenarios considered decreases. Table 5.33 shows the 
probabilities of locating the true best alternative in the top two model ranks under 
conditions of varying difficulty. 
Worst Average Best 
Additive 0.34 0.56 0.92 
Ignore 0.21 0.26 0.32 
Expected Z 0.30 0.41 0.55 
Scenario R 0.23 0.30 0.36 
Scenario P 0.27 0.34 0.40 
Scenario ML 0.33 0.44 0.53 
Scenario F 0.22 0.29 0.35 
Table 5.33: Probabilities that the true best alternative is placed first or second in the 
model rank order 
The movement away from the superior robustness of the additive model that was 
first observed in experiment 2 is continued here. In fact although in experiment 2 
the relative deteriorations of some of the scenario-based models were still greater 
than the additive model, this is no longer the case. The additive model experiences 
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the most severe absolute and relative deteriorations, and under extremely non-ideal 
conditions the relative superiority of both the additive and the expected Z models 
over the scenario ML model is extinguished. As in both previous experiments, the 
superiority of the additive model in ideal or close-to-ideal conditions is evident, while 
the performance of the expected Z models is no better than the best scenario model. 
However, the results of both models deteriorate relatively quickly as conditions move 
away from ideal. The average probability values lie closer to the worse-case value than 
the best-case value, contrast to the scenario models which are generally symmet-
rical. In other words, the frequency distribution of this particular success measure is 
symmetrical or skewed very slightly to the right in the scenario models and skewed 
to the right for the additive and expected Z model. 
The reasons for the shifting robustness behaviour can again be explained by consid-
ering two types of robustness relationships. Experiment 1 supported the sensitivity 
of the scenario models to the effect of attribute variability, which is excluded from 
this experiment. vVe could therefore expect the scenario models to ceteris paribus 
be relatively more robust in experiment 3. Then, the discussions in the previous 
section have shown that the additive model, and to a lesser extent the expected Z 
model, are more sensitive to the new non-idealities introduced into experiment 3, 
with the exception of violations of independence. These two relationships conspire 
to cause the described changes in robustness. In fact since the scenario ML model 
was shown in experiment 1 to be relatively more robust to attribute variability than 
the other scenario models, the exclusion of that effect leaves the relative robustness 
constant across the scenario models. A secondary robustness relationship is thus that 
all scenario models are similarly robust to the non-idealities specific to experiment 3. 
5.3.3 Summarised Inferences 
The following set of summarised inferences are drawn based on the results of simula-
tion experiment 3: 
• The use of one linear segment is not particularly harmful provided the under-
lying partial utility functions have the functional form characterised by case 1 
i.e. moderately but not extremely low Tj and Aj) and gradients steeper below 
the reference level than above it. 
• Deteriorations due to shifts in the reference levels are no more than moderate 
for even fairly large shifts. 
• Violations of preferential independence may cause fairly substantial deterio-
rations if the violations are of sufficient magnitude. Moderate violations of 
independence are unlikely to cause practically significant deteriorations. 
• The omission of criteria results in very substantial deteriorations in the additive 
and expected Z models, but only marginal deteriorations in the other models. 
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The deterioration is linear in the number of criteria omitted for the simulated 
range of two criteria. 
• Although the omission of criteria does not result in large deteriorations, those 
deteriorations do become more pronounced as the number of scenarios selected 
increases. 
• There is further evidence of the robustness of the scenario models and the model 
ignoring risk to the simulated non-idealities. These models experience relatively 
less deterioration than the additive or expected Z models. 
• The robustness of the scenario models is independent of selection strategy. 
126 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Effects DoF Additive Ignore Expected Z Scenario R Scenario P Scenario ML Scenario F 
v 2 176.93** 22.90** 126.26** 20.44** 17.63** 40.81 ** 15.16** 
er 1 261.63** 4.09* 138.84** 0.89 11.00** 9.23** 0.15 
"( 2 452.67** 79.12** 506.36** 228.68** 197.07** 257.76** 189.44** 
0 2 8820.25** 12.11** 947.18** 49.88** 55.60** 181.80** 39.75** 
S 2 0.21 1.21 1.14 813.38** 1061.33** 1780.42** 773.06** 
v x er 2 69.46** 5.63** 51.34** 3.63* 3.11 * 7.96** 3.64* 
vx"( 4 6.33** 0.69 4.73** 0.91 1.63 1.93 3.14* 
er x "( 2 1.36 4.21 * 5.36** 0.25 0.40 0.21 0.01 
vxo 4 1.65 0.80 4.33** 1.18 1.54 0.98 3.65* 
er x 0 2 15.30** 0.19 0.65 2.37 0.74 0.11 2.68 
"(xo 4 10.59** 1.42 2.49* 0.66 0.57 0.50 3.05* 
vxs 4 0.50 1.16 1.09 1.27 1.83 2.56* 2.45* 
er x S 2 1.17 0.74 0.34 3.30* 1.10 0.98 3.61 * 
"(xs 4 0.88 2.02 1.66 3.31 * 2.40* 1.08 3.32* 
f-' ox S 4 1.79 0.27 0.81 12.64 ** 9.95** 32.73** 7.80** 
tQ 
-.:r v x er x "( 4 0.84 1.27 1.05 2.31 0.46 1.29 0.53 
v x er x 0 4 4.09** 2.46* 1.42 1.23 1.05 1.15 0.37 
vx"(xo 8 1.78 0.81 1.04 0.74 0.68 0.71 1.03 
erx"(xo 4 1.06 0.82 1.25 0.50 1.01 0.88 1.65 
v x er x S 4 1.95 0.27 0.52 1.77 0.90 0.89 1.83 
vx"(xs 8 0.75 0.42 0.96 1.42 0.26 1.17 0.98 
erx"(xs 4 0.55 0.50 0.26 0.39 0.95 0.97 0.71 
vxoxs 8 0.33 0.17 0.37 0.32 1.45 1.19 0.82 
er x 0 x S 4 2.10 2.70* 2.35 1.08 0.95 0.57 0.79 
,,(XOXS 8 1.46 0.37 0.46 0.27 0.29 0.69 2.13* 
vxerx"(xo 8 0.35 2.17* 0.99 0.63 0.40 1.40 1.26 
vxerx"(xs 8 0.97 1.43 1.35 1.08 1.46 1.40 1.19 
vxerxoxs 8 0.72 0.66 0.81 1.81 1.10 1.38 1.23 
vx"(xoxs 16 0.48 1.38 0.88 0.88 1.29 0.78 0.84 
erx"(xoxs 8 0.97 1.32 0.64 0.47 2.03* 0.58 0.82 
vxerx"(xoxs 16 0.60 0.72 0.58 0.77 0.98 1.00 0.94 
Table 5.34: ANOVA results for POSN scores in experiment 3 
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Effect DoF Additive Ignore Expected Z Scenario R Scenario P Scenario ML Scenario F 
v 2 608.53** 56.22** 400.26** 56.25** 52.59** 61.81 ** 67.90** 
er 1 642.10** 25.14** 106.16** 20.20** 15.79** 1.14 8.37** 
, 2 497.78** 196.67** 738.46** 317.59** 370.20** 345.03** 278.95** 
0 2 5515.10** 54.34** 1355.78** 17.18** 29.54** 78.39** 28.23** 
s 2 2.27 0.29 0.16 991.76** 1463.16** 1914.61 ** 544.11 ** 
v x er 2 207.86** 2.78 50.03** 5.80** 8.95** 4.86* 7.53** 
vx, 4 13.76** 0.08 12.72** 1.00 2.80* 2.47* 3.46* 
er x, 2 10.21 ** 0.31 3.26* 1.54 0.09 1.01 0.50 
vxo 4 2.22 1.40 2.77* 1.88 1.92 4.30** 4.22** 
er x 0 2 13.44 ** 1.54 1.26 2.29 7.48** 1.23 3.09* 
,xo 4 2.64* 1.06 1.18 1.98 0.16 0.52 2.28 
vxs 4 0.54 0.88 0.59 1.53 2.06 3.51 * 4.05** 
er x S 2 0.52 0.70 0.63 5.89** 0.32 2.07 3.01 * 
,xs 4 1.12 2.77* 1.06 1.87 10.62** 4.38** 0.75 
f-' 
I'-J 
ox s 4 1.01 1.51 1.38 9.97** 10.61 ** 16.72** 1.44 
00 v x er x, 4 3.31 * 1.44 2.33 0.98 1.65 0.50 0.80 
v x er x 0 4 3.34* 0.94 1.09 0.71 0.49 0.43 0.31 
vx,xo 8 1.65 1.18 1.62 1.66 0.73 0.61 1.04 
er x, x 0 4 2.35 0.91 0.53 1.46 2.17 0.42 1.13 
v x er x S 4 1.05 0.67 0.95 2.02 1.41 1.01 1.08 
vx,xs 8 0.27 0.95 0.72 0.97 1.09 0.36 3.05** 
er x, x s 4 0.41 1.62 0.92 1.15 0.77 2.98* 0.06 
vxoXs 8 0.96 1.06 0.97 1.15 1.36 0.92 1.50 
er x 0 x s 4 1.01 2.72* 1.43 3.12* 0.93 0.98 0.78 
,xoxs 8 0.71 0.66 1.07 0.95 0.91 1.09 0.98 
v x er x, x 0 8 1.16 1.49 0.37 1.57 0.69 1.52 0.53 
v x er x, x s 8 1.85 0.78 0.65 0.52 1.10 0.94 2.16* 
v x er x 0 x s 8 0.43 0.79 0.61 1.43 1.16 1.08 0.54 
vx,xoxs 16 0.54 1.35 1.76* 0.82 1.18 0.96 1.47 
er x, x 0 x s 8 0.30 1.08 0.30 1.17 1.13 1.14 0.52 
v x er x, x 0 x s 16 0.47 1.20 0.67 0.93 1.08 0.97 0.84 
Table 5.35: ANOVA results for RANK scores in experiment 3 
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5.4 Post-hoc Reflections on the Simulations 
It has been stressed previously that each simulation is an exercise in abstracting real-
ity to a point where it retains its fundamental features while allowing for a meaningful 
interpretation of its simplified form. This process involves a series of choices that, 
while furthering the aims of a particular experiment, may be less suitable for others. 
This incongruity may become especially clear, as was the case here, where post-hoc 
modifications are attempted in response to certain aspects of the simulation results. 
The results of the simulation experiments presented in this chapter suggested a course 
of action that was simply not supported by the constructed simulation structure. In 
the interests of rigour and as an aid to future research we present a brief discussion 
of these problems. 
In light of the poor performance of the scenario-based models we were led to consider 
whether this was a general result, or whether there was any way of selecting scenarios 
that would result in a better approximation to the true rank order. In some inde-
pendent work, Stewart (personal communication, paper in preparation) considered 
a selection strategy making use of the 5th and 95th percentiles of each alternative's 
performance on each criterion. The 5th percentiles are grouped into a single scenario, 
representing in some sense a 'bad' scenario, while the 95th percentiles are grouped 
into a corresponding 'good' scenario. These scenarios are considered in conjunction 
with what we have termed the status quo scenario; that is the 'average' set of eval-
uations to which are added the scenario-based perturbations, giving a set of three 
scenarios. The 'good' and 'bad' scenarios are artificial in the sense that they are not 
plausible future states of the world, as the scenarios defined for the purposes of our 
simulation were. In fact, as they are constructed from several distinct states of the 
world they ultimately embody different and necessarily conflicting chains of causal 
reasoning, which does present some qualitative challenges. Nevertheless, a similar 
approach is often employed in scenario planning practice, and the results of some 
preliminary experiments conducted with this different simulation structure showed 
considerable promise. Using slightly different percentiles, as well as including further 
scenarios, gave similarly impressive results. On the basis of these preliminary results 
an attempt was made to replicate them using the simulation structure discussed in 
chapter 4. 
However, in the original simulation structure that was used the alternatives were con-
structed to be of very similar robustness. That is, the additive perturbations used 
to model the modifying effect of different scenarios on the 'status quo' evaluations 
Zijl are all generated uniformly between [-b, +b], where b is the parameter of the 
simulation modelling attribute variability. Nevertheless, the value of the parameter is 
constant over alternatives, with the result that the range between the best and worst 
possible performance in each alternative is very similar for a particular criterion. This 
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similarity implies that the preference orders derived from each of the 'good', 'average' 
and 'bad' scenarios are also very similar in nature: little new information is captured 
by considering multiple scenarios. While the multiplicative scenario effect Cjk does 
cause some differences in robustness to appear, it is not designed to model robustness 
among alternatives; the changes in relative ranges of performance are difficult to de-
termine and control. In contrast, the simulation structure used by Stewart explicitly 
assigns different levels of robustness to each alternative "within each criterion. 
Using the original simulation structure, the post-hoc simulation of the 'quartile' sce--
nario selection method did in fact produce excellent results - on average 1 to 1.5 rank 
orders better than the previous best scenario-based modeL However, the success ap-
pears to be due to the attribute values in the status quo scenario closely resembling 
the true expected attribute value, which has been shown to be a profitable approac1l. 
Inasmuch as it is not possible to trace the definite effects of this apparently promis-
ing selection strategy, the manner in which the attribute evaluations are constructed 
must be considered a weakness of the simulation. Strictly speaking the results of 
the three simulation experiments should be interpreted within the context of alter-
natives exhibiting similar levels ofrobustness. It does seem important, however, that 
some research be directed towards the evaluation of this artificial creation of 'quartile' 
scenarios. Future research could also examine to what extent allowing for different 
levels of robustness among the set of alternatives influences the results obtained here. 
Both these research objectives could be achieved, for example, by simply modifying 
the existing simulation structure by requiring that the additive perturbations Bik are 
generated uniformly between [-b, +b] where b is no longer constant over alternatives 
but is a function of at least i. The precise functional form would dictate the extent 
to which the alternatives differ in terms of robustness. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Future Research 
6.1 Insights from the Simulation Study 
The previous chapter has identified the more specific relating to the simulation 
experiments and summarised them as stylised inferences. In this section, we attempt 
to provide a more general set of conclusions by the information contained 
in the three simulations with reference to the three main questions identified 
in chapter 4. It becomes meaningful to separate the parameters of the simulations 
into contextual parameters, that is those effects that essentially exist outside of the 
practical modelling of the decision problem, and non-idealities, those effects which 
relate to the physical building of the decision model. Under the heading of contextual 
effects we can classify all the parameters of experiment 1: reference level, utility at the 
reference level, attribute variability and multivariate risk proneness. We can label as 
non-idealities all those parameters specific to experiments 2 or 3: assessment errors of 
criterion weights and scenario probabilities, number of segments modelling the partial 
utility functions, independence violations, reference shifts and criterion omissions. 
Dominance of the Additive Model 
1. One of the strongest emerging from the simulation results is the gener-
ally excellent performance of the additive model: that is, the model considering 
the full set of 50 scenarios in an additive approximation to the global utility 
function. It appears that very little is lost by considering an additive functional 
form relative to the more complicated multiplicative form. In particular, the 
additive model may be with confidence if the desired output is a shortlist 
of 2 or 3 alternatives. results are not new; similar ones were reported 
by Stewart [85], although in the simulations performed here it is possible to 
obtain an idea of the magnitude of the superiority of the additive modeL A 
key point from our simulations, however, is that the simplification 
of the preference model appears to cause far less of a deterioration in results 
than does the simplification of the stochastic structure of the model. In most 
cases the additive model very substantially outperforms even its closest rival, 
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the expected Z model. The analyst should ensure that the focus of the decision 
process on the multicriteria aspects of problem is not to the detriment of 
the modelling of risk. 
2. It is also apparent that the additive model is substantially more robust to 
changes in the contextual parameters. Specifically, it is unaffected by attribute 
variability and affected far less than other models by changes to the functional 
form of the partial utility functions. The additive model therefore performs 
not only far better, but more consistently than the other models when no non-
idealities are PrElSellt 
3. Although the additive model is considerably more sensitive to the occurrence of 
non-idealities than the other models, it remains the best-performing model un-
der all circumstances, and the resulting deteriorations are not of serious concern 
provided that the non-idealities do not become extreme. An important excep-
tion is the omission of criteria: omitting even one out of seven criteria causes 
very substantial deteriorations in the quality of the results and should be closely 
guarded against. The analyst should ensure that sufficient time is spent focus-
ing the attention of the decision maker on the definition of a complete set of 
criteria during the problem structuring phases of the decision process. Probing 
whether all dimensions of the problem have been captured as criteria requires 
some creative thinking from both the decision maker and the analyst, but might 
take the form of discussing firstly the ways in which alternatives equally rated 
on all captured criteria may differ, and then further discussing whether these 
aspects are important enough to include in the analysis as model criteria. 
Plausibility of Simplification Strategies 
1. One of the most interesting aspects of the results is the evidence suggesting 
that estimating the expected attribute values with a moderately high degree of 
approximation may be a useful simplification approach. In nearly all circum-
stances the performance of the expected Z model is second only to the additive 
model in terms of accuracy. In fact the expected Z model performs marginally 
but consistently better than the best scenario results when s = 10. Given 
the success of this model, future research might be directed into the develop-
ment of problem structuring tools capable of closely approximating the true 
expected attribute values. Such tools would inter alia need to take into account 
well-known heuristics and biases used in the assessment of probabilities. 
2. The results of the simplification models are less sensitive to changes in the 
problem context than the scenario models, so that performance is generally good 
under a wider range of problem contexts when no non-idealities are present. 
However, the model is far more sensitive to changes in the contextual parameters 
than the additive model, with the exception of multivariate risk proneness. 
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3. Where non-idealities are present, the expected Z model experiences relatively 
greater deteriorations than the scenario models, although far less than the ad-
ditive modeL The superiority of the expected Z model over the scenario models 
is therefore less certain when even moderate levels of non-idealities are present, 
and can become an inferiority as the non-idealities become extreme. Neverthe-
less, the generally good performance of even this simple model provides some 
justification and motivation to consider the use of expected values as a valid 
simplification technique. 
4. An equally important message from the simulation results is that if the esti-
mation is poor, then results are severely degraded. This second simplification 
model, the so-called model ignoring risk, performed extremely poorly under all 
conditions. Even under optimal conditions with no non-idealities, the accuracy 
of the model is probably not sufficient for practical purposes. The results of the 
two models can therefore be taken together as a warning that any estimation 
of expected values must be done with due care. If such care is not taken, the 
quality of the results will reflect that. 
Danger of Scenario-based Approaches 
1. The simple core of the message provided by all three simulations is that the 
injudicious use of scenarios may lead to results that are unacceptably poor 
for broader MCDM application. In particular, the general performance of the 
models using either 3 or 5 actual scenarios is poor regardless of selection pol-
icy. Although relatively efficient use is made of the information used, the fact 
remains that it is only 5-10% of the total attribute information. Some loss of 
quality therefore seems inevitable, but it is of paramount importance that the 
loss does not become so large as to jeopardise the feasibility of the modeL Yet 
this is precisely what has happened with the simulated scenario models. It is 
a fundamental conclusion of this thesis that the danger of applying existing 
scenario models has been understated in the literature. Nevertheless, it is im-
portant to note that we have only simulated some plausible selection policies. 
Future research should be directed towards evaluation of other selection 
policies and other problem contexts. In particular, early investigations into the 
use of quartiles of performance evaluations to construct three artificial 'good', 
'medium', and 'bad' scenarios indicate that this approach might prove fruitful. 
2. The poor performance of the scenario-based models is indicative of the problems 
involved both in the estimation of expected values and the identification of 
diversity in a multivariate scenario environment. In particular, the simulation 
results suggest that certain interpretations of a 'diverse' set of scenarios can lead 
to unacceptably poor results, which leads to an important message of this thesis: 
for MCDM and scenario planning to be applied in an integrated fashion, an 
operationally useful basis for selecting diverse scenarios (beyond that provided 
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by the scenario planning literature) needs to be found that avoids the type of 
deteriorations experienced here. 
3. Although the results of the scenario models are generally poor, when 10 scenar-
ios out of 50 are used the results may be quite good under optimal conditions. 
The performance of the model selecting the ten most likely scenarios is then 
very similar in quality to the expected Z model. For practical purposes it is un-
likely that as many as ten scenarios are thoroughly considered, but there is at 
least some evidence that partitioning the criterion space well may bring positive 
results. Although the performance under five scenarios remains poor, there is 
evidence that the marginal improvements from the three-scenario model more 
than justify the effort involved in creating the additional scenarios. 
4. The models are highly sensitive to changes in the problem context, 
and are particularly severely affected by changes in the degree of compensation. 
Greater levels of attribute variability also understandably result in fairly 
deteriorations. However if both the reference levels and attribute variability 
are favourable, the scenario models perform well even if only five scenarios are 
considered. The general use of scenario models in the sense considered can 
only justified if reference levels are high and attribute variability is low. 
5. Although the scenario models are sensitive to the problem context, they are 
relatively more robust to the non-idealities than either the additive or expected 
Z models. Although it is difficult to isolate the extent to which the apparent 
insensitivity is due to general poor performance, there does appear to be at 
least some genuine robustness. This provides some indication that if the general 
performance of the scenario approaches could be improved, they could be more 
suitable to problems which are poorly structured. Such problems might include 
hastily constructed analyses, unimportant decisions or unfacilitated analyses. 
At the present junction, though, the robustness of the scenario models is very 
much secondary to their poor performance, and should not be overemphasised. 
6. general, the quality of approximation increases with an increasing dependence 
on probability of occurrence as a method of scenario selection. In fact, the 
consideration of a diverse (in the context defined here) set of scenarios offers 
no better approximation to the true rank ordering than a random selection. 
However, some mitigating factors need to be considered. The use of diverse 
scenarios offers benefits relating to indirect aspects of the decision that were not 
simulated. Future simulations might consider that the use of scenario planning 
illuminates a set of possible scenarios that are not visible to other models. 
Robustness to Non-Idealities 
1. The MCDlvl models are generally fairly robust to the occurrence of moderate 
levels of non-idealities. The contextual effects that will be present in any de-
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cision problem are of a similar magnitude to the effects of non-idealities. The 
scenario models are most robust to non-idealities, followed by the simplifica-
tion models and then the additive model. In contrast the additive model is 
unaffected by the contextual parameters, while the scenario models are highly 
sensitive. The simplification models occupy an intermediate position, though 
closer to the scenario models. The scenario models therefore become relatively 
more attractive as the framework of the decision becomes more problematic, 
although all the models may be used with some confidence in their abilities to 
handle such conditions. 
2. Assessment errors are generally not particularly influential unless they are ex-
treme. In particular errors in the assessment of scenario probabilities are 
ligible for a large range of errors. An implication of this robustness is that it 
is unlikely to be important whether notions of relative likelihood, which have 
been rejected by scenario planners, are included in a scenario analysis or not. 
Weight assessment errors cause substantial deterioration in the additive model 
when the errors become large, but are only moderate in the other models. 
3. The only non-idealities causing consistently substantial deteriorations are cri-
terion omissions and independence violations. The omission of criteria exerts 
comfortably the most significant influence of the non-idealities, and is extremely 
detrimental to the quality of results in the additive model. Due care needs to 
be taken to avoid omitting even one criterion. Deteriorations due to violations 
of independence are only substantial if severe violations occur, and are unique 
in that they affect the models equally. 
4. The use of a single-segment linear partial utility function is justifiable if the 
functional form of the utility function is such that the reference level and the 
utility at that reference level are moderately low, with gradients steeper below 
the reference level. The conclusion does not extend to general functional forms 
though, and should be understood in the context of other results highlighting 
the deterioration resulting from the use of a single segment. Shifts in reference 
levels do not cause substantial deteriorations in any of the models. 
6.2 Insights from the Literature Survey 
The following conclusions are drawn from the literature survey conducted and de-
scribed in chapters 2 and 3, with particular reference to the objectives outlined in 
chapter 1. 
Identifying Relevant Uncertainty in MCDM 
Three broad, non-exclusive categories of uncertainty are recurrent in the literature: 
risk, imprecision, and vagueness. Risk relates to the possible dependence of the 
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performance of an alternative on a random future event. In such a case the physical 
randomness of the decision problem prevents the performance of the alternative from 
being known with certainty. Imprecision relates to doubts about the accuracy of 
physical quantities, beliefs or preferences, and arises from the limited discriminatory 
power of the human mind. Vagueness relates to doubts arising from the limited 
amount of knowledge available at any point in time. A fundamental aspect of the 
decision problem is that we must draw boundaries around the problem to be modelled: 
vagueness relates to the uncertainties involved in constructing this boundary. 
Value Function Methods 
Multiattribute utility theory is the most comprehensive treatment of risk available 
to MCDM practitioners. The axiomatic foundations provide a strong base for both 
practical and theoretical work. However, strict adherence to the axiomatic require-
ments of MAUT often necessitates the use of unwieldy models that are arduous to 
construct. If we wish to incorporate the axiomatic violations that are known to occur 
in practice i.e. to use a more general set of axioms, then the complexity of the model 
increases further. Yet the theoretical advancement of more complex methods is of-
ten in conflict with the limited consequences of using simpler models that ignore the 
violations. From a practical perspective, the axioms of MAUT should be interpreted 
constructively rather than in a strictly normative sense. Although for the integrity of 
the model it is important that the preferences of the decision maker are in agreement 
with the axioms, the agreement should not be applied too strictly, but rather used as 
a goal which is worked towards and as a basis for discussing the tradeoffs at hand. 
Outranking Methods 
The lack of an integrated treatment of risk in the outranking methods is indicative of 
the little attention the problem has received. Most of the surveyed approaches hinge 
on the ability of the DM to make judgements about probability distributions defined 
over attribute values. Even if the serious question of whether such judgements are 
practically feasible is ignored, the methods seem to neglect the real aim of the deci-
sion process: learning about the nature of preferences and the decision problem at 
hand. The outranking methodology appears secondary to the treatment of risk, and 
as such the models appear unbalanced and poorly integrated. The construction of a 
distributive outranking relation is a far more methodologically attractive option. Al-
though it is considerably more complex, the model possesses the admirable quality of 
postponing the aggregation over future outcomes, in contrast to the other outranking 
models and even the MAUT model. The integration of scenario planning techniques 
with the distributional outranking model should be of considerable interest, based on 
their common view of outcome aggregation and the need for practical simplification. 
136 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Metric Methods 
The treatment of risk in a goal programming framework has been largely borrowed 
from similar models in the older and more well-established linear programming area. 
Most of the focus has been on chance-constrained models that set goals on the prob-
ability that constraints are satisfied. These models are not well suited to MCDM, 
where there are no strict constraints. In such circumstances, goals must be specified 
both on the desired level of performance and the desired probability of achieving such 
a level of performance. The interrelationship between the two aspirations introduces 
an undesirable complication that will in most cases only serve to confuse the process. 
Furthermore the consideration of preferences over probability distributions leads to 
the same practical problems as encountered in the outranking methods. An almost 
unexplored but seemingly more attractive MCDM model is an extension of the re-
course ideology to the GP context, obtained by the minimisation of the expectation of 
a weighted sum of deviations. The complications stemming from the dual aspirations 
in the chance-constrained model are thus avoided in this approach. Research should 
be directed into the methodological and algorithmic feasibility of such a modeL 
Integrating Scenario Thinking with MCDM 
MCDM can appear, both to outsiders and those working in the field, as a house di-
vided against itself; and in many respects this appearance is a fundamental obstacle 
to the widespread use of MCDM tools. This carries through to the incorporation of 
risk, where little in the way of a unified approach is available. To this end we have 
proposed several models making use of scenario planning, a well-established and pop-
ular tool for incorporating risk into high-level decision making. We have shown that a 
scenario-based approach to incorporating risk can be integrated with any of the value 
function, outranking, or metric MCDM methods. Although no claim is made that 
a scenario-based approach is universally applicable, it does make some contribution 
towards an integrated and unified framework for decision making. 
A scenario-based approach to MCDM could view the context of each scenario as a 
deterministic MCDM problem making up a super-MCDM problem, equivalent to the 
consideration of the scenarios in the second level of the objectives hierarchy. Ag-
gregation over the future outcomes is therefore postponed as far as is possible. The 
facilitator should use some basic cross-checks to identify whether or not the extra 
qualitative information illuminated by the construction of scenarios has resulted in 
scenario-dependent preferences. Some discretion would be required as to whether any 
differences are sufficient to warrant the increased complexity of a model incorporating 
changing preferences. Future research would need to consider both the occurrence 
and effects of changing preferences. The former can only be answered in a practical 
setting, while the latter might quite easily be tested in a simulation environment. 
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The nature of the aggregation over scenarios itself is quite controversial. Although 
scenario planners often advocate 'no aggregation', the implicit message is often that 
of maximin aggregation, which in many practical applications is overly pessimistic. 
The simulation results indicate that it is not a good idea to consider the scenario 
approach as a three- or five-point approximation to expectation. Future research 
therefore needs to consider softening the notions of robustness to be applicable to 
the highly conflicting problem contexts found in MCDM. However, for MCDM to 
be applicable to broader scenario planning, a fundamental adaptation is for the con-
struction and consideration of results within each of the scenarios to assume primary 
importance. Under such conditions the global aggregation should be considered of 
secondary importance, and several different forms may be used in a single analy-
sis. The most apparent advantage of using MCDM in a scenario planning context 
is the formality and structure that is provided to the decision problem in terms of 
articulating preferences and available tradeoffs. 
6.3 Themes for Future Research 
In the earlier sections of this chapter and as a footnote to the literature survey in 
chapter 3 we made mention of several future research questions. In this penultimate 
section we draw from these questions to select a number of themes for future research. 
Development of Problem Structuring Tools 
A successful structuring of the problem context to considered is important in 
many disciplines; nevertheless those structuring tools currently used in MCDM must 
adapt to the specific needs of 11CDM in order to be relevant. Our simulation results 
highlighted two areas that might be considered from a problem structuring point of 
view: 
1. The omission of criteria is critical to the integrity of results. In order to avoid 
omitting any material criteria from the scope of the analysis, the analyst needs a 
set of structuring approaches at his or her disposal that can be used to probe the 
preferences of the decision maker at a very early stage of the analysis in order to 
ensure that the described value tree is in fact complete. Future research could 
be directed into the qualitative and quantitative structuring tools that might 
be used. 
2. Making use of expected attribute values provides good results in many instances, 
but it is imperative that the expected values be closely approximated. Future 
research might consider firstly exactly what qualifies as 'closely approximated' 
i.e. to extend the results provided in our simulations by considering more than 
just the two degrees of approximation. Then, the development of problem 
structuring tools capable of closely approximating the true expected attribute 
values might be considered. 
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Unified Risk Treatment in the Outranking and Metric Methods 
Unlike the value function methods, where one risk treatment (MAUT) dominates 
the methodological landscape, there exist several quite different approaches for in-
corporating risk in both the outranking and metric methods. Future research might 
examme: 
1. how similar the results of the different treatments of risk within each method-
ology are, 
2. qualitative issues such as the ease of use of the various methodologies and the 
scope provided for learning about the decision problem, 
3. whether any methodologies are specifically suited to certain decision contexts. 
At least some of these questions could be investigated using the simulation frameworks 
proposed for the metric and outranking methods in sections 4.5 and 4.6 respectively. 
It could be hoped that the results of such research would provide the input to fur-
ther research providing an integrated and unified treatment of in each of the 
outranking and metric methods. 
Development of Integrated Scenario-based MCDM Methods 
In the course of this thesis we have laid out a framework for using a scenario-based 
methodology as a treatment of uncertainty in 11CDM. For the meaningful integration 
of two schools of thought such as MCDM and scenario planning, it is important 
to consider potentially problematic areas where the two schools have different and 
possibly conflicting opinions, as well as specific instances to which the integrated 
methodology is particularly well-suited, and which can serve as an impetus to further 
integration. With this in mind, future research might consider the following areas. 
1. An important question relates to the nature of the aggregation over scenarios, 
on the basis that scenario planning and MCDM hold quite different views as 
to what types of aggregation are appropriate. Future research might consider 
investigating different notions of robustness over scenarios in order to allow 
more flexibility in the decision making process, as well as the feasibility of using 
different forms of aggregation in order to obtain different views on the decision 
problem. 
2. Within the outranking methodology, future research could consider the feasi-
bility of simplifying the methodologically attractive but conceptually difficult 
distributive outranking method of d'Avignon and Vincke [19] by making use of 
scenario planning. Such research might take the form of either some initial prac-
tical case studies or a simulation approach similar to that outlined in chapter 
4.6. 
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3. In a similar fashion to the outranking methods, research relating to metric meth-
ods could be directed into investigating the feasibility of using scenario planning 
as a basis for extending the recourse ideology to the case of goal programming 
under conditions of risk. Research should be directed into the methodological 
and algorithmic feasibility of such a model, with particular emphasis on the 
potential for modelling different behavioural aspects of the decision maker by 
employing different aggregation metrics within and between scenarios. 
4. The issue of changing preference structures over scenarios also could be ad-
dressed by future research. The essential questions to be considered are whether 
the qualitative information that is made available during the construction of the 
scenarios leads the decision maker to change his or her preferences dependent 
on scenario, and whether this change affects the results of the analysis to a 
sufficient extent to warrant being included in the analysis. A related practical 
question is whether a decision maker is able and willing to assume the increased 
cognitive burden of considering preferences within each scenario. 
Scenario Selection Policies 
As we have mentioned, we believe that the issue of diversity is central to further 
integration of scenario planning and MCDM. The construction of a diverse set of 
scenarios is essentially a problem structuring problem. However, without a good idea 
as to what constitutes 'diversity', progress in developing structural tools is unlikely. 
Future research should therefore first be directed into: 
1. providing operationally useful definitions of diversity as it is understood by 
those employing scenario planning techniques i.e. in a descriptive sense, 
2. providing normative definitions that might guide the selection of diverse sce-
narios while avoiding the deterioration of results experienced in the simulations 
presented here. 
3. simulating a broader range of selection policies than the ones used here. In 
particular, the possibility of using artificially constructed 'quartile' scenarios 
representing 'good', 'average', and 'bad' performance should be addressed. 
4. simulating some of the claimed advantages of using scenario planning in a quan-
titative fashion i.e. illuminating some previously unseen scenarios or alterna-
tives, learning benefits. 
The fruits of such research might in turn suggest new problem structuring approaches 
for the construction of such scenarios. In all cases, it is important to bear in mind 
the concerns of both MCDM and scenario planning philosophies. 
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6.4 A Final Comment 
The multicriteria decision making methodologies provide practical frameworks for the 
consideration of those difficult problems relating to the intricacies and idiosyncracies 
of human choice. The scope of the problem is such that an all-encompassing 'solution' 
is a fallacy and a diversion from the principal condition that an MCDM framework 
should remain usable by a diligent decision maker. This seems particularly important 
in the complex environments in which uncertainty is prevalent. Although several use-
ful models exist, perhaps more practically meaningful methodological developments 
might only be achieved through a persistent effort to apply MCDM to an area in 
which uncertainty is an integral and unavoidable aspect, for example portfolio se-
lection. In any decision problem, practitioners and theoreticians alike would be well 
served by the advice 'to look for precision in each class of things just as far as the 
nature of the subject admits' [91]. 
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